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 Abstract 
In this thesis, we study the causal relationship between functional distribution of income and 
economic growth. In particular, we focus on some of the aspects that might alter the effect of the 
profit share on growth. After a brief introduction and literature review, the empirical contributions 
will be presented in Chapters 3,4 and 5. 
Chapter 3 analyses the effect of a contemporaneous decrease in the wage share among countries 
that are major trade partners. Falling wage share and wage moderation are a global phenomenon 
which are hardly opposed by governments. This is because lower wages are associated with lower 
export prices and, therefore, have a positive effect on net-exports. There is, however, a fallacy of 
composition problem: not all countries can improve their balance of payments contemporaneously. 
Studying the country members of the North America Free Trade Agreement, we find that the effect 
on export of a contemporaneous decrease in the wage share in Mexico, Canada and the United 
States, is negative in all countries. In other words, the competitive advantage that each country 
gains because of a reduction in its wage share (to which is associated a decrease in export prices), 
is offset by a contemporaneous increase in competitiveness in the other two countries. Moreover, 
we find that NAFTA is overall wage-led: the profit share has a negative effect on aggregate 
demand.  
Chapter 4 tests whether it is possible that the effect of the profit share on growth is different in the 
long run and in the short run. Following Blecker (2014) our hypothesis is that in the short run the 
growth regime is less wage-led than it is in the long run. The results of our empirical investigation 
support this hypothesis, at least for the United States over the period 1950-2014. The effect of 
wages on consumption increases more than proportionally compared to the effect of profits on 
consumption from the short to the long run. Moreover, consumer debt seem to have only a short-
run effect on consumption indicating that in the long run, when debt has to be repaid, consumption 
depends more on the level of income and on how it is distributed. Regarding investment, the effect 
of capacity utilization is always larger than the effect of the profit share and that the difference 
between the two effects is higher in the long run than in the short run. This confirms the hypothesis 
that in the long run, unless there is an increase in demand, it is likely that firms are not going to 
increase investments even in the presence of high profits. In addition, the rentier share of profits – 
that comprises dividends and interest payments – has a long-run negative effect on investment. In 
the long run rentiers divert firms’ profits from investment and, therefore, it weakens the effect of 
profits on investment. 
Finally, Chapter 5 studies the possibility of structural breaks in the relationship between functional 
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distribution of income and growth. We argue that, from the 1980s, financialization and the 
European exchange rate agreements weakened the positive effect of the profit share on growth in 
Italy. The growth regime is therefore becoming less profit-led and more wage-led. Our results 
confirm this hypothesis and also shed light on the concept of cooperative and conflictual regimes 
as defined by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). 
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1 - Introduction 
Two of the main macroeconomic trends that characterised western industrial countries during 
the last decades of the past century are a substantial increase in income inequality and a decrease 
in the rate of economic growth (Smeeding 2002, Picketty and Saez 2006 and Hein 2015).  
The aim of this thesis is to study the effect of the rising trend in inequality on economic growth. 
In particular, we will study three aspects of the relationship between income distribution and 
growth that have been partly overlooked by the relevant literature. We will try to answer the 
following three sets of empirical questions: 
A. Do changes in the distribution of income in a country have any impact on other 
countries’ economic growth?  If so, is this positive or negative? 
B. Do the effects of changes in the distribution of income on a country’s economic growth 
differ over the short and long-runs?  If so, in what ways do they differ, and what is the 
source of the difference? 
C. What factors can cause a change from a ‘co-operative’ to a ‘conflictual’ growth 
regime? What is the impact of this change? 
Before we start to address the above questions it is worth noticing that, in the last century, the 
relationship between income distribution and economic growth has been one of the main themes 
of the economic debate. In fact, most books on growth theory have a chapter that tries to answer 
the following question: does growth have an effect on the distribution of income? 
Probably the most famous argument in this regard is the Kuznets hypothesis1. In 1955, the 
Nobel laureate Simon Kutznets argued that the process of economic development causes, in its 
initial phase, a rise, and later on a decrease, in income inequality. The inverted U shape of the 
evolution of inequality is said to be due to the migration of workers from traditional sectors to 
industrial ones. Indeed, when economic development begins, most of the population is employed 
in rural activities which are characterised by a low level of marginal product and thus low income 
per capita. However, during the development process more and more workers migrate to cities and 
start working in the industrial sector where the marginal product is higher than in agriculture. Thus, 
the difference between the income of the rural and urban populations increases, as does the level 
of inequality. Finally, when a country completes its industrialisation process, most of the 
                                                          
1 The Kutznets curve is more properly a relationship between output per capita and inequality rather than between 
growth and inequality.  
2 
 
population works in the industrial sector, hence, inequality decreases because most people now 
earn a higher income. 
Until the late 1990s, both theoretical and empirical studies on this topic seemed to confirm 
Kuznets’ view on the evolution of inequality. In fact, an inverted U relationship was usually found 
between levels of GDP and income inequality (Fields 2001). However, these results were obtained 
using cross section regressions that are probably not appropriate to test a relationship that evolves 
over time. When Ravaillon (1995), Deininger and Squire (1998), Schults (1998) and Angeles 
(2010) tested the same hypothesis using panel data, the findings failed to support Kuznets’ theory. 
After controlling for country-fixed effects, the inverted U relationship is no longer significant. It 
seems that previous empirical results were driven by the presence, in the samples, of Latin 
American countries. Indeed, Latin America is characterised by high levels of inequality and 
average levels of income per capita (Field 2001). Moreover, both Deininger and Squire (1998) and 
Angeles (2009), using time series regressions for each country, find that this relationship is not 
statistically significant and that many countries show a U relationship instead of an inverted U 
one. 
More recently, however, the World Bank is supporting the thesis that growth is not a 
determinant of income distribution. Dollar and Kraay (2002, 2004) provide some evidence that 
suggests that the neoliberal growth agenda does not have an effect on the distribution of income. 
Analysing panels of countries for over forty years, they found that there is a one-to-one relationship 
between the share of income of the poorer quintile of the population and the average income. 
Growth does not affect the distribution of income. These results are however often criticised even 
by supporters of free trade. Nye et al (2008) for example point out that the one-to-one relationship 
between average income and income of the poor is only an average relationship: the vast majority 
of countries in the panel deviate from the one-to-one relationship. Moreover, even if the average 
income of the poorest quintile was increasing at the same growth rate of the income of the richest 
- since the level of income of the highest quintile is higher than the level of income of the poorest 
quintile - income distribution would actually become more unequal. 
The measure of income inequality used in the studies mentioned so far describes how income 
is divided between households (or individuals). Since the “unit of analysis” of neoclassical models 
is the representative agent, it makes sense that they focus on how income is distributed among 
individuals without any distinction. This is one of the biggest methodological differences between 
the neoclassical and many of the heterodox schools. The theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
Marxist and post-Keynesian school is mostly a class analysis. That is, the focus of the analysis is 
not on the behaviour of fictitious representative agents but on the different behaviour of different 
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social classes. For this reason, even though the personal distribution of income is not entirely 
discharged, the analysis in the Marxist and pos-Keynesian tradition is focused on the functional 
distribution of income. With functional distribution of income, we refer – broadly speaking - to 
the division of income between profit and wage earners. The rationale for dividing society into 
classes is that capitalists and workers have different economic behaviours and roles. In spite of 
this distinction, an increase in functional income inequality usually corresponds to an increase in 
personal income inequality because most profit earners have a high personal income while wage 
earners are in the lower part of the income scale. 
According to the heterodox tradition, the share of wages can move either counter-cyclically and 
cyclically with respect to income. From a Marxian perspective for example, an increase in growth 
rate, which increases employment, reduces the reserve army of labour and increases the contractual 
power of workers which has a positive effect on their wage (Thirlwall 2002). On the other hand, 
according to Kalecki (1971), the distribution of income between workers and capitalists depends 
on the mark-up pricing decision of firms. The wage share is negatively related to the mark-up that 
firms charge on top of unit variable costs. The mark-up in turn is positively related to the overhead 
costs which are relatively high during a recession. Therefore, when growth is high, overhead costs 
are low, the mark up is low and the wage share is high (Hein 2015)2. We will further discuss the 
relationship between mark-up and wage share in Chapter 5. 
What has been presented so far on the effect of growth of inequality only scratches the surface 
of the vast debate that exists in literature both within and between different schools of thought. In 
the remainder of the thesis we will not discuss this issue further - except briefly in Chapter 5 – 
because, as stated at the very beginning of this introduction, our empirical analysis focuses on the 
opposite direction of causality: what is the effect of a change in the distribution of income on 
growth?  
                                                          
2 Assuming for simplicity that labour is the only variable cost, prices are set adding a mark-up to the variable costs: 
𝑃 = (1 + 𝑧)𝑊𝑎0. Where W is the money wage rate, a0 is the inverse of labour productivity (hours worked divided 
by output) and z the mark-up. Rearranging, the price equation, the share of wages is equal to 𝜓 =
𝑊𝑎0
𝑃
=
1
1+𝑧
. It is easy 
to notice the mark-up has a negative effect on the wage share. Therefore, anything that has a positive effect on the 
mark-up will have a negative effect on the wage share and vice-versa. According to Kalecki (1971), two of the main 
factors that influence – positively and negatively respectively - the mark-up are overhead costs and the bargaining 
power of labour labour. Empirically, Stockhammer (2012) finds that growth has a statistically significant negative 
effect on the adjusted wage share. He argues that this result could be justified by the fact that in the short run prices 
are probably more responsive than wages to growth: the denominator of 𝜓 rises while the numerator falls.  
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Figure 1.1 summarises the main voices of this debate which will be analysed in more depth in 
the next chapter. On the mainstream side there are two contrasting sets of arguments. The growth 
models “à la Solow” imply, indirectly, that a more unequal distribution of income is associated 
with a higher steady-state level of income per capita and that an increase in inequality will cause 
a temporary increase in the growth rate until the new steady-state level is reached. Since the end 
of the 1980s however, some new theoretical models found a negative relationship between 
inequality and growth. The main channels through which inequality influences growth are 
endogenous fiscal policy, political instability, capital market imperfection and the size of the 
domestic market. Also among the Heterodox schools there are no common views on the overall 
effect of inequality on growth. The main Marxian argument is that since investment depends on 
the profit rate, inequality is positively related to growth. On the other hand, the-Post Keynesian 
prediction on the effect of functional distribution of income on growth is not well defined. Initially 
Robinson (1962), because of the assumption of full capacity utilization, implied a negative 
relationship between wage share and growth. During the 1980s, as the assumption of full capacity 
utilization was relaxed, Kaleckian models predicted a positive relationship between wage share 
and growth. Finally, during the 1990s, most models allowed for both a positive and a negative 
effect of the wage share on distribution. 
Fig. 1.1: The debate on the effect of income distribution on growth 
 
How does income distribution affect growth?
Neoclassical  
Schools
Exogenous 
growth models
Endogenous 
growth models
Recent 
developments on 
distribution and 
growth 
Heterodox 
Schools
Marxist Post-Keynesian
Robinsonian
Kaleckian
Neo Kaleckian
(wage/profit led)
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This thesis will contribute to the debate on the effect of inequality on growth by trying to answer 
the three sets of empirical questions (A, B, C) stated at the outset of the present chapter from a neo-
Kaleckian standpoint and it is organised as follows. 
 To contextualise our contribution, the next chapter briefly survey the relevant literature as 
schematised in Figure 1.1.  
Chapter 3 delves into the set of questions A on the between-country effects of income distribution 
on economic growth. More specifically, it analyses an aspect that is particularly relevant for the 
neokaleckian literature: “What is the effect of a contemporaneous decrease in wage share among 
countries that are major trade partners?” As highlighted by the post-Keynesian/Kaleckian school, 
wages play a double role in the functioning of the economy. On the one hand, wage share has a 
positive effect on consumption because wage earners consume a larger proportion of their income 
compared to profit earners. On the other hand, wage share is negatively related to both investment 
and exports. A decrease in wage share – which corresponds to an increase in profit share – 
increases profitability and retained profits and therefore it has a positive effect on investment. 
Similarly, a decline in wage share is associated with a lower unit labour costs which makes export 
less expensive and therefore more competitive. However, decreasing labour costs are a global 
phenomenon and not all countries can improve their balance of payments at the same time. This 
chapter studies the effect on aggregate demand and trade of a contemporaneous decrease in wage 
share of income in the members of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Testing the effect 
of a contemporaneous change in the distribution of income in NAFTA is realistic because, in spite 
of a stable rise in real income per capita, the real hourly wage in the manufacturing industry 
remained steady, or decreased, since the late seventies in the United States, Mexico and Canada. 
Consequently, the wage share - that is the portion of total income received by wage earners - 
decreased as well. Specifically, the adjusted wage share3 was constant in the US and Canada from 
1960 to 1970 and then it decreased by about 10% until 2007. In Mexico instead, apart from the 
initial increase, the wage share fell by 30% from 1970 to 2007. Our results show that the effect on 
export following a contemporaneous decrease in wage share is negative in all countries. In other 
words, the competitive advantage that each country gains because of a reduction in its wage share 
(to which is associated a decrease in export prices), is offset by a contemporaneous increase in 
competitiveness in the other two countries. Moreover, we find that even though an increase in 
profit share has an overall positive effect in Mexico and Canada and a negative effect only in the 
United States, NAFTA is overall wage-led: profit share has a negative effect on aggregate demand. 
                                                          
3 Adjusted wage share is the wage share augmented by the share of income earned by the self-employed. 
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This is because the negative effect of the profit share in the United States is larger than the sum of 
its positive effects in Mexico and Canada. The three countries, therefore, could all benefit from a 
- coordinated - redistributive policy in favour of wages. 
In Chapter 4, we study the set of questions B on the different effects of income distribution on 
growth in the short run and in the long run. Using a neo-Kaleckian terminology this set of questions 
can be re-stated as: “does the growth regime change over the long run compared to the short run?” 
Blecker (2014) suggests that it is possible that in the short run the growth regime is less wage-led 
than in the long run. That is, growth tends to be more positively related to wage share in the long 
run rather than in the short run. Briefly, he argues that this could be the case because the 
components of aggregate demand should respond more positively to wages in the long run rather 
than in the short run. Firstly, consumption is, in the short run, a function of both income and debt. 
In the long run however, debt must be repaid and therefore income and its distribution should 
become the main determinants of consumption. Regarding investment, while in the short run 
profitability is important for firms, in the long run it is likely that they are not going to invest more 
unless there is an increase in demand. Finally, net exports are more likely to be positively affected 
by low labour costs in the short run than in the long run because of automatic adjustments that 
might come into play such as a currency appreciation. The results of our analysis of internal 
demand support Blecker’s hypothesis. In the United States, an increase in the wage share has a 
larger positive effect on consumption in the long run than in the short run while debt has only a 
short run effect. At the same time, investment depends less on profit in the long run compared to 
the short run: not only the effect of capacity utilisation is always larger than that of profits in the 
long run but the effect of the rentier share of profits has a long run negative effect on investment. 
Chapter 5 is the final empirical chapter and will study the last set of questions (C). In particular, 
we will test two of the main intuitions of the Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) model, which is the 
theoretical framework for most of the empirical work on the effect of functional income 
distribution on growth. Specifically, we will study the possibility of a switch in the growth regime 
(caused by a structural break) and underline the distinction between cooperative and conflictual 
regimes. On the one hand, in literature the effect of functional income distribution on growth is 
mostly estimated as linear in the second part of the twentieth century. Instead, we make the case 
that this effect of distribution on growth might vary because it depends on variables that can very 
well change magnitude over time, even within the same country. On the other hand, the distinction 
between cooperative and conflictual growth regimes has been substantially overlooked by 
empirical research. According to Bhaduri and Marglin, a wage-led cooperative regime is one in 
which an increase in wage share stimulates enough growth to allow for an increase in total profits, 
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in spite of a decrease in profit share. On the other hand, a profit-led regime is cooperative if the 
increase in profit share causes an increase in growth that is large enough to cause, in spite of a 
decrease in wage share, an increase in the wage bill – through higher employment for example. 
Symmetrically, a conflictual regime is one in which an increase in profit (wage) share does not 
stimulate the economy enough to allow the total level of wages (profits) to grow. For the empirical 
analysis we use Italy as a case study. In this country, the growth rate of the wage bill was similar 
to the growth rate of the level of profits during the 1960s and the 1970s but from the 1980s while 
the former started to decrease sharply the latter remained high. This indicates that the regime was 
initially cooperative and that it became conflictual from the 1980s. Our hypothesis is that the 
demand regime in Italy was initially cooperative and profit-led. From the 1980s, however, the 
combination of increasing financialization and reduced net exports due to the European trade 
agreements weakened the effect of profits on investments and net exports. As the positive effect 
of profit share on aggregate demand became weaker, the increase in profit share that happened 
from the 1980s did not manage to stimulate enough growth to allow for an increase in the wage 
bill together with the level of profits: the profit-led regime became conflictual. The results of our 
analysis confirm our hypostasis and the intuitions of the Bhaduri and Marglin’s model regarding 
the possibility that the nature of growth regimes might change over time. As the growth regime in 
Italy is becoming wage-led, the economic policy should adjust accordingly. If Italy keeps 
implementing policies of wage moderation the growth rate will remain low, as it has been the case 
since the early 2000s. 
The limitation and the policy implication of our work will be discussed in chapter 6 which 
concludes the thesis. 
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2 - The debate on the effect of distribution on economic growth 
Even though the empirical analysis of the following three chapters is based on a Post-Keynesian 
and specifically neo-Kaleckian framework, in this chapter we discuss both mainstream and 
heterodox theories on distribution and growth. The aim is not only to contextualise and pinpoint 
our contribution to the literature, but also to highlight how different schools of thought might reach 
similar policy conclusion. I think this chapter will show that there is some room for collaboration 
in terms of policy conclusions in so far as a more equal distribution of income is concerned. In this 
attempt to explain different arguments, I propose a division into school of thoughts that is 
somewhat arbitrary. The label given to each argument is however secondary to my purpose of 
explaining the main intuition of each approach. 
Starting with our “guests”, we first discuss the mainstream side of the debate.  
2.1 Neoclassical models of growth 
2.1.1 The Solow model 
The first generation of Neoclassical growth models - à la Solow (1956) - are characterised by 
three main assumptions: the growth rate of population and technological progress are exogenous, 
investment is determined by savings as a fixed portion of output (I = S = sY) and the production 
function has constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to capital and labour (Thirlwall 
2002). Following Neil (2009), the production function is a Cobb-Douglas 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼  (𝐿)1−𝛼                                                                        (1) 
Where Y is output, K is capital, A is the level of technology, L is the labour force, α is the 
elasticity of output respect to capital and 1- α is the elasticity of output respect to labour4. To obtain 
the production function per worker, (1) is divided by L 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘𝛼                                                                                (2) 
Where 𝑦 =  
𝑌
𝐿
 and 𝑘 =
𝐾
𝐿
.  
Intuitively, the growth of capital per workers is equal to investment minus depreciation d and 
the growth rate of the labour force n 
∆𝑘 = 𝑠𝑦 − ( 𝑛 + 𝑑)𝑘                                                                    (3) 
                                                          
4 Since in neoclassical economics the remuneration of factor of production is equal to their marginal product, α and 
1- α are also the capital and labour share of income, respectively.  
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The equilibrium level of y* – the steady state level – is where ∆𝑘 = 0  and therefore the growth 
rate of income per worker is zero  
𝑠𝐴𝑘𝛼 = ( 𝑛 + 𝑑)𝑘                                                                      (4) 
Fig. 2.2: The Solow diagram: steady state 
 
Solving equation (4) we obtain the steady state level of capital per worker 
𝑘∗ = (
𝑠𝐴
𝑛 + 𝑑
)
1
1−𝛼
                                                                      (5) 
Substituting (5) into (2) we obtain the steady state level of output per equivalent worker 
𝑦∗ = 𝐴
1
1−𝛼  (
𝑠
𝑛 + 𝑑
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
                                                                (6) 
At a given steady state, the growth rate of the economy is equal to the growth rate of the labour 
force so that the availability of capital per worker remains constant(∆𝑘 = 0). When an economy 
is at its steady state, only the growth rate of A – which is exogenous – can have a positive, lasting 
effect, on the growth rate of income per worker. A one-off increase in the saving rate, for example, 
would cause an increase in the steady state level of income per capita but it would stimulate only 
the growth necessary to reach this new steady state. This would correspond to an upward rotation 
of the investment curve in Figure 2.2. As we can see from equation (6) the Solow model does not 
directly include the distribution of income as a determinant of the equilibrium level of output per 
worker and of the growth rate of the overall economy. However, if we accept that the propensity 
to save increases with income, higher inequality will translate into higher saving rate because rich 
people will earn a larger fraction of income. Therefore, within this framework, higher inequality 
sy 
k* k 
y 
(n + d)k 
y y* 
Consumption 
sy* 
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will determine a higher level of income per capita and therefore the economy will temporary grow 
at a higher rate until the new steady state is reached. 
Since the 1980s many growth models tried to extend the Solow model. The main reason was 
that the Solow model implies that sustained income per capita growth can only be achieved though 
technological progress which is exogenous. Without technological progress, per capita income 
should stabilise around its steady state level. However, the sustained increase in per capita income 
over that period stimulated a lot of research that tried to explain and endogenise the rate of what 
they thought to be the engine of growth: technological progress. 
2.1.2 Endogenous growth models 
The AK model is an endogenous growth model which does not endogenise technological 
progress but rather the growth rate. In particular, as explained below, unlike the Solow model, 
there is no need to assume that technology is growing at an exogenous rate in order to justify 
sustained per capita growth.  
Let us assume for simplicity that there is no population growth and therefore there is no 
distinction between the evolution of per capita and overall output. The production function is 
similar to the Cobb Douglass function used in the Solow model with the difference capital does 
not have diminishing marginal return5. Moreover, A is the level of technology that is constant over 
time.  
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾                                                                                (7) 
As in the Solow model, capital accumulation is equal to investment minus depreciation 
∆𝐾 = 𝑠𝑌 − 𝑑𝐾                                                                         (8) 
Figure 2.3 shows the implications of this new production function with constant return to 
capital. If investment is higher than the depreciation of capital  (𝑠𝑌 > 𝑑𝐾),  both the level of 
income per capita and the overall output will keep growing indefinitely. This result is due to the 
assumption of constant return to capital which make the production function a straight line. In fact, 
the marginal product of capital A, is constant and does not decrease when the total stock of capital 
increases. Consequently, if productivity of capital does not decrease with capital accumulation, 
output can grow indefinitely.  
Fig. 2.3: The AK model 
                                                          
5 In equation (1), diminishing marginal returns of capital were caused by α < 1. In equation (7), there are constant 
return to capital as it is assumed that α = 1. 
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This can be seen by dividing both sides of the equation (8) by the level of capital 
𝐾
𝐾
̇
= 𝑠
𝑌
𝐾
− 𝑑 = 𝑠𝐴 − 𝑑                                                                  (9) 
Note that from the production function we know that 𝐴 =
𝑌
𝐾
. Moreover, by taking logs and 
difference (respect to time) of the production equation, we have that 
𝑌
𝑌
̇
=
𝐾
𝐾
̇
= 𝑠𝐴 − 𝑑                                                                     (10) 
As we can see from equation (9), an increase in the saving rate has an effect not on the 
equilibrium level of output per worker as in the Solow model but on growth itself. Therefore, 
higher inequality, associated with larger propensity to save, will cause a long run increase in 
growth. Similarly, everything else being equal, a country with a more equal distribution of income 
will have a lower growth rate compared to a country with higher income inequality. 
However, not all models of endogenous growth reach the same conclusions regarding the role 
of the saving rate. Romer (1986), for example, improves the Solow model by endogensing what 
according to Solow is the engine of growth: sustained technological progress. He does so by 
expressing the rate of new discoveries as a function of the population employed in research and 
development. The conclusion of the model is that technological progress depends ultimately on 
population growth. In this case, the saving rate has the same role as in the Solow model and 
therefore it has no effect on growth even though it has a positive effect on the level of investment 
per capita. In another famous model, Lucas (1988) endogenises the rate of human capital 
accumulation rather than technological progress. He divides the time available to each worker into 
time spent working and time spent accumulating skills and specifies human capita per person as a 
dK 
sY 
K 
Y 
K0 
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positive function of time spent accumulating skills. As a result, a policy that redistributes workers 
time towards skills accumulating activities produces a permanent increase in workers’ 
productivity. The effect of an increase in the saving rate remains similar to that of the Solow model. 
2.1.3 Evidence of conditional convergence 
To test the validity of the Neoclassical models we should look at how the data fit their main 
prediction: conditional convergence. If two countries have the same steady state level of income 
per worker, the poorer country will converge towards the steady state at a faster rate than a rich 
country. This is because, everything else being equal, a country with lower income per worker 
must have a lower level of capital per worker. Therefore, given the assumption of decreasing 
marginal product of capital, the capital of a country with less capital per person should be more 
productive than the capital of a country in which the capital stock per person is higher. 
Let us consider the following cross-country model  
𝑦
𝑦
̇
= 𝛽1𝑦0 + 𝛽2𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑛 + 𝛽4ℎ + 𝛽5𝐴 + 𝛽6𝑋 
Where 
𝑦
𝑦
̇
 is the growth rate of income per capita, 𝑦0is the income per capita at the beginning of 
the period under examination, 𝑠 =
𝐼
𝑌
 is the propensity to save or the investment rate, 𝑛 is population 
growth, ℎ is a measure of human capital, 𝐴 is a measure of the technological level and 𝑋 is a set 
of control variables. There is evidence of Conditional convergence is 𝛽1 < 0, that is, a low level 
of initial income per capita is, other things being equal, associated with higher growth of per capita 
income during the subsequent period. Moreover, a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
of variables such as education and R&D would support the thesis of the new endogenous growth 
model that try to explain differences across countries thorough different level of technology and 
productivity of human and physical capital. Initial empirical studies seem to find consistent proof 
of conditional convergence. Two of the earliest and most influential studies in this area are the 
ones of Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992; henceforth, MRW).  
Barrow (1991), using a cross-country dataset of 98 countries, finds robust evidence of 
conditional convergence between 1960 and 1985. After controlling for primary and secondary 
school enrolment rates, the investment ratio, the fertility rate, the ratio of public expenditures on 
total income and regional dummies for Latin America and Africa, the initial level of income per 
capita is negatively correlated with per capita growth. Moreover, while education and the 
investment ratio are positively correlated with growth, fertility and government expenditures as a 
share of income have a negative effect on growth. 
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Similar results are found by MRW (1992). Like Barro (1991), they also analyse a sample of 98 
countries from 1960 to 1985 but in addition, they repeat the analysis for three subsamples: non-oil 
countries, OECD and countries with intermediate level of income per capita. The initial level of 
income per capita has a negative effect on the average growth between 1960 and 1985, once the 
other determinants of the steady state are kept constant. In particular, the investment ratio and 
school enrolment are positively related with per capita growth while the sum of population growth 
and depreciation has a negative effect on growth. These results are robust in all the subsamples. 
Further evidence for conditional convergence comes from the works of Barro and Wha Lee 
(1993), Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1993), Levine and Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos 
(1993). The main limitation of this studies is that their results could be biased because the initial 
level of efficiency and technology are not the same across countries. Most researchers tried to 
solve this problem using panel data rather than cross sectional datasets. Panel data analysis in fact 
allows to control for time invariant country specific factors as it could be the starting level of 
technology. For example, Islam (1995), using panel data comprising the same sample of countries 
as MRW, finds a faster speed of conditional convergence and a larger output elasticity of capital 
respect to MRW. Similarly, using different datasets, Caselli et al. (1996) and McQuinn and Whelan 
(2007) estimate rates of conditional convergence to the steady state level of output per capita of 
10% and 6-7% which are substantially higher compared to the rate estimated by MRW (2%).  
An aspect of disagreement among neoclassical studies concerns the relative weight of 
technological progress and physical capital accumulation in determining the growth rate. In 
particular, new endogenous growth models were developed because it seemed that difference in 
physical and human capital per person were not able to explain why growth rates of income per 
capita are so different across countries. In this regard, MRW find that their estimate of the Solow 
model augmented by a measure of education, can explain about 80% of the difference in growth 
rates between countries. Similarly, Alwyn Young (1994, 1995) argues that the exceptional growth 
of the “four Asian tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) was driven more by 
physical capital and labour rather than high productivity growth. On the other hand, most studies 
that use growth accounting techniques find total factor productivity to have a major role in 
explaining growth6. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) find that human capital contributed less 
to growth per capita compared to what estimated by MRW. They argue that when primary school 
enrolment is included in the estimations together with secondary school enrolment, the explanatory 
power of human capital decreases. This is because since primary schooling is more homogeneous 
                                                          
6 In growth accounting, total factor productivity is calculated as a residual. Precisely, it is equal to the growth rate of 
per capita income minus the contribution (to growth) of capital, labour and other possible factors of production.  
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across countries, the measure of education becomes less able to explain large differences in income 
per capita. Regarding productivity, they find that total factor productivity is accountable for at 
least 50% of the differences in income per worker across countries in 1985. In addition, the 
difference across growth rates seem to be explained mainly (up to 91%) by difference in total 
factor productivity growth. Similarly, Hall and Jones (1999) report that productivity plays a major 
role in determining cross-country differences in income.  For example, according to their analysis, 
while differences in total factor productivity contributed a factor of 7.7 to the difference in income 
per worker between the United States and Nigeria, capital accumulation and education (schooling) 
contribute factors of 1.5 and 3.1 respectively. Furthermore, they argue that the underlining cause 
of differences in the three factors mentioned above is to be found in differences in social 
infrastructures. In fact, they find that capital accumulation, education and total factor productivity 
are positive functions of their measure of social infrastructure. This measure is an index composed 
of measures of protection of private property, risk of government expropriations and oneness to 
international trade. 
Finally, it is important to point out that even though the evidence of a negative correlation 
between initial level of income and subsequent growth seem to be robust, there is a different 
explanation for this result other than the neoclassical story of conditional convergence. According 
to the theory of “catch-up”, poor countries will growth faster than rich countries because of 
technological transfers. When a country has a level of technology embodied in its capital stock 
that is below that of the country that is the technological leader (at that moment), productivity 
growth will be faster in the  former than in the latter.  This is because reproducing existing foreign 
technology it is easier than innovate (Veblen 1915). As Abramovitz (1986) points out industrial 
latecomers, provided that they have adequate “social capabilities” necessary to be able to absorb 
foreign technology, will have higher rate of productivity growth compared to the technological 
leaders. This will translate in higher rate of income growth7.  
2.2 Neoclassical models of distribution and growth 
Starting from the end of the 1980s, within the Neoclassical school of thought there has been an 
outpouring of models that, unlike those described above, focused specifically on the relationship 
between income distribution and growth. This literature, identified four main channels through 
which income inequality affects economic growth: endogenous fiscal policies, political instability, 
constraint in physical and human capital accumulation and market size constraints.  
                                                          
7 An in-depth review of the catch up theory is beyond the scope of this literature review as it is not related to the 
relationship between distribution of income and growth. Other studies on the subject are Gomulka, 1971 and 1990; 
Dowrick and Gemmell, 1991 and Amable, 1993.   
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2.2.1 Endogenous Fiscal Policy  
In the models proposed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) income 
inequality has an effect on future investment through redistributive policies. Their argument is 
based on Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) median voter hypothesis. In democratic countries, where 
decisions are taken using majority rule, the vote of the median voter is the decisive one. There are 
three important assumptions behind this hypothesis. Firstly, each individual votes in favour of the 
option which maximises his/her income. Secondly, taxes are proportional to the level of income 
of each individual. Thirdly, a lump-sum method is used to redistribute the income collected by 
taxes. Therefore, the amount of tax paid by each individual is a positive function of their income, 
while the amount of income redistributed is equal for everyone (Perotti 1996). It follows that, if a 
country is characterised by high inequality, the median voter has an income which is below the 
average income and consequently he/she will vote in favour of higher taxes and more 
redistribution. In other words, income inequality is a determinant of the tax rate: the higher is the 
distance between the income of the median voter and the average income, the higher is the tax 
rate. (Meltzer and Richard 1981). The tax rate, on the other hand, has a negative effect on 
investment since it decreases the net profits. An initial high level of inequality, then, will determine 
a high level of taxation which in turn will discourage investment and will ultimately reduce the 
pace of economic growth.  
This approach, however, is not supported by empirical evidence.  Even though Alesina and 
Rodrick (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) find a negative correlation between the initial 
level of inequality and growth, their results do not particularly support the transmission channel 
proposed in their models. Moreover, Perotti (1994) finds that there is no correlation between initial 
income distribution and fiscal variables in democratic countrires. Indeed, even if four out of six 
measures of fiscal activity have the coefficient that is in line with the theory, only one is 
statistically different from zero (Perotti 1996). Finally, Deininger and Squire (1998) not only find 
that the initial level of inequality does not influence future economic growth in democratic 
countries, but they discover that inequality is correlated to future growth in  undemocratic counties. 
This suggests that the link between inequality and investment cannot be explained by the argument  
that democratic voting results in a higher tax rate which in turn have a negative effect on 
investment.  
Saint Paul and Verdier (1996) highlight a few objections that try to explain why empirical 
results were unsupportive of this mechanism. On the one hand, the median voter hypothesis might 
not be valid for two reasons. First, not all voters have the same weight because the rich part of the 
population tends to be more involved in politics than poor one. Second, the distance between the 
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median voter’s income and the mean income is a suitable determinant of direct taxation only if the 
assumptions of a non-progressive tax rate and a lump-sum method of redistribution hold. On the 
other hand, these models might have been unsuccessful because a reduction of income inequality 
can be good for investments for four main reasons. First, if taxes are used to pay education then 
the effect on economic growth might very well be positive since the level of human capital 
increases. The remaining three objections of a negative relationship between redistribution and 
investment will be described in the next three sections. 
2.2.2 Political Instability, Crime and Violence  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) propose this second mechanism which links inequality and 
investment through the channels of political instability, crime and violence. In their model, 
inequality, in non-democratic societies, causes political instability, changes of regime and violence 
while, in consolidated democracies - as previously analyzed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) - the 
effect of inequality is high redistribution of income. Their argument is based on the assumption 
that in democratic societies the poor have more political power than in undemocratic countries and 
thus they manage to make the rich pay high taxes (or at least higher taxes compared to 
undemocratic countries). Consequently, poor people in non-democratic societies tend to be pro-
democracy while the elite who are ruling the country tend to be against democracy since they 
would have to pay more taxes in a democratic system. When inequality increases too much, the 
elite might begin to concede some temporary redistribution in order to avoid threats of revolution 
or social unrest. However, if social unrest does not stop, the government will have to accept a 
higher degree of democracy and thus a higher level of redistribution of wealth. Nevertheless, this 
situation is far from being stable. Since democracy is more expensive for the elites, they will likely 
try to mount a coup in order to restore their political power. In this way, high inequality causes to 
a non-consolidated democracy to oscillate between non-democratic and democratic regimes, 
resulting in political instability. The political instability, in turn, will result in fiscal uncertainty 
because the amount of redistribution varies with the social group in power. Moreover, if the elites 
in power use repressive methods to suppress social unrest and prevent a democratization of the 
country, higher inequality would be positively related to the level of violence.  
Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1994, 1996) argue that political instability and violence 
are negatively related to investment. Firstly, they both create uncertainty with regard to fiscal 
policies and the protection of property rights. Secondly, they can cause disruption of productive 
activities. Moreover, these authors point out that excessive inequality might drive the poorer parts 
of society to take on rent-seeking activities through illicit or violent acts. This would have a further 
negative effect on investment. 
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To sum up, the hypothesis of this approach is that an increase in inequality will raise political 
instability, crime and violence, especially in non-democratice countries. This in turn, will reduce 
the incentives to invest there. Therefore, Saint Paul and Verdier (1996) suggest that a redistributive 
policy could stimulate investment by reducing social unrest and crime.  
The empirical evidence partially supports the validity of this channel between income 
distribution and capital accumulation. In particular, Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1994, 
1996) find that a large middle class is positively related to political stability and that political 
instability has a negative effect on investment. However, Keefer and Knack (2002) argue that the 
results of these works depend on the particular index of political violence used and on the lack of 
reliable data. Indeed, when they repeat the analysis using high quality data from the Deninger and 
Squire inequality dataset, they do not find a statistically significant effect of inequality on violence. 
 2.2.3 Capital Market Imperfections  
Benabou (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1992 and 1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor 
and Zeira (1993) and Piketty (1997) proposed different models which have in common the fact 
that, in the presence of capital market imperfections, inequality reduces access to credit among the 
very poor and thus prevents certain investment projects from taking place. This channel between 
inequality and investment is based on the presence of credit rationing that is caused by imperfect 
information between two economic agents (Acocella 2008). In particular, imperfect information 
might cause moral hazard and repayment enforcement problems. When poor people want to invest, 
they need to borrow more money from the bank compared to someone wealthy. Consequently, 
they will have to share a higher part of the investment return with the lender. For this reason, poor 
borrowers might decrease the level of effort that they exert in order to succeed in their investment 
because the incentives (namely the profits) are low (Aghion and Bolton 1992). The second 
problem, instead, is related to the repayment of the loan once the project is successful. In this case, 
particularly with big loans, there is the risk that the borrowers would hide the returns of their 
investment in order to avoid the enforcement of their contract with the lender (Ehrhert 2009). For 
both these reasons, a bank (or another lender) could decide to lend only against collateral or decide 
to set a higher interest rate. A high interest rate however, would incresae the problem of adverse 
selection as only risky projects with very high returns would be able to repay the high rate 
(Acocella 2008).  
In line with this, Benabou (1996) notes that in the presence of capital market imperfections, 
loans for investments with high returns requested by poor people will be denied in favour of loans 
for projects with possibly even lower returns but requested by wealthy people. This reduces 
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economic growth by excluding good projects. Moreover, Aghion and Bolton (1997) highlight that 
redistribution would raise production efficiency. If poor borrowers have to ask for less credit, they 
have a greater incentive to succeed in their projects since they can retain a higher part of their 
investments’ returns.  
Finally, just like investments in physical capital, investments in human capital can also be 
negatively affected by the presence of capital market imperfections. According to Galor and Zeira 
(1993) in the presence of credit rationing and indivisibility of investments, poor individuals who 
cannot use personal wealth as collateral, or get credit against future income, will not have the 
possibility of investing in their education. Hence, income inequality has a negative effect on 
growth since it prevents, in the presence of this kind of market imperfections, an increase in the 
level of human capital. Moreover, because of the lack of investment in education, more unequal 
societies will have more unskilled than skilled labour and thus the wage differential between the 
two will be higher.  
Empirical evidence seems to support this channel between income distribution and investment 
in both physical and human capital. Perotti (1994) finds that the income of the first two quintiles 
is positively correlated with the level of capital investment and that, for a given level of inequality, 
increasing market imperfections have a negative effect on investment. However, using an 
interaction term between a measure of market imperfection and the income of the two bottom 
quintiles, Perotti finds that the importance of this channel decreases if the capital market becomes 
less imperfect. The same author, two years later (Perotti 1996), tests the effect of inequality on 
human capital investment in the presence of capital market imperfections and the results seem to 
confirm a negative correlation between the two variables. The main criticism to his work is related 
to the fact that the measure of market imperfection used is not precise since only developed 
countries have data on credit rationing. At the same time, these countries have fewer capital market 
imperfections when compared to developing countries (Ehrhart 2009). To conclude, Deininger and 
Squire (1998) find that the level of land inequality at the beginning of the sample is negatively 
correlated to average economic growth and that this effect is both larger and more statistically 
significant than the one between income inequality and growth. Since the distribution of land is a 
considered to be a better proxy for the distribution of wealth, this finding support the hypothesis 
that a more equal distribution of wealth would allow more people to invest and this would enhance 
economic growth.  
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2.2.4 A Long Run Unified Theory  
The unified theory proposed by Galor and Moav (2004) suggests that the effect of inequality 
on economic growth depends on the stages of development. This unified theory, has the merit to 
bring together two important streams of economic thought and to highlight a non-linear 
relationship between inequality and economic growth that may explain the heterogeneous 
empirical results that have been found in the literature. Most of the studies mentioned above, 
indeed, tried to find a linear effect of inequality on growth.  
Galor and Moav (2004), underline that the very first step in order to start the industrialization 
process is to accumulate capital. Thus, since rich people save a higher percentage of their income, 
they are able to carry out large investments in physical capital. Higher inequality hence might have 
a positive effect on capital accumulation and growth at the beginning of the industrialization 
process. In later stages of development, however, when human capital accumulation becomes the 
engine of growth because of the capital-skills complementarities, inequality is harmful for growth. 
As discussed above, high inequality makes impossible for the poor to invest in education. 
Moreover, when wages become sufficiently high, more and more people will be able to afford 
expenses in education for their family. Consequently, The effect of inequality on growth through 
this channel will decrease. 
The different effects that inequality might have on investments and economic growth, in 
different stages of development and industrialization (through the mechanisms presented above), 
might be an explanation for the mixed evidences that we have discussed in the previous sections. 
2.2.5 Market Size and Domestic Demand  
As we discussed above, an increase in income inequality usually causes the propensity to save 
to increase because rich people tend to save more than poor people. When a large part of income 
is in the hands of a few rich people, the economy will have a higher propensity to save and a lower 
propensity to consume compared to a situation characterised by a more equal distribution of 
income. While the Solow model predicts that this has a positive effect on income, here we present 
the studies that argue that the opposite is true. High income inequality, associated with a lower 
propensity to consume, reduces the domestic market and creates a lack of internal demand which 
could have negative effects on growth. In the following sections, we describe three of the main 
arguments that have theorised a negative effect of smaller markets on growth. 
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2.2.5.1 Division of Labour and Demand Constraint 
The first economist who pointed out the relevance of a big market in the development process 
was Adam Smith (1776) in “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”. 
One of his main arguments was that, thanks to the division of labour, industry is characterised by 
increasing returns. The division of labour, indeed, raises labour productivity through three 
mechanisms. First, it allows the worker to specialize in a small and simple activity (learning by 
doing process); secondly, it facilitates the invention of a great number of machines; and finally, it 
makes it possible to save time in moving from one work to another. Hence, through the division 
of labour, labour productivity (and thus, in a fair world, income per worker) increases when the 
amount of output produced increases. However, this mechanism might not work if there is a 
demand constraint. Smith, indeed, pointed out that it is not cost-effective to build machines in 
order to produce only a few products. Thus, the expansion of the industrial sector (and the amount 
of investment) will depend also on the extent of the market.  
In addition, Young (1928) underlines the relevance of external economies of scale: the 
interaction of different industries can increase productivity. For example, let us assume that a new 
technology reduces the cost of producing iron. All the industries that use iron in their production 
process can now lower their prices and increase production (because the quantity demanded should 
increase). Finally, the iron industry will also benefit from price reductions in other industries. It is 
evident that, even in this case, a constraint on the demand side would prevent the exploitation of 
this type of economy of scale.  
We now discuss two of the possible solutions to the problem of scarcity of demand that have 
been proposed by other classical economists. Rosenstain Rodan (1943) suggests that, in order to 
solve the problem of a small market size in a developing country, the surplus of labour from 
agriculture should be relocated into those industries that produce the bulk of goods consumed by 
the working class. In this way, the relocated workers would create the necessary demand for the 
goods produced by the industries in which they work and relax possible demand constraints. 
Kaldor, instead, suggests that to avoid demand constraints an economy should look at international 
markets and specialize in products that have a high income elasticity of demand. Indeed, increasing 
exports not only would increase the level of aggregate demand, but it would also have the 
advantage of allowing a country to import more without the problem of incurring a deficit in the 
balance of payments (Thirlwall 2002). This is particularly important for developing countries that 
do not yet produce capital goods. 
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2.2.5.2. Neoclassical models 
Murphy et al. (1989) and Mani (2001) elaborate two models that try to explain how income 
distribution affects growth through the size of the market. 
In their model, Murphy, Sleifer and Vishny (1989) formalized the theory of the big push 
proposed by (among others) Rsenstein-Rodan (1943) and Nurske (1968). Their main argument is 
that in order for increasing return technologies to become profitable, the level of demand must be 
high enough. The first step to increase demand at the beginning of the development process is to 
increase the national income. This can happen thanks to and increase in productivity inside the 
agricultural sector or an exogenous export boom. Once the level of income is increased, it must be 
distributed in such a way that enhances the demand for manufactured goods. In this model, there 
are three “classes” of individuals. Poor individuals who consume mainly food, rich individuals 
who consume mainly imported luxuries rather than goods produced by local firms, and the middle 
class that consumes local manufactured goods. Hence, especially in developing countries, 
redistribution from the richest towards the middle class will foster investments, through a bigger 
domestic market which makes profitable the use of modern technologies that are efficient only on 
a large scale. To conclude, it is necessary to underline that one fundamental assumption of this 
model is that trade with other countries is costly and difficult. If international trade was costless, 
domestic demand would have a minor role since the Country could rely on foreign demand.  
Mani (2001) proposes a second model on the role of market size in which focuses on the 
interaction between domestic demand and human capital accumulation. Contrary to Murphy et al. 
(1989), in this model there is more than one kind of manufactured goods. Indeed, now it is possible 
to consume essential goods, simple manufactured goods and sophisticated goods which are 
produced by workers with different degrees of skills. Unskilled, medium-skilled and high skilled 
workers produce respectively essential, simple manufactured and sophisticated goods. As in the 
previous model, the composition of consumption changes with the level of income of each 
individual. The rich consume expensive goods; the middle class consumes simple manufactured 
goods; while poor people buy essential goods. In addition, this model considers the problem of 
capital market imperfections and assumes the indivisibility of investment in education. As 
suggested by Galor and Zeira (1993), the level of education of each individual depends on the 
income of the parents since it is difficult to secure loans without any collateral. If income is 
extremely unevenly distributed, people would either be too poor to buy manufactured goods or 
rich enough to buy sophisticated goods. This means that the demand for medium–skilled labour 
decreases and consequently the wages for this category will decrease as well. Accordingly, 
medium-skilled workers will not be able to invest in human capital for their children who, in turn, 
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they will never become skilled workers. On the other hand, low inequality would imply the 
formation of a large middle class which consumes manufactured goods and would increase the 
demand for medium skilled worker and hence their wages. In this case, parents would be able to 
invest more in the education of their children and the general level of human capital in the country 
would rise. According to this model, redistribution might increase investment in both physical and 
human capital through an increase in the income of the middle class.  
These two theoretical models have not received much attention from the empirical literature. 
Keefer and Knack (2002) tested the big push hypothesis that is incorporated in the model proposed 
by Murphy et al (1989). They found that although domestic demand plays a more important role 
in relatively closed economies than in more open ones, the difference between the two coefficients 
is small and not significantly different from zero. Moreover, their results suggest that income 
inequality has a larger negative effect on growth in those countries in which the market size is 
small compared to the countries with a large domestic market. However, in this case as well, the 
difference between the two effects is not significant. 
2.2.5.3 The Role of Market Size in the Theory of Foreign Direct Investments  
Another important point of view about the role of the size of a country market comes from 
studies that analyze the behaviour of foreign direct investment (FDI). Market size is considered to 
be one of the main determinants of horizontal FDI. The theory distinguishes between horizontal 
and vertical foreign direct investment, the former are those foreign investment which take place 
when the main objective of an enterprise is to sell in a new country while avoiding trade costs and 
barriers, whereas the latter is characterized by an attempt of multinational enterprises to reduce 
costs of production.  
In the first case, according to the Proximity-Concentration theory, a firm decides to replicate 
its production plants in a foreign country in order to serve the local market, only if the cost of 
opening new plants is lower than the trade costs that the firm would face in selling its goods in that 
same country through exports (Brainard 1997). Hence, if tariffs and transport costs are high, the 
firm might prefer to open an affiliate abroad. Moreover, two additional reasons to produce in the 
same country where the firm wants to sell its products is that, in this way, it is easier to shape the 
product based on the preferences of the local population and to respond better to changes in local 
market conditions. On the other hand, if a firm is characterized by high economies of scale at plant 
level, splitting the production over more than one site would be more expensive and the firm will 
not open a new plant in another country. Consequently, the larger the size of the foreign market, 
the greater the probability that the firm would manage to cover the costs of opening a new plant.  
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The size of the market is determined principally by the average income and total population 
but, as discussed above, also the distribution income plays a role. The empirical results on 
determinants of foreign direct investment confirm that market size has a fundamental positive role 
in the decision on whether to produce (and hence invest) or to export in a certain country. Kravis 
and Lipsey (1982) and Wheeler and Mody (1992) found a positive and significant effect of market 
size on investment by American firms in other countries. Similarly, Yeaple (2003) found that 
foreign investment rises by 1.79% when the market size of the host country increases by 1%. 
Moreover, and unexpectedly, the size of the market seems also to be important in the case of 
vertical foreign investments. Finally, the results from Azemar and Desbourdes (2009), in a study 
on the main determinants of FDI, show that market size is an important factor considered by 
multinational firms when they have to decide where to produce.  
To conclude this section, it is important to highlight that FDI might have a negative (crowding 
out) effect on national investment. However, according to Agosin and Mayer (2000), this effect of 
FDI on domestic investment varies from region to region. For example, they found that in Latin 
America FDI tends to substitute for the activity of local firms while in Asia the effect is the 
opposite.  
2.3 Marxist growth theory 
Before turning to the post Keynesian approach to growth and distribution we briefly analyse 
the main characteristics of Marxist theory of growth. In spite of Neoclassical and Marxist being 
virtually at the opposite end of the scale of the schools of thought in economics, they have 
surprisingly similar conclusion about the growth process.  
Two of the most striking differences between the Marxist and the Neoclassical school are the 
class analysis as opposed to the methodological individualism of the neoclassical school and the 
presence of unemployment in the economy. Marxist theory focuses on the dynamics between the 
capitalist and workers class. The real wage rate and consequently the distribution of income 
depend on the struggle between these two classes and the level of the “reserve army”: the highest 
is the unemployment rate, the weaker is the bargaining powers of workers. Assuming that firms 
have no access to external financing and there are no “realisation” problems – that is, firms can 
always sell all produced goods – investment is equal to realised profits. Hence, the rate of capital 
accumulation directly depends on the rate of profit (Crotty 1993). This is the foundation of the 
Goodwin (1967) cycle. An increase in the real wage rate lowers the profit rate and this causes a 
fall in accumulation which in turn increases the level of unemployment. When the reserve army 
increases and workers lose contractual power, the profit rate can increase again and with it the 
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accumulation rate. High accumulation and growth then make unemployment fall and the reserve 
army shrink. This causes the wage rate to increase again and the profit rate to decrease starting a 
new cycle. As Crotty (1993) points out, it is worth noting that during the cycle two different models 
of accumulation can take place: capital widening and capital deepening. When the profit rate is 
high, there is no incentive for firms to change the technical composition of capital i.e., to make 
labour saving investment. In the second part of the cycle, when capital widening erodes the reserve 
army and the profit rate falls, firms will now invest in labour saving techniques. A lower level of 
(labour saving) investment causes unemployment to rise again and this restores the original profit 
rate. However, Crotty (1993) explains how this interpretation of the investment function, which 
depends only on the profit rate, rests on the assumptions of Volume I of Marx’s Capital mentioned 
above. He expands the argument by relaxing such assumptions: when firms face the possibility of 
not selling all of their product and are allowed to borrow funds in the financial markets, it is 
possible, for short periods of time, that excessive competition among firms leads to an increase in 
capital accumulation even when firms face decreasing profits. 
The theoretical positive relationship between the profit rate and the growth rate is however not 
always easy to spot in the empirical data. In particular, while the profit squeeze that characterised 
most Western countries during the 1970s was associated with lower growth rate, as predicted by 
Marxist theory, the redistribution of income from wage earners to profit earners, which took place 
in the past few decades, was associated with medium-low levels of economic growth. Dumenil 
and Levi (2004) argue that, to defend Marxist theory of investment, it is necessary to distinguish 
between overall profit rate and rate of retained profits - which excludes interest payments and 
dividends. Accumulation depends upon the latter rather than the former because firms do not invest 
interest payments and dividends in productive capacity. The increase in interest rate that took place 
at the end of the 1970s when the main priority of monetary policy became reducing inflation, put 
a wedge between overall and retain profits. Hence, the very modest growth performances of the 
last decades are justified by the fact that retained profits did not increase. According to Dumenil 
and Levi (2004), during the 1980s, the overall profit rate increased mainly because of the increase 
in the amount of interest payments and dividends rather than retained profits. 
“After having associated, in Chapter 3, the decline in the rate of profit and the 
decline in the rate of accumulation in the crisis, until l982 (the year when profit rates 
reached their low), one expected a symmetrical development: the profit rate trend, 
now on the rise, would prompt a resumption of accumulation - which was not the 
case. We now know the answer: the rate of accumulation is controlled by the rate of 
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retained profit and the rise in the rate of profit before the pay out of interest and 
dividends was confiscated by finance.” (Dumenil and Levi, 2004, p.77) 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) propose a similar argument which, as we will discuss in the 
following sections, also inspired many post-Keynesian empirical studies. They explain the rise in 
the profit rate to the low growth rate of the past few decades with a shift in the strategy with which 
corporations allocate their revenues. In particular, during the 1980s corporations started to follow 
the strategy of “downsize and distribute” as opposed to “retain and reinvest”. This happened 
because of the emergence of agency theory which implies that shareholders should have a main 
role in managing the firm and managers should simply be their agents. In addition, institutional 
investors - such as pension funds and insurance companies - were in those years allowed to include 
corporate equities in their investment portfolios and therefore the collective power of the 
shareholders increased greatly. 
Kliman and Williams (2014) however find that in the long run, from 1948 to 2007, overall 
accumulation decreased because of a decrease in the profit rate rather than because of 
financialization. They reject the argument according to which accumulation, in the last part of the 
millennium, did not keep up with the profit rate because profits were “diverted” from production 
towards shareholders. In particular, they find that the relationship between high dividend payment 
and low productive investment is not statistically significant and that this can be explained by the 
tendency of firms to finance financial expenditures by borrowing funds rather than diverting 
profits.  
In conclusion, independently of the role of financialization and whether the relevant measure 
of profits is overall profits or retained profits, Marxist theory implies that a more equal distribution 
of income (from profit to wage earners) leads to a fall in the rate of accumulation and therefore to 
a decrease in the growth rate. Moreover, as in the Neoclassical models, demand has no role in the 
determination of long run growth. 
2.4 Post-Keynesian models of growth and distribution 
The models and theoretical approaches discussed so far are part of the so called supply side 
economics: growth is determined by supply and demand always adjusts to it. As we have seen, in 
the Solow model and the endogenous growth models, investment is entirely endogenous and 
driven by savings and the growth rate depends on production constraints such has growth rate of 
labour force and productivity. Similarly, in the more recent studies on distribution and growth, the 
effect of distribution is always a supply effect: distribution affects growth because it affects human 
and physical capital accumulation and the productivity of the factors of production. 
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The primacy of supply over demand is probably one of the most important points of 
disagreement between the Neoclassical and Post-Keynesian schools of thought. In particular, Post-
Keynesian models of growth and distribution try to expand to the long run the Keynesian principle 
that demand matters. The Keynesian short run analysis can be simply explained using the 
aggregate demand function.  
𝑌 = 𝐶0 + (1 − 𝑠)𝑌 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑋 − 𝑚𝑌                                                 (11) 
Where 𝑌 is income, 𝐶0 is autonomous consumption, (1 − 𝑠)𝑌is induced consumption, 𝑠 is the 
propensity to save, 𝐼 is investment (which is considered here to be exogenous with respect to 
income), 𝐺 is government spending, 𝑋 is export and 𝑚 is the propensity to import out of current 
income.  
Assuming that the capital stock and prices do not change, income is positively related to the 
exogenous components of demand and negatively related to the propensity to save and to import.  
𝑌 =
𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑋 + 𝐶0
𝑠 + 𝑚
                                                                  (12) 
These short run conclusions are substantially different compared to those of the Neoclassical 
models discussed above. Not only has autonomous demand a positive role in determining income 
(it does not simply adjust to supply), but also the propensity to save has a negative effect on 
income. This is known as the paradox of thrift: while at the individual level increasing savings to 
accumulate wealth has no effect on personal income, at a macroeconomic level, an increase in the 
propensity to save has a negative effect on aggregate income. Unlike in the Neoclassical models 
then, an exogenous increase in income inequality, that increases the propensity to save, has a 
negative effect on the income.  
In the sections below, we will present a summary of the three main theoretical Post-Keynesian 
approaches: Robinsonian, Kaleckian and NeoKaleckian. We choose a chronological exposition as 
this should help to show the evolution of the arguments.  
2.4.1 Robinsonian models 
The first Post-Keynesian models were developed by the members of the so-called Cambridge 
school: the most famous contributors are Nicholas Kaldor (1957), Joan Robinson (1956, 1962) 
and Luigi Pasinetti (1962). We labelled these models as Robinsonian because, following 
Stockhammer (1999), we will use a stylised version of the model proposed by Robinson (1962) as 
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reference point. As Lavoie8 (1995) points out, the main characteristic that differentiate this first 
group of models and the Kaleckian and neo-Kaleckian models is the assumption of full capacity 
utilisation. The Robinsonian models, similarly to neoclassical models, assume that in the long run 
capital is fully utilised.  
The model is composed of three main equations, the investment and saving functions and the 
equilibrium condition i.e. the equality between savings and investment. Both saving and 
investment are normalised by the stock of capital.  
Investment (𝐼) is a function of autonomous demand (𝛾) and the expected profit rate proxied by 
the current profit rate (𝑟 =
 𝑅
𝐾
). 
𝑔𝑖 =
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝛾 + 𝛽𝑟                                                                     (13) 
Contrary to Neoclassical models, investment is not constrained by savings because firms have 
access to external sources of credit. As Robinson puts it: 
“Profit influences investment not only by providing the motive for it but also through 
providing the means. An important part of the gross investment is financed by gross 
retained profits. Moreover, the amount that a firm puts up of its own finance influences 
the amount that it can borrow from outside.” (Robinson 1962, p.86) 
The profit rate therefore, not only is an indicator of investment profitability (which should 
influence the “animal spirit”) and of the firms’ capacity to self-finance their investment, but it is 
also a measure of firms’ access to external credit. This characteristic of the investment function 
will be present also in the Kaleckian and Neo-Kaleckian models. 
Savings is determined as a share of total profits (R): 𝑠𝑐 is the capitalists’ propensity to save. For 
simplicity, we are assuming that wage earners consume all their income and therefore the 
propensity to save out of wages is zero. 
𝑔𝑠 =
𝑆
𝐾
= 𝑠𝑐𝑟                                                                        (14) 
In equilibrium, in a closed economy, investment must be equal to savings.  
                                                          
8 Lavoie (1995) labels this first groups of models and Neo-Keynesian models. While this is probably a more 
appropriate name, we choose Robinsonian to avoid any terminological confusion. The term Neo-Keynesian is 
sometimes used to identify the Neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis and the works of John Hicks, Franco Modigliani and 
Paul Samuelson among the others.  
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𝑔𝑖 = 𝑔𝑠                                                                             (15) 
Substituting (13) and (14) into (15) we get the equilibrium rate of profits (𝑟∗) 
𝑟∗ =
𝛾
𝑠𝑐 − 𝛽
                                                                         (16) 
Thus substituting the equilibrium rate of profits into the capital accumulation function (13), we 
get the equilibrium growth rate i.e. the growth rate that guarantees the equality between investment 
and savings. 
𝑔∗ = 𝛾 +
𝛾𝛽
𝑠𝑐 − 𝛽
                                                                     (17) 
The model has two main results: the propensity to save out of profit is negatively related to 
growth and there is a negative relationship between aggregate demand and the wage share of 
income. Taking partial derivatives of equation (16) and (17) respect to the propensity to save, we 
can see how the profit rate and capital accumulation are negatively influenced by the propensity 
to save. One merit of this model therefore, is that the Keynesian paradox of thrift discussed above 
is maintained in the long run. 
 
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑠𝑐
=
−𝛾
(𝑠𝑐 − 𝛽)2
< 0 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑠𝑐
=
−𝛾𝛽
(𝑠𝑐 − 𝛽)2
< 0 
On the other hand, taking the partial derivative of the profit rate respect to autonomous demand 
in (16), we see that an increase in demand leads to a redistribution of income towards profits (if 
the stability condition of savings reacting faster than investment to profits is respected, i.e. 𝑠𝑐 >
𝛽).  
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝛾
=
1
𝑠𝑐 − 𝛽
> 0 
Regarding the relationship between autonomous demand and the profit rate, two aspects should 
be underlined. Firstly, in this model, an increase in the profit rate is equivalent to an increase in 
the profit share. Let us consider the following decomposition of the profit rate into profit share 
(𝜋), capacity utilisation (𝑢) and capital productivity (
1
𝑣
). Since both 𝑢 and 
1
𝑣
 are assumed constant, 
a change in the profit rate must entail a proportional change in the profit share.  
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𝑟 =
𝑅
𝐾
= (
𝑅
𝑌
) (
𝑌
𝑌𝑓𝑐
) (
𝑌𝑓𝑐
𝐾
) =
𝜋𝑢
𝑣
                                                       (18) 
In the second place, we should note that the direction of causality in this relationship goes from 
autonomous investment demand to the profit rate. In particular, given that full capacity is assumed, 
an increase in investment will put upward pressure on prices and consequently real wages will 
decrease (Stockhammer 1999). This in turn, increases the profit rate and decreases the wage share. 
Distribution of income is therefore endogenous in this model. 
2.4.2 Keleckian models 
The implied endogeneity of income distribution is one of the main differences between the first 
group of models inspired by the work of Michel Kalecki and the model proposed by Robinson. A 
second difference is that Kaleckian models maintain in the long run, Kalecki’s paradox of cost 
according to which an increase in the wage share does not comport a decrease in the profit rate.  
Lavoie (1995) identifies four common features to most Kaleckian models. Firstly, unlike in 
Robinson’s model, in addition to labour, also capital is not supposed to be fully utilised because 
the models are framed in an oligopolistic world. The rationale is that spare capacity is necessary 
for firms to respond quickly to demand shocks but is also constitute an entry barrier for new firms 
that might want to join the market. Moreover, as Steinld (1952) points out, excess capacity might 
be due to indivisibility of capital. Secondly, since firms do not operate at full capacity, there are 
constant returns to labour as additional workers would be able to use the spare capital and therefore 
their productivity would not decrease. It follows that an increase in output does not put upward 
pressure on prices, i.e. prices are not demand driven. In the third place, given the oligopolistic 
framework and the presence of excess capacity, prices are mainly determined adding a mark-up to 
variable costs. Dutt (1984), for example, specifies prices as  
𝑝 = (1 + 𝑡)𝑤𝑎                                                                       (19) 
Where 𝑝 is the level of prices, 𝑡 is the murk-up, 𝑤 is the nominal wage rate and 𝑎 is equal to 
the inverse of labour productivity. From equation (19) we can easily derive that the profit share 
(𝜋) and the wage share (WS) are respectively a positive and a negative function of the mark-up. 
𝑊𝑆 =
𝑤𝑎
𝑝
=
1
1 + 𝑡
                                                                   (20) 
𝜋 = 1 − 𝑊𝑆 =
𝑡
1 + 𝑡
                                                                 (21) 
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Therefore, in this simple model functional income distribution is determined by the mark-up 
which is in turn influenced, according to Kalecki (1971), by the degree of monopoly, i.e. the 
relative strength of capitalists with respect to workers. The degree of monopoly and the mark-up 
are determined by four main characteristics of the market. First, the degree of concentration within 
industries is positively related to the mark-up. When a few firms dominate a certain market, it is 
easier to organise tacit agreements or cartels. Second, the mark-up is positively related to the 
degree of non-price competition such as advertisements and selling agents as this causes an 
increase in the degree of monopoly. Third, overhead costs are positively related with the mark-up. 
When overhead costs increase, firms have to increase the murk-up on variable costs in order to 
avoid a profit squeeze. Finally, the degree of monopoly and the mark-up are negatively related to 
the power of trade unions. Empirically, Stockhammer (2012) and Hein (2015) suggest that neo-
liberalism and finance have been the main drivers of the change in income distribution because 
they weakened the bargaining power of labour respect to capital and increased the overhead costs 
- especially managers’ salaries. Moreover, Hein (2015) underlines how in more sophisticated 
models in which price is the weighted average of the price level in different industries, the 
structural composition of the economy is also a main determinant of the profit/wage share. If 
sectors traditionally characterised by high mark-up increase their share of production, the overall 
profit share will increase. The exogeneity of the functional income distribution is therefore 
justified in this model by the fact that given excess capacity, output does not influence prices and 
therefore real wages. At the same time, however, since the degree of monopoly is only partially 
influenced by growth (through overhead costs for example) and Financialization and neo-liberism 
policies are not influenced by growth, the assumption of the exogeneity of the profit share with 
respect to the growth rate seems reasonable. 
The final characteristic of Kaleckian models is the investment function. As firms have a desired 
level of capacity utilisation (below full capacity), the investment function used in the Robinsonian 
models is augmented by the level of capacity utilisation. If current capacity is above the desired 
level, firms will invest in new capital in order to restore the desired level of utilisation (Steindl, 
1979).  
𝑔𝑖 =
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝛾 + 𝛽𝑟 + 𝛿𝑢                                                                (22) 
According to Amadeo (1987) the first Kaleckian models were developed by Bob Rowthorn 
(1981) and Amitava Dutt (1984). In the remaining part of this section, we use a simplified version 
of Dutt’s model to explain its main intuitions.  
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As in the Robinson’s model, we have an investment and saving function and an equation that 
equates investment and savings - (14), (22) and (15) respectively. In addition, there is a profit cost 
function derived substituting (21) into (18) 
𝑟𝑐 =
𝑡𝑢
(1 + 𝑡)𝑣
                                                                       (23) 
Giving this setting, it is easy to see that the paradox of costs holds. Substituting (22) and (14) 
into (15) we obtain what Lavoie (1995) calls effective demand equation.  
𝑟𝑒𝑑 =
𝛾 + 𝛿𝑢
(𝑠𝑐 − 𝛽)
                                                                     (24) 
Plotting in the (r,u) space (Figure 2.4) the profit cost and the effective demand equation, we get 
a clear picture of how the paradox of cost works. Since the partial derivative of (23) respect to 𝑡 is 
positive - 
𝜕𝑟𝑐
𝜕𝑡
=
𝑢𝑣
[(1+𝑡)𝑣]2
 - a decrease in the profit margin that corresponds with an increase in the 
wage share rotates downward the profit cost curve. If the level of capacity utilisation were to 
remain fixed, as it would be the case in Robinson’s model, the profit rate would decrease to rmin. 
However, as capacity utilisation increases to u1 due to the rise in consumption expenditures, the 
profit rate will remain constant at r*0. The higher level of capacity utilisation however, in the long 
run, stimulates investment and therefore it increases the level of utilisation and rate of profit even 
further. The paradox of cost works: a higher wage share is associated with a higher profit rate, at 
a macroeconomic level.  
Fig. 2.4: The paradox of cost in a Kaleckian model 
 
To verify the paradox of thrift we first substitute equation (18) into the investment and saving 
functions - (22) and (14) respectively – in order to express savings and investment in terms of 
capacity utilisation and profit share rather than the profit rate.  
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𝑔𝑖 =
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝛾 + 𝛽
𝜋𝑢
𝑣
+ 𝛿𝑢                                                              (24) 
𝑔𝑠 =
𝑆
𝐾
= 𝑠𝑐
𝜋𝑢
𝑣
                                                                      (25) 
Equating (24) and (25), and assuming for simplicity 𝑣 = 1, we get the equilibrium level of 
capacity utilisation 
𝑢∗ =
𝛾
(𝑠𝑐𝜋 − 𝛽𝜋 − 𝛿)
                                                                 (26) 
Then substituting the equilibrium level of capacity utilisation into the accumulation function, 
we get the long run growth rate of capital 
𝑔∗ = 𝛾 +
𝛾(𝜋𝛽 + 𝛿)
(𝑠𝑐𝜋 − 𝛽𝜋 − 𝛿)
                                                            (27) 
Since the saving rate appears only in the denominator, the partial derivatives respect to the 
profit share are both negative i.e. 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑠
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑠
< 0. Hence, an increase in the saving rate is 
associated with a fall in the growth rate and capacity utilisation: the paradox of thrift holds. To 
give an example, let us plot in the (g, u) space the investment and saving functions (Figure 2.5).  
We start from a position of equilibrium determined by the intersection of the saving and 
investment functions: the growth rate is g*0 and capacity utilisation is at its desired level, u
*
1. A 
decrease in the saving rate rotates the gs curve downwards. In the short run, at a given rate of 
capital accumulation g*0, capacity utilisation increases to u1 because the capital stock remains fixed 
while consumption rises. In the long run, however, the accelerator effect will come into play: the 
initial increase in capacity utilisation cause an increase in the rate of accumulation which raises 
capacity accumulation even further until savings and investment meet again at a higher level of 
growth (g*1) and capacity utilisation (u
*
1). 
Symmetrically, the profit rate has an effect on growth and capacity utilisation similar to that of 
the saving rate. In fact, the derivative of (26) and (27) with respect to the profit rate are negative 
if the Keynesian stability condition is respected (𝑠𝑐 > 𝛽).  
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜋
=
−𝛾(𝑠𝑐 − 𝛽)
(𝑠𝑐𝜋 − 𝛽𝜋 − 𝛿)2
< 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑐 > 𝛽                                                 (28) 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝜋
=
−𝑎𝛿𝑠𝑐
(𝑠𝑐𝜋 − 𝛽𝜋 − 𝛿)2
< 0                                                           (29) 
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The negative relationship between profit share and growth implies that growth is positively 
influenced by the wage share: the growth regime is wage-led. 
Fig. 2.5: The paradox of thrift in a Kaleckian model 
 
2.4.3 Neo-Keleckian models 
Most of the assumptions listed above behind the Kaleckian models are maintained in the Neo-
Kaleckian models. The main difference between the two approaches is the different specification 
of the investment function. One could argue that the wage-led result of the Kaleckian models is 
driven by the fact that capacity utilisation in equation (22) and (24) is counted twice. Bhaduri and 
Marglin (1990) propose a new investment function in which investment is only a function of the 
(expected) profit rate9. However, they allow the components of the profit rate - see equation (18) 
- to have different effects on investment. In other words, the profit share and capacity utilisation 
enter the investment equation as independent and separate arguments10.  
𝑔𝑖 =
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝛾 + 𝛽𝜋 + 𝛿𝑢                                                                (30) 
Equating the investment and saving functions, we obtain the equilibrium level of capacity 
utilisation  
𝑢∗ =
𝛾 + 𝛽𝜋
(𝑠𝑐𝜋 − 𝛿)
                                                                      (31) 
                                                          
9 To cite a few, Kurz (1990), Taylor (1991), Blecker, (2002) and Naaspepad (2006) use a similar investment 
functions. 
10 The third component of the profit rate, capital productivity (𝑣) does not enter equation (30) because it is assumed 
to be constant. 
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Then substituting the equilibrium level of capacity utilisation into the accumulation function, 
we get the long-run growth rate of capital 
𝑔∗ = 𝛾 + 𝛽𝜋 + 𝛿
(𝛾 + 𝛽𝜋)
(𝑠𝑐𝜋 − 𝛿)
                                                           (32) 
Taking the partial derivatives of equations (31) and (32) respect to the profit share, we can see 
the main difference between the Neo-Kaleckian and the Kaleckian models. 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜋
= −
𝛽𝛿 + 𝑠𝑐𝛾
(𝑠𝑐𝜋 − 𝛿)2
< 0                                                              (33) 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝜋
= 𝛽 −
𝛿(𝛽𝛿 + 𝑠𝑐𝛾)
(𝑠𝑐𝜋 − 𝛿)2
= 𝛽 + 𝛿
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜋
                                                  (34) 
As before, the profit share has a negative effect on capacity utilisation. The effect on growth, 
however, is undetermined and it depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of capacity utilisation 
respect to the profit share. The growth regime is said to be wage-led or profit-led if the sign of the 
derivative in equation (34) is negative or positive, respectively. We will explore the Bhaduri and 
Marglin model in detail in chapter 4, for now it is sufficient to highlight that such model implies 
that whether distribution of income has a positive or a negative effect on growth depends on 
country specific characteristics. This has sparked a vast amount of country specific empirical 
literature which tries to determine what growth regime is present in each country. Since the 
contributions of the next three chapters build on this branch of literature, we will survey these 
empirical studies at the end of this chapter. 
2.4.4 Open economy considerations 
The closed economy models considered so far allowed to describe the evolution of the main 
assumptions and findings of the Post-Keynesian models of growth and distribution. In this and the 
next section, we discuss two main extensions of such models: the role of international trade and 
the role of supply.  
Blecker (1989) and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) were the first to extend the Kaleckian 
framework to the open economy (Blecker 2011). The setting of the model changes in two 
important ways. First, net exports (
𝑁𝑋
𝐾
), which is a function of real exchange rate (𝑞), domestic 
capacity utilisation (𝑢) and foreign capacity utilisation (𝑢𝑓), is added to the equilibrium equation 
(15)  
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𝑁𝑋
𝐾
= 𝑛(𝑞, 𝑢, 𝑢𝑓)                                                               (35) 
𝑆
𝐾
=
𝐼
𝐾
+
𝑁𝑋
𝐾
                                                                   (36) 
Second, the distribution of income is expressed as a function of the real exchange rate. In an 
open economy, firms have to take into account the price of foreign products in order to determine 
their price. If, following an increase in the nominal wage rate, firms increase the price level in 
order to keep the profit share constant, they will lose market shares as their prices are increased 
compared to those of imported goods (Blecker 1989). Following this logic, the mark-up and the 
profit share will be positively related to the exchange rate. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) on the 
other hand, argue that depreciation will cause the cost of imported raw material to increase and 
this will squeeze the profit share. At the same time, however, following a depreciation of the 
exchange rate, workers will ask for a higher wage because of the increase in prices of imported 
goods. If the nominal wage increase more than labour productivity, the wage share will increase. 
The main finding of these post-Keynesian open economy models is that even if a country is 
internally wage-led (as it was the case in the Kaleckian models), it might very well be that, in an 
open economy, it becomes profit-led (or in any case less wage-led). For instance, if the central 
bank increases the target exchange rate, firms will be able to set a higher mark up and hence the 
share of wages decreases. If the economy is domestically wage-led, as it was the case in the 
Kaleckian models, this will result in a lower level of growth and capacity utilisation. However, an 
increase in the exchange rate now stimulate export and discourage imports and therefore it has a 
positive effect on growth. In other words, if the price elasticity of demand for imports and exports 
is high enough, even though an economy could be internally wage-led, there might be an overall 
negative relationship between wages and capacity utilisation caused by currency depreciation. As 
Bleckers puts it  
“[in Kaleckian models] it is possible to increase both real wages and employment 
on the one hand, and realised profits and growth on the other hand. This comforting 
conclusion must be drastically revised in the light of the model of an open economy. 
With a flexible mark-up, the possibility of a conflict between a redistribution toward 
wages and maintaining international competitiveness greatly lessens the prospects for 
a happy coincidence of workers' and capitalists' interests. In a relatively open 
economy, the aggressive pursuit of high wages by the working class in one nation can 
impede that nation's economic growth and reduce its level of employment.” (Blecker, 
1989) 
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Consequently, in an open economy it becomes essential to have some cross-country wage 
coordination to avoid “beggar thy neighbour’s effects” rather than a race to the bottom of real 
wages to increase competitiveness.  
2.4.5 Integrating supply side aspects 
A further extension of the Neo-Kaleckain models regards the inclusion of supply side elements. 
For instance, Naastepad (2006) and Naastepad and Storm (2010) augment an open economy Neo-
Kaleckian model with a Neo-Kaldorian productivity function. The model is therefore characterised 
by a demand regime, which can be either wage or profit-led as discussed above, and a productivity 
regime. The labour productivity (λ) equation is expressed as a function of output and real wage 
rate 
λ = 𝛼 + ∅𝑥 + 𝜃𝑤     𝛼, 𝜃 > 0;  0 < ∅ < 1                                         (37) 
∅ captures the Verdoorn law (1949) according to which output has a positive effect on labour 
productivity11. This relationship can be explained in different ways. First, as discussed above, 
Smith (1776) and Young (1928) when production increase productivity raises because of the 
exploitation of economies of scale. Second, as new capital equipment is more productive than 
older capital, labour productivity increases. Finally, there is a “learning by using” effect on 
productivity.  𝜃, on the other hand, captures the positive effect of real wages. Higher labour costs 
will push firms to find more labour savings techniques of production: productivity is wage-led. 
In the (λ, g) space, we can represent the productivity regime (PR) with an upward line as ∅ is 
positive. The demand regime, instead, can be described by an upward or downward line depending 
on the nature of the regime. An increase in λ, keeping the real wage fixed, causes a reduction in 
the unit labour cost and an increase in the profit share which will entail an increase in the 
propensity to save. This in turn will translate in an increase in net exports, an increase in investment 
and a decrease in consumption. If the demand regime (DR) is wage-led, the negative effect of a 
change in the distribution on consumption will be greater than the positive effect on investment 
and export and therefore growth will slow down (the curve is sloped downward). If, on the other 
hand the demand regime is profit-led, the curve will have a positive slope because the positive 
effect on investment and export will be larger than the negative effect on consumption.  
 
 
                                                          
11 This law was later revised by Kaldor (1966) and became known as Kaldor’s second law: an increase in 
manufactory output increases labour productivity in manufactory. 
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Fig. 2.6: Productivity regime and profit-led demand regime 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the effect of a fall in the real wage rate when the demand regime is wage-led. 
DR1 shifts downward to DR2 as, in a wage-led regime, growth is positively related to the wage 
rate. At the same time PR1 moves upward because of the negative effect of lower wages on 
productivity. The final effect on the growth rate depends on how productivity reacts to changes in 
the wage rate. For high values of 𝜃, PR will move to PR2 and the equilibrium growth rate will 
increase slightly. This is because initially a decrease in the real wage rate causes a decrease in the 
wage share and therefore growth. The decrease in productivity, however, is so large that - for a 
given (new) wage rate - the profit share will fall and therefore growth will increase. We can easily 
see that if the reaction of the productivity to the wage rate fall is smaller - PR moves to PR3 – the 
impact on the growth rate will be negative. On the other hand, independently on how productivity 
reacts to the wage share, the final effect on the equilibrium level of productivity growth will be 
lower (λ
∗
2, λ
∗
3 < λ
∗
1) 
Fig. 2.7: Productivity regime and demand led demand regime 
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Figure 2.7 shows the dynamics of a change in the distribution of income when the demand 
regime is profit-led. A fall in the wage rate shifts DR1 to DR2 because of the positive effect of a 
lower wage share on aggregate demand. As before, productivity is negatively affected by a fall in 
the wage rate and hence it moves to either PR2 or PR3. In this case, the effect on growth is always 
positive provided that DR is flatter than PR, i.e. the increase in demand caused by an increased in 
productivity is lower than the increase in productivity caused by an increase in output growth. The 
effect on productivity, on the other hand will vary with the sensitivity of productivity respect to 
the wage rate which determine whether PR1 shift to PR2 or PR3. This is because in a profit-led 
regime, there are two contrasting effects on productivity caused by a fall in the wage rate. Higher 
growth has a positive effect on productivity while lower wages a negative one. 
To sum up, when productivity is not too responsive to real wages (PR shifts to PR3), a fall in 
the real wage will cause respectively, depending on whether the regime is wage or profit-led, a 
decrease and an increase in both productivity and growth. It follows that, in the light of this 
extension of the Neo-Kaleckian models, it becomes even more relevant to determine by which 
demand regime individual countries are characterised.   
2.4.5 The long and the short run 
Closely related to the problem of accounting for both demand and supply is that of determinant 
of long-run and short-run growth. Outside the post-Keynesian school, there have been some 
attempts to reconcile supply and demand by Marxists and Neoclassical scholars. The conclusion 
that both approaches reach is that growth can be driven by demand in the short run but it is 
constrained by supply in the long run. On the neo-Marxist side, Duménil and Lévi (1999) expand 
the Kaleckian model by endogenising inflation and adding a reaction function of the central bank 
to inflation. Inflation (?̇?) is modelled as a positive function of the difference between actual and 
desired level of capacity utilisation (𝑢 and 𝑢𝑑 respectively).  
?̇? = 𝜑(𝑢 − 𝑢𝑑)                                                                  (37) 
 Moreover, inflation reacts to capacity utilisation with a lag. When the inflation rate is above 
its target rate (?̇?𝑡) - which is the inflation rate which occur when capacity utilisation is at its desired 
level - the central bank reacts increasing the interest rate (𝑖) 
∆𝑖 = 𝛼(?̇? − ?̇?𝑡)                                                                  (37) 
In the short run, growth is influenced by the paradox of thrift and the functional income 
distribution as in the Kaleckian model discussed in section 2.3.2: a decrease in the propensity to 
save causes an increase in both capacity utilisation and growth. This correspond to a rightward 
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rotation of the gs curve in Figure 2.8 and a higher short run equilibrium growth rate (g1). In the 
long run however, the mechanisms that brings capacity utilisation back to its original level kicks 
off. The Central Bank reacts to the increase in inflation caused by high capacity utilisation by 
increasing the interest rate. This causes a downward shift of the investment function in the graph 
in Figure 2.8. Interest rate will remain high until capacity utilisation is brought back to its normal 
level. At the new intersection point, the growth rate (g2) is lower than the original one. The paradox 
of thrift therefore holds only in the short run, in the long run savings is positively related to growth. 
This model however, can be criticised for at least three strong assumptions. First, the model relies 
on the fact that the Central Bank has a target rate of inflation determined at the normal level of 
capacity utilisation. If the Central Bank does not follow this rule there would be no shift in the gi 
curve and fall in the growth rate. If investment does not respond strongly enough to changes in the 
interest rate the shift in gi could be small and it could not offset the positive effect of an increase 
in the saving rate. Moreover, investment might be influenced asymmetrically by the interest rate. 
Finally, as long as the desired level of utilisation is below full capacity, the marginal cost of labour 
does not change and therefore prices should not be influenced by demand.  
Fig. 2.8: Short-run and long-run dynamics 
 
Models that try to integrate demand and supply proposed by the neoclassical synthesis reach 
similar conclusions. Dutt (2006, 2010) summarises them as follows. The short run is modelled as 
in the Kaleckian models. In the long run however, since prices and wages are perfectly flexible, 
autonomous investment (𝛾 in equation 13) changes with the growth rate of unemployment which 
equal to the growth rate of employment (𝑙) minus the growth rate of the labour force (𝑛). 
?̇? = −𝜕(𝑙 − 𝑛)                                                                  (38) 
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This can happen for two reasons. First, an increase in unemployment causes a fall in the wage 
rate and therefore in prices. The decrease in price increases the real money supply and decreases 
the interest rate which in turn stimulates investment. Second, when unemployment increases, the 
government might respond with expansionary monetary policies that through a fall in the interest 
rate would also stimulate investment. Demand therefore has only a short term role: an increase in 
the wage share stimulates growth in the short run but in the long run the decrease in unemployment 
discourage investment through higher interest rate. The main reasons which might cause the 
market-adjustment to work are rigidity of prices and wages, endogeneity of the money supply, the 
lack of responsiveness of investment to the interest rate and the fact that policy makers might not 
want to respond to changes in unemployment.  
As Dutt (2006, 2010) points out, in so far as growth depends on aggregate supply factors such 
as the growth rate of labour supply and labour productivity - which are often uncorrelated with 
aggregate demand in the long run – growth will not depend on aggregate demand. He therefore 
proposes a model in which labour productivity is determined in the short run which is, in turn, 
influenced by aggregate demand. In particular, labour productivity is positively influenced by the 
difference between growth rate of employment and the growth rate of the labour force.  
λ = 𝜀(𝑙 − 𝑛)                                                                    (39) 
The assumption is that firms respond to labour shortages by adopting more efficient techniques 
of production. This view of technological change is similar to that of Naastepad (2006) in so far 
as the real wage rate and growth rate of unemployment are positively correlated. Since productivity 
depends positively on aggregate demand, one of the main implication of this model is that in a 
wage-led country an improvement in the functional distribution of income produces positive 
supply as well as demand effects not only in the short run. Similarly, the effect of monetary and 
fiscal policies is not limited to the short run.  
To conclude, as Lavoie (1995) points out, the theories that allow for Keynesian or Kaleckian 
dynamics only in the short run assume that, in the long run, capacity utilisation is stable at its 
desired or natural level. This means that firms, in the long run, try to adjust their capacity utilisation 
to a certain optimal and given rate. This implies that, in terms of the Kaleckian model described 
above, the investment function (24) changes in the long run  
𝑔𝑖 =
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝛾 + 𝛽
𝜋𝑢𝑛
𝑣
                                                            (40) 
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The accelerator term (𝛿𝑢) disappears because actual capacity utilisation is equal to its natural 
rate and as in the Robinson’s model, the profit rate is only a function of the profit share because 
𝑢𝑛 is fixed (assuming also 𝑣 remains constant). To restore the intuition of the Kaleckian model to 
the long run, Lavoie (1995) proposes an adjustment mechanism that endogenises capacity 
utilisation. In particular, he argues that, even though in the long run firms reach the desired rate of 
utilisation, this rate depends on the short-run actual rate of capacity utilisation. To put this with 
Amadeo’s words: 
“Indeed, one may argue that if the equilibrium degree is systematically different 
from the planned degree of utilisation, entrepreneurs will eventually revise their plans, 
thus altering the planned degree. If for instance, the equilibrium degree of utilisation 
is smaller than the planned degree (𝑢∗ < 𝑢𝑛), it is possible that the entrepreneurs will 
reduce 𝑢𝑛. The reduction of the planned degree would shift the investment function in 
such a way that the new equilibrium degree will be greater than the initial one. If 
entrepreneurs keep revising their plans, eventually both degrees of utilisation will 
coincide. Even if this is the case, however, the objective of this model is to show that 
the equilibrium degree of utilisation – be it equal or different from the planned degree 
– is endogenously determined.” (Amedeo, 1986, p.155) 
In terms of the analysis based on Figure 2.8, this would mean that gi2 would not have had to 
shift until gi2 and g
s
2 intersect at the original natural rate of utilisation. The short run increase in 
utilisation to u*1 would have caused un to move somewhere to the right and the new long-run 
equilibrium would be somewhere between the initial long-run equilibrium (g0) and the short-run 
growth rate (g1) (Lavoie 1995). 
2.5 Heterodox empirical literature 
This section presents the main empirical findings on the relationship between functional income 
distribution and economic growth with special emphasis on the Post-Keynesian tradition. As 
discussed in section 2.4.3, the neo-Kaleckian theoretical models – because of the Marglin’s and 
Bhaduri’s variant of the investment function - allows for both a profit and a wage-led growth 
regime. Therefore, whether the wage share is positively or negatively related to growth is an 
empirical question which might have a different answer depending on the country. For this reason, 
since the middle of the 1990s, many empirical works have been devoted to the analysis of the 
growth regimes in different countries. To simplify the exposition these studies have been divided 
by their estimation methodology.  
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2.5.1 Decomposition of aggregate demand 
The first method used to estimate the effect of income distribution on economic growth is based 
on the analysis of the decomposed aggregate demand. The method consists in summing up the 
effects of an increase in the profit share on the components of aggregate demand: consumption, 
investment and net exports. The effect of the profit share on government spending is usually not 
included as government spending is assumed to be exogenous to changes in the distribution of 
income. 
Assuming that prices do not depend on demand, the effect of a change in the profit share on 
growth is equal to the sum of the effects of a change in the profit share on the components of 
aggregate demand. 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝜋
=
𝜕𝐴𝐷
𝜕𝜋
=
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝜋
+
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝜋
+
𝜕𝑁𝑋
𝜕𝜋
                                                   (41) 
Bowles and Boyer (1995) are the first to test the Bhaduri and Maglin’s (1990) variant of the 
Kaleckian model. They estimated single equations for the three components of aggregate demand 
as described above for USA, UK, France, Germany and Japan. The relevant finding is that all the 
countries in the study are domestically wage-led: the profit rate has a negative effect on 
consumption and investment. However, when the negative effect of redistribution on net exports 
is added to the domestic effect, the two European countries and Japan become profit-led. The main 
econometric shortfall of this study is that it fails to take into account the problem of unit root. The 
rest of the papers presented in this chapter explicitly tackle this problem. 
The first generation of empirical works inspired by the neo-Kaleckian models - Naastepad and 
Storm (2006), Ederer and Stockhammer (2007), Stockhammer and Ederer (2008), Hein and Vogel 
(2008, 2009) - built on the work of Bowles and Boyer (1995) in order to determine the growth 
regimes of individual OECD countries. In particular, the countries that were analysed more often 
are Germany, France, The Netherlands, Austria, Japan and the United States. The main common 
result is that the domestic regime is usually wage-led but the overall regime is less wage-led (or 
profit-led) because of the negative effect of higher unit costs on net exports. It is worth pointing 
out that Austria, as one would expect from a relatively small and open economy, is the only country 
whose overall regime is always found to be profit-led (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012). 
Stockhammer and Ederer (2008), moreover point out that the negative effect of redistribution on 
net exports in Austria increased from 1960 to 2005. The effect of a 1% increase in the wage share 
was -0.11% and -0.39% in 1960 and 2005 respectively. 
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Onaran and Yenturk (2001) use a different approach. They employ an industrial panel data to 
estimate the Turkish investment function. They find that the structural adjustment program wanted 
by the World Bank, which increased profitability of investment, did not succeed in stimulating 
new investment. Their analysis seems to confirm the Kaleckian hypothesis that pro-capital policies 
might not stimulate investment because wages are not only a cost but also a primary driver of 
demand.  
The second generation of empirical works inspired by the neo-Kaleckian models extended the 
analysis by including other factors that might influence the growth regime. The three main factors 
that are included are the interaction between countries, the role of financialization and the non-
linearity of the growth regime.  
First, Stockhammer et al (2009) and Onaran and Galanis (2014), account for possible 
interactions between countries. In particular, Stockhammer et al (2009) analyse the effect of a 
change in the wage share in the Euro area as a whole because, since most countries within it trade 
mostly with each other, it can be considered as a relatively closed economy. They find that both 
the domestic regime and the overall regime are wage-led. Onaran and Galanis, in an article that 
we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, analyse the effect of a contemporaneous decrease 
in the wage share in many OECD and developing countries. Not surprisingly, the results highlight 
how the world economy as a whole is wage-led. 
Financialization12 is the second element that is added to the analysis in order to extend the first 
generation of empirical work on growth regimes. In particular, the main argument is that 
financialization weakens the effect of distribution on growth because it makes investment less 
dependent on profits and consumption less dependent on real income. At the same time however, 
financialization, through financial capital flows, relaxes balance of payments constraints and 
allows trade imbalances to persist for longer periods. Stockhammer (2009, 2015) argues that wage 
stagnation gave rise to two complementary growth regimes: debt-led and export-led. In some 
countries, such as the United States, low real wages are compensated for by a growing household 
debt that fuels domestic demand. In this case, debt becomes the engine of growth. In other 
countries, such as Germany for example, low domestic demand caused by low wages is 
                                                          
12 Financialization does not have a unique definition. Lapavitsas (2011) underlines that Marxian and post-Keynesian 
economist focus on different aspect of it, even though there are overlaps. Post-Keynesian empirical literature 
associates financialization with the rise of the rentier class. In the most empirical studies this is proxied by the amount 
of interest payments and dividends - see for example, Onaran et al (2011), Stockhammer (2004). Marxist approach 
instead underlines three aspects of financialization. Firstly, large corporations have become financially independent 
from banks as they can aquire external fundings on the financial marets. Secondly, Banks rather than providing credit 
to firms, mediate the transactions on the financial markets and have turned to providing credits to households. 
Workers, because of stagnating wages, are more active on the financial markets especially in regard to borrowing 
(Lapavitsas, 2011 and Lapavitsas and Powel, 2013).  
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compensated by net exports growth. While these growth regimes can persist over long periods, 
they are substantially unstable because they depend on the stability of the financial markets as the 
2007 financial crisis demonstrated. Other studies that highlight the role of inequality as a primary 
cause of the 2007 financial crisis are Lysandrou (2011) and Goda and Lysandrou (2013). 
Regarding investment, Stockhammer (2004) and Onaran et al (2011) show how the shift towards 
a shareholder value orientation of firms, as predicted by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000), had a 
negative effect on accumulation in the United States and France: Interest payments and dividend 
have a negative effect on accumulation. Orhangazi (2008) using a panel of firm level data between 
1973 and 2003 confirms the negative relationship between financialization and accumulation. 
Similarly, to the previous studies, he argues that increasing payments in the financial market might 
have diverted funds from accumulation of physical capital. When some measure of financialization 
is included in the empirical method used by the first generation of studies mentioned above, 
Onaran et al (2011) and Stockhammer and Wildauer (2015) find that the growth regime in the 
OECD countries analysed is wage-led even though the effect of functional income distribution is 
modest in size. Moreover, they find evidence that debt has a positive effect on consumption which 
support the hypothesis of debt-led growth. 
A further extension of the first generation works concerns the inclusion of possible non-
linearities or structural breaks in the growth regimes. This will be discussed in the Chapter 4. 
2.5.2 System approach 
Arguably, the main shortfalls of the single equation method described above is its inability of 
accounting for the interactions between the components of aggregate demand. To overcome this, 
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) and Onaran and Stockhammer (2005, 2007) use a structural 
vector autoregressive model (SVAR). The advantage of using a SVAR compared to a simple VAR 
is that the former allows modelling the contemporaneous relationships between variables. In these 
works, the dependent variables of the VAR are investment, profit share, export, imports, capacity 
utilisation and employment. The contemporaneous effects – Byt - are describes in the following 
matrix  
      𝑦 =
|
|
𝐼/𝑌
𝜋
𝑋/𝑌
𝑀/𝑌
𝑧
𝐸
|
|
 𝐵 =
|
|
 
𝑏11 0 0 0 0 0
0 𝑏22 0 0 𝑏25 𝑏26
0 𝑏32 𝑏33 0 0 0
0 𝑏42 0 𝑏44 𝑏45 0
𝑏51 𝑏52 𝑏53 0 𝑏55 0
0 0 0 0 𝑏65 𝑏66
|
|
                               (42) 
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Where yt is a vector of all the variables and B is the contemporaneous interaction coefficients 
matrix. The zeroes represent the contemporaneous effects between variables which are restricted 
to zero. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous sections, b25, b32 b45, b51 b53 and b65 are 
supposed to have positive values while b26, b42, b52 are expected to have a negative sign. The 
contemporaneous effects are defined as follows. Investment is assumed to be affected by other 
variables only in the future hence there are no contemporary effects. The profit share depends only 
by the rate of capacity utilisation (b25) and employment (b26) because of the labour reserve army 
effect on wages. Exports are determined only by the profit share (b32) as it is considered to be an 
indicator of competitiveness. Profit share (b42) - because it is negatively related with the level of 
demand – and capacity utilisation (b45) are the contemporaneous determinants of imports. Capacity 
utilisation depends on all the variables (b51, b52 and b53) a part from import ad employment while 
employment depends only on capacity utilisation (b65) because, considering that the proxy used 
for capacity utilisation is growth, there is no need to include investments as well. 
The most important characteristic of a VAR is that, being a system of equations, it allows to 
check how the whole system respond to a shock of one variable. This is done through the impulse 
response functions which describe what is the effect of a shock in one of the variables on others 
considering all the between-variable interactions.  
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) analyse France, UK and USA. In this case, the impulse 
response functions do provide evidence in support of the Kaleckian models as a shock in the 
distribution of income does not have a statistically significant effect on capacity utilisation and 
accumulation. However, they find that employment is negatively affected by shocks in 
accumulation and capacity utilisation which seems to confirm the post-Keynesian hypothesis that 
the labour market depends on good market variables. The same authors in 2005 use a similar 
approach to study the growth regime of Korea and Turkey. They find that, in both countries, 
employment and accumulation are negatively related to the profit share and therefore the 
accumulation regime is wage-led - in Korea more than in Turkey. Turkish wage-led regime is 
confirmed also by Stockhammer and Onaran (2007).  
However, using a simple VAR with only two variables (capacity utilisation and a distributional 
variable), Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) and Carvalho and Reza (2015) find evidence that the 
United States is profit-led. Their impulse response functions show that an increase in the profit 
share leads to an increase in capacity utilisation. 
From this brief summary of the empirical literature it emerges that there is mixed evidence 
regarding the growth regimes in most countries. Unfortunately, the results seem to depend, not 
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always but often, on the statistical tool used in the analysis. For this reason, in the following three 
chapters we will discuss in more detail the empirical methodology of some of the works mentioned 
above. 
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3 - Wage moderation in Mexico, Canada and the United States: The effect of functional 
income distribution on trade and aggregate demand 
3.1 Introduction 
Whether increasing income inequality is a natural result of capitalist economies caused – among 
other things - by the higher returns of capital compared to labour and by technological progress or 
whether, instead it is the result of policies aimed at reducing the cost of labour, the rise in income 
inequality in western countries, in the past thirty years, is largely undisputed. Smeeding (2002) for 
example, pointed out, using the data of the Luxembourg income study, that since the 1980s most 
OECD countries experienced an increase in the polarization of income. 
The advocates of wage moderation look positively at a pro capital redistribution of income for 
two reasons. Firstly, when wage share of income decreases, the profit share must increase and this 
stimulates investment. Secondly, lower labour costs allow for the reduction of domestic and export 
prices with the effect of improving net exports. As discussed in the previous chapter however, 
post-Keynesians highlight how wages are not only a cost item for firms but also a fundamental 
determinant of demand and in particular of consumption. Consequently, whether the final effect 
of wage moderation on growth is positive or negative – the growth regime is profit or wage-led, 
respectively - is an empirical question. In the Keleckian tradition, theoretical studies as well as 
early empirical works have found that individual countries become more profit-led when external 
demand is accounted for because of changes in competitiveness13. 
Even though these studies focused on individual countries, wage moderation is a global 
phenomenon. Since we live in an increasingly globalised world and wage moderation affects 
competitiveness, the causal relationship between income distribution and aggregate demand 
should be looked at including in the analysis countries that trade with each other. For this reason, 
this chapter will try to answer the following set of questions: 
A. Do changes in the distribution of income in a country have any impact on other 
countries’ economic growth?  If so, is this positive or negative? 
Specifically, we will compute the effect of a contemporaneous decrease in wage share among 
countries that are major trade partners. 
                                                          
13 Blecker (1989, 2011) and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) are among the early theoretical open economy models. On 
the empirical side, the main contributions come from Bowles and Boyer (1995), Naastepad and Storm (2006), Ederer 
and Stockhammer (2007), Stockhammer and Ederer (2008), Hein and Vogel (2008, 2009).  
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 In order to answer these questions, we developed a methodology, based on a post-Keynesian 
framework, to test what is the effect on aggregate demand and foreign trade, of a contemporaneous 
fall in the wage share in the Country members of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). In particular, after estimating the effect of a change in the functional distribution of 
income on aggregate demand, the interactions between the three countries are analysed. 
Our work belongs to a “second generation” of empirical Kaleckian papers together with 
Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer (2009) and Onaran and Galanis (2014). The intuition behind 
this second group of studies is that the competitive advantage that a country gains by reducing its 
wage share is undermined by the fallacy of composition. If all countries reduce their wage share 
at the same time in order to reduce domestic and export prices, no one will have a relative 
advantage on the others. Stockhammer et al (2009) try to solve this problem by analysing the Euro 
area as a whole, because most European countries trade greatly with other European partners and 
hence the euro area can be considered as a closed system. Their main result is that Europe would 
benefit from a pro labour redistribution of income. The principal limitation is that even if Europe 
as a whole is wage-led we have no information on whether all the countries within it are wage-led 
as well, or not. However, knowing this is essential in order to propose some policy coordination 
between countries. Onaran and Galanis (2014) on the other hand, set up an empirical framework 
that enables studying the effect of a change in the functional distribution of income on each country 
assuming that the same change was to happen in all the other countries as well. They find that the 
competitive (country) gains of a fall in the wage share are substantially reduced when the wage 
share falls in all the other countries as well. Moreover, they find that the world as a whole is wage-
led. The empirical analysis of this chapter is inspired by Onaran’s and Galanis’ work even though 
there are some substantial methodological difference especially regarding the interactions between 
countries. These differences will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
Testing the effect of a contemporaneous change in the distribution of income in NAFTA is 
realistic because the United States, Mexico and Canada, followed the same trend in the distribution 
of income as the other western countries. In spite of a stable rise in real income per capita, the real 
hourly wage in the manufacturing industry remained steady, or decreased, from the late seventies 
in the United States, Mexico and Canada (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Consequently, the wage share - 
that is the portion of total income received by wage earners - decreased as well. Figure 3.3 shows 
that the adjusted wage share14 was constant in the US and Canada from 1960 to 1970 and then it 
decreased by about 10% until 2007. In Mexico instead, apart from an initial increase, the wage 
share fell by 30% from 1970 to 2007. This is also consistent with Blecker’s finding (2003) that 
                                                          
14 The adjusted wage share is the wage share augmented by the share of income earned by self-employed individuals.  
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throughout NAFTA - from 1990 to at least 2003 - there has been an increasing gap between 
productivity of labour and labour compensation.    
Fig 3.1: Gross Domestic Product per Capita (2005 PPP $) 
 
Note: Data are from the World Economic indicators 
Fig. 3.2: Hourly Wage in Industry (2005 PPP $) 
 
Note: Data are from LABORSTA, the database of the international labour office database. 
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Fig. 3.3: Adjusted Wage Share 
 
Note: The adjusted wage share is transformed into an index with base year in 1960 
for the United States and Canada and 1970 for Mexico. 
One of the main results of the analysis is that the effect on export following a contemporaneous 
decrease in the wage share is negative in all countries. In other words, the competitive advantage 
that each country gains thanks to a reduction in its wage share (to which is associated a decrease 
in export prices), is offset by a contemporaneous increase in competitiveness in the other two 
countries.  Moreover, we find that even though an increase in the profit share has an overall 
positive effect in Mexico and Canada and a negative effect only in the United States, NAFTA is 
overall wage-led. This is because the negative effect of the profit share in the United States is 
larger than the sum of its positive effects in Mexico and Canada. We confirm the results from 
Stockhammer et al (2009) and Onaran and Galanis (2014) that find that when more countries are 
analysed together, the overall growth regime is likely to be wage-led. 
The chapter develops as follows. In the next sections, we present the theoretical foundation of 
our analysis, discussing how functional distribution affects each component of aggregate demand. 
The third section describes the empirical methodology and the sample selection while the results 
are shown and discussed in the fourth section. Section five concludes. 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
Following Stockhammer et al (2008) and Onaran and Galanis (2014) we now outline a simple 
and general Keynesian-Kaleckian theoretical framework upon which we based the empirical 
investigation. We define this framework as Keynesian-Kaleckian because it has similar 
characteristics to the Post-Keynesian empirical works discussed in the previous chapter. Firstly, 
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the subject of the analysis is the distribution of income between wages and profit earners rather 
than between households. A second typical feature of Kaleckian models is the presence of spare 
capacity utilization in the economy. Therefore, prices are not positively related to the quantity 
produced - because there are no diminishing returns - and we assume they depend on a mark up15 
decided by the firms as a share of total cost. Inflation then is mainly determined by the straggle 
between profit and wage earners to secure a higher share of income for themselves. Finally, the 
functional distribution of income depends on factors that we consider exogenous in our analysis 
such as the degree of monopoly and the sectoral composition of the economy.  
The central relationship of interest is between aggregate demand and income distribution, in 
particular how demand (Y) responds to changes in the profit share of income (π) 16 
𝑑𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝑑𝜋
= ?                                                                         (1) 
The effect of a change in the profit share on aggregate demand can be decomposed into the sum 
of the effects that a change in the profit share has on the different components of aggregate demand 
𝑑𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝑑𝜋
=  
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋
+
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋
+
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋
−
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋
= ?                                             (2) 
Where C is consumption, I is investment, X is export and M is import17 
In the next section, we describe how wages affect each component of aggregate demand within a 
country taking functional distribution of income as exogenous and constant in the other countries. 
Subsequently, in section 3.2.2 we discuss and model the interactions between the aggregate 
demand in one country and changes in the distribution of income in its trade partners. 
3.2.1 The effect of the profit share on aggregate demand 
Consumption is expressed as a function of wages (W) and profits (R) rather than the level of 
income as a whole because wage earners and profit earners have different consumption behaviours. 
                                                          
15 𝑃 = (1 + 𝑚)
𝑤𝐿
𝑌
, where prices are determined with a mark up (m) on unit labour cost (w is hourly wage, L is total 
hour worked and Y is GDP. 
16 The change in aggregate demand caused by an increase in the profit share is normalised by the level of income at 
factor cost to simplify the interpretation. Income at factor cost (Yfc) is used because it is equal to the sum of the wage 
and the profit share. 
17 Government expenditure does not appear in the equation because it is assumed to be exogenously determined from 
the distribution of income. 
52 
 
𝐶 =  𝐶(𝑊, 𝑅)                                                                     (3) 
 The propensity to consume out of wages should be higher than the propensity to consume out 
of profit not only because often profits are associated with high-income earners but also because 
firms reinvest most of their retained profit. If this is true, an increase in the profit share should 
have a negative effect on consumption. 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
< 0                                                                          (4) 
Investments is specified as a function of the interest rate (ir) and the profit rate (r) that - 
following Bhaduri and Maglin (1990) – is decomposed into profit share (π), capacity utilization 
(u) and productivity of capital (z).  
𝑟 =
𝑅
𝐾
=  
𝑅
𝑌
𝑌
𝑌𝑝
𝑌𝑝
𝐾
                                                                  (5) 
𝐼 =  𝐼(𝑖𝑟, π, 𝑢, 𝑣)                                                                  (6) 
Where K is the stock of capital and Yp is potential output.  For a given rate of capacity utilization 
and productivity of capital, we expect the profit share to be positively related to investments.  
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
> 0                                                                          (7) 
It follows that whether a country (i) domestically benefits or loses from a higher profit share - 
that is, the demand is domestically profit or wage-led - depends on the magnitude of the opposite 
effects that a pro-capital redistribution of income has on consumption and investment.  
Turning to the foreign trade sector, functional distribution of income affects net exports mainly 
through a change in competitiveness. As mentioned in the introduction we are assuming that prices 
are set with a mark-up on unit labour costs. Since the real unit labour cost is closely related and 
moves in the same direction of the wage share18, a decrease in the unit labour costs is always 
associated with an increase in the profit share. Hence, when the profit share increases a country 
becomes more competitive because both its domestic and export prices fall.  
                                                          
18 Real unit labour costs is equal to the adjusted wage share multiplied by income at factor costs as a ratio to income 
at market price. This adjustment is necessary because while the wage share does not include taxes and subsides the 
unit labour cost must take them into account. 
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Import, is specified as a function of domestic prices (P), import prices (Pm), exchange rate (e), 
and import demand divided between consumption and investment spending19.  
𝑀 =  𝑀(𝑃, 𝑃𝑚, e, I, 𝐶)                                                            (6) 
Therefore, the overall effect of a change in the functional distribution of income on import is 
the sum of price and demand effects 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
= (
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐶𝑖
+
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
) +
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
                                         (7) 
The first term of equation (7) illustrates how imports relate to domestic demand that is in turn  
determined by consumption and investment separately rather than total GDP. We use this 
specification to take into account the structural composition of import between capital and 
consumer goods that may very well vary across countries - especially if they are at different stages 
of economic development. Since income distribution affects consumption and investment, the 
effect on import - that could be either positive or negative - depends on both the marginal effect 
of consumption and investment on import (
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐶𝑖
 and 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
) and the marginal effect of the profit 
share on consumption and investment (
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
). The second term in equation 5 instead, 
describes the relationship between the profit share and import. As discussed above, we expect the 
profit share to be negatively related to domestic prices that are in turn positively related to imports. 
As a result, the first term of equation (7) should be negative. 
The advantage of using this import specification is its flexibility that allows us to use the same 
methodology for different countries and at the same time account for structural economic 
differences between them. The effect of a change in the functional distribution of income on import 
is the sum of the price and demand effect. 
The last component of aggregate demand, export, is a function of export prices (Px), world 
prices (Pw), exchange rate and income of the rest of the world (Yw).  
𝑋 =  𝑋(𝑃𝑥, 𝑃𝑤, e, Yw)                                                               (8) 
                                                          
19 This specification of import demand is one of the difference with the empirical work of Onaran and Galanis (2014) 
and it will influence the way in which we account the interaction between countries. 
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Since, as seen above, the wage share is directly related to export prices, an increase in the profit 
share has a positive effect on export because it increases competitiveness by reducing export 
prices. 
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
→
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
> 0                                                            (9) 
Table 3.1: Partial effect of profit share on aggregate demand 
Components of 
aggregate demand 
Decomposed effect of π on Y 
Consumption 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
< 0 
Investment 
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
> 0 
Export 
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
=
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
> 0 
Import 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
< 0 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐶𝑖
+
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
=? 
  
Aggregate Demand 
𝜕𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
=
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
=? 
Finally, the total effect on GDP is the sum of the partial effects of a change in the distribution 
on consumption, investment and exports minus the effect on imports. Because these effects do not 
go in the same direction, whether the economy is wage or profit largely depends on the specific 
structural characteristic of each country such as, for example, its degree of openness, the 
propensity to consumer and firms’ access to credit. Table 3.1 sums up the expected effects of an 
increase in the profit share and a consequent decrease in the wage share. 
3.2.2 Interactions between countries and the fallacy of composition 
The framework outlined above allows to investigate the within country effects of functional 
income distribution but it does not take into account the interactions between countries. Not only 
it does not consider the effects of a change in one country’s income on its trade partners’ 
economies, but it also assumes that the distribution in the latter is kept constant. In this section, 
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following the footsteps of Onaran and Galanis (2014), we delineate the main channels of 
interaction between components of aggregate demand among countries. As discussed above, one 
of the main advantages of reducing the wage share is that the country gains international 
competitiveness through lower domestic and export prices. If, however, its trade partners reduce 
their wage shares as well, this competitive advantage will decrease or be entirely offset.  
Let us first consider how country i’s import is affected by a change in the distribution in its 
trade partner - country j. The change in price of import in country i (𝑃𝑚𝑖) is equal to the change 
in the price of export in country j (𝑃𝑥𝑗) weighted by the share of country i imports from country j 
over country i total import(
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
). 
∆𝑃𝑚𝑖 =
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
∆𝑃𝑥𝑗                                                                (10) 
The underlining assumption behind this identity is that the change in the functional distribution 
of income causes the price of all exported goods to vary in the same proportion20. Equation (11) 
shows the relationship between one country’s import and its trade partner’s functional distribution 
of income. 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑗
=  
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑚𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝜋𝑗
                                                         (11) 
An increase in country j’s profit share (𝜕𝜋𝑗) has a positive effect on country i’s import because 
it decreases its import price (𝑃𝑚𝑖) through a reduction of country j’s export prices (𝑃𝑥𝑗). This is 
a typical fallacy of composition problem: country i gains a competitive advantage - resulting in a 
reduction of imports - by decreasing the wage share only if its trade partners do not reduce their 
wage share at the same time. If that happens, the positive effect of lower wages is offset, at least 
partially. 
The overall effect of a contemporaneous increase in the profit share in country i and j (𝜋𝑖+𝑗), 
on country i’s import is equal to the sum of (7) and (11) 
                                                          
20 If this assumption holds true, the change in export price in country j is distributed among its trade partners depending 
only on their share of imports from country j and not on the composition of their imports. If instead, goods are 
heterogeneously affected by a change in the cost of labour, the composition of trade between countries should be taken 
into account, as it might be the case that some countries import from country j products that experience a lower 
increase in price compared to the good imported by other countries from country j. 
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𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖+𝑗
= (
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐶𝑖
+
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
) + (
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
) + (
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑚𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝜋𝑗
)           (12)   
It is not possible to determine a priori what the direction of the change in import is because it 
depends on the magnitude of these three contrasting effects. 
On the other hand, country i’s export to country j depends on country j’s import that, 
symmetrically to what shown in equation (12) for country i, depend on the distribution of income 
in both countries. However, since we already account for the effect of a change in export price in 
country i on country i’s export, we will now consider what is the effect (on country I’s export) of 
a change in country j’s import caused by a change in country j’s distribution rather than the change 
in country j’s import caused by a change in the distribution of income in both countries. In other 
words, we use the change in import in country j as calculated in equation (7) rather than (12). Since 
the change in country j’s import, following a change in the profit share in both j, can be positive 
or negative, we cannot foresee what is the effect on country i’s export. Formally we can write the 
change in country j’s demand for country i’s export, caused by an increase in country j’s profit 
share, as 
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑗
 =  
𝜕𝑀𝑗
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑗
𝜕𝜋𝑗
 
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑗
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑗
                                                       (13)  
Where the partial change in country i’s export is equal to the product of the change in country 
j’s import - as in equation (7) - and the ratio of the two countries income (
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑖
) weighted by the 
share of country j’s import coming from country i (
𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝑀𝑗
). 
The total effect of a change in the functional distribution in both countries on the export of 
country i, is the sum of the change in demand for its goods and services from country j (13) plus 
the positive effect of a reduction in its export prices (9). 
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖+𝑗
 =  
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
𝜕𝑀𝑗
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑗
𝜕𝜋𝑗
 
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑗
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑗
                                           (14) 
Also in this case whether an increase in the profit share has a positive or negative effect on 
export has to be determined empirically because it depends on the magnitude of the opposite 
effects that contribute to the total change in export. 
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The estimation of export demand is probably the main methodological difference between our 
work and Onaran and Galanis (2014). They calculate the demand for export coming from abroad 
as 
𝑑𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑖
𝑑𝑌𝑗
=
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝜕𝑌𝑤
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
𝜕𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑗
                                                              (15) 
Where Country i’s export depends on the marginal effect of export with respect to world income 
(Yw) and the increase in country j’s aggregate demand (
𝜕𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑗
) weighted by the share of country j’s 
income in the world income (
𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤
).  The main problem of this method is that it does not take into 
account the share of trade between countries. The contribution of country j’s increase in demand 
to country i’s export depends entirely on country j weight on world total income independently 
from whether country i and j are trade partners at all. For example, Mexico and Spain have similar 
GDP but they do not have the same trade patterns with the US. An increase in Mexican GDP 
should have a larger effect on US export than a similar increase in Spanish GDP because Mexican 
demand for US export is higher than the Spanish one. 
Finally, the total income effect of a contemporaneous change in the profit share in both 
countries on country i can be written as 
𝜕𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖+𝑗
=
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
− [(
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐶𝑖
+
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
) + (
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
) + (
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑚𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝜋𝑗
)]
+
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
𝜕𝑀𝑗
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑗
𝜕𝜋𝑗
 
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑗
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝑀𝑗
                                                            (16) 
3.3 Empirical analysis 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
The selection of the sample of countries is based on two principles: How much they trade with 
each other and whether a political agreement already exists between them or not. 
On one hand, the intuition behind this paper is that the distribution of income between wage 
and profit share should be treated internationally and not simply at a national level because it has 
an effect on each country’s net exports and it consequently has an impact on its trade partners as 
well. The idea then is to look at the effect on a country’s aggregate demand of a contemporaneous 
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decrease in the wage share in its principal trading partners. We decided to look at Mexico, Canada 
and the United States because they trade with each other a large share of their exports compared 
to any other group of countries.  
On the other hand, our approach suggests that because wage policies have international 
economic spillovers, it would make sense to coordinate these policies between countries. Mexico, 
Canada and the United States not only trade largely with each other and are geographically close 
but they are also part of NAFTA. It seems reasonable to believe that some coordination between 
trade partners would be easier to achieve if the countries are already part of these type of 
agreements.  
Table 3.2: Direction of trade, NAFTA 
By main destination By main origin 
United States 
Canada 19.4% China 19.5% 
EU (27) 18.8% EU (27) 16.6% 
Mexico 12.8% Canada 14.2% 
China 7.2% Mexico 11.8% 
Japan 4.7% Japan 6.3% 
Canada 
United States 74.9% United States 50.4% 
EU (27) 8.6% EU (27) 11.9% 
China 3.3% China 11.0% 
Japan 2.3% Mexico 5.5% 
Mexico 1.3% Japan 3.3% 
Mexico 
United States 80.1% United States 48.2 
EU (27) 4.8% China 15.1% 
Canada 3.6% EU (27) 10.8% 
China 1.4% Japan 5.0% 
Brazil 1.3% Korea, Republic of  4.2% 
Table 3.2 shows the composition of trade between the NAFTA countries using the data of the 
World Trade Organisation (2011). In 2011, China and the EU appear in the top five trade partners 
in all three countries. The reason we decided to exclude them from our analysis is mainly due to 
the political principle discussed above. While the coordination of the wage policy between Mexico 
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Canada and the United States seems already practically and politically challenging, coordinating 
the same policy also with all the EU countries and China is utopian to say the least. 
Following the same two principles another obvious set of countries to apply our methodology 
on are the members of the European Union. We chose NAFTA over the EU because a common 
wage policy seems more feasible between three countries rather than twenty-eight.  
3.3.2 Estimation Methodology 
The relationship between the profit share and aggregate demand is estimated by regressing the 
different components of aggregate on the distribution of income. In particular, we estimate an 
equation for Consumption, Investment, Export, Exports prices, Imports and Domestic Prices. As 
the final effect on aggregate demand is the sum of the effects on all its components, we are not 
only interested in the sign of each effect but also in its magnitude. This and the fact that we have 
to estimate eighteen equations calls for some clarifications on the methodology used to select the 
best econometric model for each equation in order to dissipate possible suspicions of data mining. 
The methodology used to select the econometric model is the general to specific21. The first step 
consists in estimating a general unrestricted statistical model that describes well the endogenous 
variable. This general model includes the dependent and independent variables and as many of 
their lags as they are needed to have a well defined model. A well defined model in this case is a 
model without any form of misspecification. In particular, we tested for autocorrelation (Breush-
Godfrey test), heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan), normality (K2 test) and functional form 
misspecification (Ramsey RESET test22). The second step is to reduce the statistical model into a 
restricted, parsimonious economic model. To do this, all the variable that are not statistically 
significant in the statistical model are removed - provided that they are also jointly insignificant 
using an F test. Just like the statistical model the economic model must be well defined and hence 
it must pass all the misspecification tests listed above. If the removal of a statistically insignificant 
variable caused the economic model to suffer from some form of misspecification, we did not 
remove it (which is why sometimes non significant variables appear in the tables).  
Year dummies23 have been included both in the statistical and economic models to take into 
account outliers that were causing some form of misspecification as defined above. When one 
outlier distorted the relationship between two variables, a year dummy was interacted with the 
independent variable whose relationship with the dependent variable was being distorted. The need 
                                                          
21 For a detailed explanation see Spanos (1986). 
22 For the Breush Godfrey test we used 2 lags of the residual and for the RESET test we used ŷ2, ŷ3 and ŷ4 
23 The coefficient of the dummy variables are not reported on the tables but they are all significant at least 1%. 
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to use year dummies reveals that our empirical model is failing to take into account some unknown 
factors that are relevant to explain the behaviour of the dependent variable at least in those years. 
We use them conscious that they are a measure of our ignorance but we cannot afford to have any 
form of misspecifications especially because our sample size is too small to justify the use of 
robust standard error. 
Turning to the data, they have all been collected from AMECO, the database of the European 
Commission, a part from the data on the direction of trade and the data on the Mexican adjusted 
wage share that come from respectively the database of the International Monetary Fund and the 
OECD’s statistical database.  
All the variables have been, converted in constant (2005) PPP dollars, transformed into 
logarithmic form24 and tested for unit root with the Dickey-Fuller test. As expected, most of them 
resulted to be non-stationary, but at the same time most specification failed the Pesaran 
cointegration bond test.25 Consequently, since in most cases we could not use error correction 
models, we estimate the equations in first difference using OLS. We are therefore not able to 
capture the long-run dynamics of the variables in our analysis. The elasticities of interest are 
calculated as the sum of the coefficients that capture the contemporaneous and lagged (if 
statistically significant) effect of a dependent variable on the independent variable. For example, 
Section 3.4.1.1 below, the elasticity of consumption with respect to profits (eC,aR) in the United 
States is equal to β2 + β4. The elasticities are subsequently transformed into marginal effects using 
the same method as Onaran and Galanis (2014) which is discussed step by step in the following 
sections. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Domestic effects 
In this section, we present the estimates of the within country effects of a change in π. The 
interaction between countries and the effect of a contemporaneous change in π in all three countries 
is discussed in section 3.4.2.  
3.4.1.1Consumption 
Similarly to Stockhammer and Ederer (2008), Hein and Vogel (2008, 2009), Stockhammer et 
al (2009) and Onaran and Galanis (2014), consumption is specified as a function of adjusted total 
                                                          
24 For this reason, the coefficient resulting from the estimations have to be interpreted as elasticities. 
25 We selected this test to check for cointegration because, compared to other methods such as those based on the 
approach of Engle and Grange (1987) of Johansen (1991), it is applicable even if, as it is our case, not all regressors 
are I(1) (Pesaran et al 2001). 
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profit and adjusted total wages. Using the methodology described in section 3.3.2 we estimate the 
following models for the United States, Mexico and Canada respectively. 
US: ∆log(C) = β0 + β1∆log(aW) + β2∆log(aR) + β3∆log(ir) + β4∆log(aWt-1) + β5∆log(aRt-1) 
Mexico: ∆log(C) = β0 + β1∆log(aW) + β2∆log(aR) + β3∆log(aWt-1) + β4∆log(aRt-1) + β4∆log(Ct-1) 
Canada: ∆log(C) = β0 + β1∆log(aW) + β2∆log(aR) + β3∆log(aWt-1) + β4∆log(aRt-1) + β4∆log(Ct-1) 
The lending interest rate (ir) was only statistically significant in the United States and, therefore, 
it does not enter the regression for the other two countries. The negative sign of its coefficient does 
not necessarily support the argument that higher interest rate encourages savings. An alternative 
explanation very well described by Stewart Lansley (2012) is that in the US given soaring level of 
inequality, credit was made more readily available to the low-middle class in order to finance 
consumption. In other words the poorer strand of the population has to rely on credit to keep a 
sustained level of consumption that their salary would otherwise not allow. This is in line with the 
argument put forward by Stockhammer (2009, 2015), Lysandrou (2011), Lapavitsas (2011) and 
other authors whose work was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Turning to the coefficients of interests, as we expected, the elasticity of consumption with 
respect to the adjusted wages (eC,aW) is considerably higher than the elasticity of consumption with 
respect to adjusted profits (eC,aR) in all three countries. We transform these elasticities into the 
marginal effect of an increase in the profit share on consumption as a share of total income at the 
sample mean using the following method  
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
= 𝑒𝐶,𝑎𝑅 
𝐶
𝑎𝑅
− 𝑒𝐶,𝑎𝑊  
𝐶
𝑎𝑊
                                                   (17) 
Where (
𝐶
𝑎𝑅
) is the share of consumption in total adjusted profits and (
𝐶
𝑎𝑊
) is the share of 
consumption in total adjusted wages both taken at the sample mean26.  
 
 
 
                                                          
26 For a given GDP the wage share is equal to 1 – π. In order to calculate the effect on consumption of a pro-capital 
change in the distribution of income we have to sum the effect of an increase in π to the negative effect of a reduction 
in the wage share (that is a necessary consequence of an increase in π). 
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Table 3.3: Regression results for the consumption function 
Dependent 
Variable 
∆log(C) 
Country USA Mexico Canada 
∆log(aW) 0.641*** 0.556*** 0.669*** 
 (0.0566) (0.0351) (0.0854) 
∆log(aR) 0.173*** 0.368*** 0.162*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0514) (0.0261) 
∆(ir) -0.00311***   
 (0.000490)   
∆log(aW t-1) 0.0520 -0.283*** -0.293** 
 (0.0486) (0.0946) (0.120) 
∆log(aR t-1) -0.0563** -0.162** -0.0728* 
 (0.0275) (0.0788) (0.0362) 
∆log(Ct-1)  0.458*** 0.400*** 
  (0.163) (0.145) 
    
Time period 1960 - 2007 1970 - 2007 1960 - 2007 
Adj R2 0.894 0.894 0.778 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
Our analysis suggests that when the profit share increases by one percentage point, consumption 
decreases - as a percentage of income - by 0.420% in the United States, 0.119% in Mexico and 
0.189% in Canada. The result for Canada is almost identical to the one of Onaran and Galanis 
(2014) but our marginal effect of profit share on consumption for the United States and Mexico is 
about one quarter smaller. This is due to small differences between our specifications. 
Table 3.4: Marginal effect of πi on i’s consumption (as % of Yfc) 
Marginal effect United States Mexico Canada 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 
-0.420 -0.119 -0.189 
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3.4.1.2 Investment 
Investment was initially specified as a function of the decomposed profit rate – as presented in 
equations (5) and (6)27 - and the interest rate. However, since the interest rate was found to be not 
statistically significant in Canada and Mexico, it was removed from the regression for these two 
countries. We estimated the following investment functions for the United Stated, Mexico and 
Canada28 
US: ∆log(I) = β0 + β1∆log(u) + β2∆log(π) + β3∆log(ir) + β4∆log(u t-1) + β5∆log(ir t-1) + β6∆log(I 
t-1) +  β7∆log(π) *d75 + β7∆log(π) *d98 + β9d84 
Mexico: ∆log(I) = β0 + β1∆log(ut-1) + β2∆log(π t-1) + β3∆log(π t-1)*d82 + β4∆log(π t-1)*d83 + 
β6∆log(π t-1)*d95+ β5d86 
Canada: ∆log(I) = β0 + β1∆log(u) + β2∆log(ut-1) + β3∆log(π t-1) 
The main difference between these specifications of the investment function and the those used in 
the empirical studies mentioned above concerns capacity utilization. Here, the ratio of income over 
capital (u) is used instead of the growth rate of income as a proxy for capacity utilization. Table 
3.4 and 3.5 show respectively the results of the estimations of the investment function and the 
marginal effect of π on I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 As we have no data on potential output so the profit rate is decomposed only into two components: 
𝑅
𝐾
=  
𝑅
𝑌
𝑌
𝐾
. Where 
Y/K accounts for both the productivity of capital and its rate of utilization. 
28 The dummy variables and the interaction terms have been included in the regression line following the criteria 
explained in Section 3.2, in particular for Mexico a dummy for year 1982, 1983 and 1995 was interacted with the 
profit share because in these years the change in the adjust profit share has been drastically larger than in the rest of 
the sample (the change in each of  these three years has been of about over 10%) and this was distorting the relation 
between the profit share and the investment rate.  
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Table 3.4: Regression results for the investment function 
Time period  1960 - 2007 1970 - 2007 1960 - 2007 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
As we can see from Table 3.4, the accelerator effect of capacity utilization is always 
substantially larger than the effects of the profit share and interest rate on investment. In addition, 
the magnitude of the coefficients of π is similar in the regressions for the three countries and they 
are statistically significant at least at 5%. Regarding the United States, our results are similar to 
those of Naastepad and Storm (2007) but are quite different from those of Onaran and Galanis 
(2014) and Hein and Vogel (2008) because they do not find a statistically significant effect of π 
on I. Moreover, the magnitude of our marginal effect in Canada and Mexico is double the size 
compared to the one estimated by Onaran and Galanis but we both find that only the coefficients 
Dependent 
Variable 
∆log(I) 
Country USA Mexico Canada 
∆log(u) 2.581***  3.223*** 
 (0.368)  (0.437) 
∆log(π) 0.559**   
 (0.259)   
∆ir 0.00965***   
 (0.00251)   
∆log(u t-1) -1.107* 1.044** -1.552*** 
 (0.546) (0.470) (0.504) 
∆log(π t-1)  0.627*** 0.774*** 
  (0.226) (0.272) 
∆ir t-1 -0.00771**   
 (0.00333)   
∆log(I t-1) 0.221*   
 (0.120)   
Time dummies 1975 1998 
1984 
1983 1995 
1986 
 
    
Adj R2  0.895 0.795 0.580 
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of the lagged profit shares are significant. These differences in the results were to be expected 
because of a substantial difference in the specification of our estimated equations29. 
The elasticities of investment with respect to the profit share (eI,π) are multiplied by the share 
of investment over profit to obtain the marginal effect of an increase in the profit share on 
investment as a share of income. Table 3.5 shows that a 1% increase in the profit share, increases 
investment by 0.314 in the United states, by 0.324 in Mexico and 0.468 in Canada.  
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
= eI,π
I
aR
                                                                   (18) 
Table 3.5: Marginal effect of πi on i’s investment (as % of Yfc) 
Marginal effect United States Mexico Canada 
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 
0.314 0.324 0.468 
 
3.4.1.3 Imports 
Income distribution has an effect on imports because it affects both the demand for import and 
its prices as shown in equation (7). To calculate the effect of a rise in a country’s profit share on 
its imports, we use a three steps procedure. First we estimate the elasticity of imports with respect 
to consumption (eM,C), investment (eM,I) and domestic prices (eM,P) using the following 
specifications – based on equation (6) - for the United States, Mexico and Canada respectively30 
US: ∆log(M) = β0 + β1∆log(C) + β2∆log(I) + β3∆log(e) + β4∆log(Prelt-1) 
Mexico: ∆log(M) = β0 + β1∆log(Prel) + β2∆log(C) + β3∆log(I) + β4∆log(Prelt-1) + β5∆log(et-1) 
+ β6∆log(Mt-1) + β7d86 + β8d95 
Canada: ∆log(M) = β0 + β1∆log(C) + β2∆log(I) + β3∆log(Prelt-1) + β4∆log(It-1)  + β5∆log(Mt-1) 
The results are shown in Table 3.6: all coefficients - except that for the exchange rate in Mexico 
- have the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
                                                          
29 For example, our coefficient for Canada would be almost identical to the one computed by Onaran and Galanis if 
the lagged value of capacity utilization were to be removed from the regression. However, as discussed in Section 
3.3.2 we cannot remove a significant variable from the economic model because we would be imposing a restriction 
to the statistical model that is not justifiable. In other words the model would be dynamically incomplete (see 
Wooldridge 2009) 
30 Prel – relative prices - is the ratio of domestic prices over import prices.  
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The second step consists in computing the effect of a change in functional income distribution 
on domestic prices. To do so, domestic prices are estimated as a function of unit labour cost (ulc), 
import prices and level of income as follows 
US: ∆log(P) = β0 + β1∆log(ulc) + β2∆log(Pm) + β3∆log(Y) + β4∆log(ulct-1) + β5∆log(Pmt-1) + 
β6∆log(Pt-1) 
Mexico: ∆log(P) = β0 + β1∆log(ulc) + β2∆log(Pm) + β3d82 + β4d86 
Canada: ∆log(P) = β0 + β1∆log(ulc) + β2∆log(Pm) + β3∆log(Y) + β4∆log(Pt-1) 
Table 3.6: Regression results for the import function 
Dependent 
Variable 
∆log(M) 
Country USA Mexico Canada 
∆log(Prel)  0.529***  
  (0.125)  
∆log(C) 0.624* 1.210** 0.835* 
 (0.340) (0.440) (0.434) 
∆log(I) 0.450*** 0.858*** 0.396*** 
 (0.0726) (0.125) (0.0905) 
∆log(e) -0.0866*   
 (0.0481)   
∆log(Prelt-1) 0.337*** 0.290** 0.277** 
 (0.0734) (0.121) (0.135) 
∆log(It-1)   -0.218** 
   (0.0927) 
∆log(et-1)  0.0991**  
  (0.0412)  
∆log(Mt-1)  -0.205** 0.317** 
  (0.0832) (0.133) 
Time dummies  1985 1995  
    
Time period 1960 - 2007 1970 - 2007 1960 - 2007 
Adj R2 0.823 0.940 0.675 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 3.7: Regression results for the domestic price function 
Dependent 
Variable 
∆log(P) 
Country USA Mexico Canada 
∆log(ulc) 0.303*** 0.760*** 0.628*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0383) (0.0920) 
∆log(Pm) 0.0590*** 0.300*** 0.0754* 
 (0.0132) (0.0283) (0.0398) 
∆log(Y) 0.102***  0.273*** 
 (0.0339)  (0.0808) 
∆log(ulct-1) 0.207***   
 (0.0602)   
∆log(Pmt-1) 0.0598***   
 (0.0129)   
∆log(Pt-1) 0.228***  0.185* 
 (0.0742)  (0.108) 
Time dummies  1982 1986  
    
Time period 1960 - 2007 1970 - 2007 1960 - 2007 
Adj R2 0.970 0.990 0.886 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
In the third step, the marginal effect of the profit share on import in proportion to GDP is 
computed using the following formula  
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
= [(
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝑒𝑀,𝐼
𝑀
𝐼
 ) + (
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝑒𝑀,𝐶
𝑀
𝐶
)] − [𝑒𝑀,𝑃 𝑒𝑃,𝑢𝑙𝑐 𝑒𝑢𝑙𝑐,𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑌
𝑌𝑓𝑐
 
1
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑀
 𝑌𝑓𝑐
]     (19) 
In the first square bracket we calculate (see Table 3.8) how much of the marginal effect of an 
increase in π on investment and consumption becomes an increase in import demand, i.e. the first 
term in equation 8. The partial change in investment and consumption caused by an increase in the 
profit share is multiplied by the marginal effect of investment and consumption on import.31In all 
three countries, even though eM,C is larger than eM,C, the marginal effect of investment on imports 
                                                          
31 𝑒𝑀,𝐼
𝑀
𝐼
=
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝐼
 and 𝑒𝑀,𝐶
𝑀
𝐶
=
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝐶
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(at sample mean) is always larger than the marginal effect of consumption on import. Since 
investment is positively related to the profit share, it follows that import demand increases when 
the profit rate increases. 
Table 3.8: Marginal (demand) effect of πi on i’s import (as % of Yfc) 
  USA Mexico Canada 
eM,C A 0.620 1.21 0.835 
eM,I B 0.45 0.858 0.178 
M/C C 0.150 0.258 0.444 
M/I D 0.598 0.665 1.391 
∂C/Y/∂π E 0.093 0.312 0.371 
∂I/Y/∂π F 0.269 0.571 0.248 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 
G=(A*C*E)+(B*D*F) 0.045 0.150 0.247 
The second square bracket describes the effect of the wage share on imports through its effect on 
prices. eM,P is the elasticity of imports to domestic prices, eP,ulc is the elasticity of price respect to 
unit labour cost and eulc,rulc is the elasticity of unit labour cost to real unit labour cost
32. The product 
of these elasticities - the elasticity of import to real unit labour cost (eM,RULC) - is then multiplied 
(see Table 3.9) by the ratio of income and income at factor costs33 and by import over the product 
of GDP at factor costs and real unit labour cost. The negative sign before the square bracket is due 
to the fact that we are interested in an increase in the profit share (and hence a decrease in the wage 
share and the unit labour cost) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 eulc,rulc is calculated as  
1
1− 𝑒𝑃,𝑢𝑙𝑐
 
 
33 This adjustment is necessary because the wage share is equal to the real unit labour costs minus net taxes. 
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Table 3.9: Marginal (price) effect of πi on i’s import (as % of Yfc) 
  USA Mexico Canada 
eP, ULC A 0.51 0.76 0.628 
eULC, rulc B = 1/(1-A) 2.041 4.167 2.688 
eM, P C 0.337 0.819 0.277 
eM, rulc D= A*B*C 0.351 2.593 0.468 
Y/Yfc E 1.078 1.085 1.132 
M/(Yfc*rulc) F 0.171 0.386 0.472 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 
G=D*E*F -0.064 -1.085 -0.250 
The marginal effect the profit share on import as a fraction of GDP (
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
) , shown in Table 
3.10, is the sum of the demand and price effect (first and second square parenthesis respectively). 
Table 3.10: Marginal effect of πi on i’s import (as % of Yfc) 
Marginal effect United States Mexico Canada 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 
-0.019 -0.937 -0.204 
The comparison with the literature is, in this case, trivial because other studies only take into 
account the change prices without considering the change in demand. Our results show that 
imports in Mexico and Canada fall – by respectively 0.937 and 0.204 as a percentage of GDP at 
factor costs - when their profit shares increase by 1%. On the other hand, in the United States the 
effect is still negative but very small (-0.019% of GDP). The fact that in the United States a change 
in competitiveness has a much smaller effect than in Canada or Mexico is not surprising given the 
different size of their economies. Moreover, the difference in the sign of the effect confirms, as 
discussed in Section 2, that whether a change in the distribution of income has a positive or 
negative effect on import it is not defined a priori but it is an empirical question and the answer 
might very well vary from country to country.  
3.4.1.4 Exports 
To calculate the effect of an increase in the profit share on exports, we use a method that is 
symmetric to the one used in the previous section to calculate the price effect on imports. We only 
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discuss the price effect of a change in the profit share on export because the demand effect depends 
on other countries and will be discussed in the next section. 
 The first step consists in estimating the sensitivity of export to prices with the following 
regressions for the United States, Mexico and Canada, respectively. 
US: ∆log(X) = β0 + β1∆log(Pxrel) + β2∆log(Yw) + β3∆log(e) + β4∆log(Yw t-1) + β5∆log(X t-1) 
Mexico: ∆log(X) = β0 + β1∆log(Pxrel) + β2∆log(Yw) + β3∆log(e) + β4∆log(Yw t-1) + β5∆log(e t-1) 
+ β6∆log(X t-1) + β7d85 
Canada: ∆log(X) = β0 + β1∆log(Pxrel) + β2∆log(Yw) + β3∆log(e) + β4∆log(Pxrel t-1) + β5∆log(Yw 
t-1) + β6∆log(X t-1) + β7∆log(e t-2) + β8d67 + β9d70 
Where Yw is the income of the rest of the world and Pxrel is a proxy for relative prices calculated 
as the ratio between export and import prices. The coefficient of interest - β1 - represents the 
elasticity of import with respect to export prices (eX,Px). Table 3.10 reports the results of the 
regressions. As expected the price elasticity of export in United Stated and Canada is negative and 
significant. Unfortunately instead, in the regression for Mexico, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant and its magnitude is very small.  
In the second step, the elasticity to export prices to unit labour cost is calculated using the 
following specifications 
US: ∆log(Px) = β0 + β1∆log(ulc) + β2∆log(Pm) + β3∆log(Pmt-1) + β4d80 
Mexico: ∆log(Px) = β0 + β1∆log(ulc) + β2∆log(Pm) + β1∆log(ulct-1) + β2∆log(Pmt-1) + β3∆log(Ywt-
1) + β4∆log(Pxt-1) + β5d80 + β6d86 
Canada: ∆log(Px) = β0 + β1∆log(ulc) + β2∆log(Pm) + β3∆log(Yw) + β4∆log(Pxt-1) + β5d73 + β6d74 
+ β7d7934 
The only difference with the specifications used in the domestic prices regression is that the 
income of the rest of the world (Yw) is used to control for demand pressures on prices rather than 
the income of the country (Y). 
 
 
                                                          
34 Without dummies the model is misspecified and has heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 3.11: Regression results for the export function 
Dependent 
Variable 
∆log(X) 
Country USA Mexico Canada 
∆log(Pxrel) -0.419*** 0.186* -0.421** 
 (0.146) (0.109) (0.174) 
∆log(Yw) 2.939*** 3.400*** 3.264*** 
 (0.441) (0.632) (0.336) 
∆log(e) 0.171*** 0.199*** 0.467*** 
 (0.0593) (0.0410) (0.105) 
∆log(Pxrelt-1)   -0.523** 
   (0.198) 
∆log(Yw t-1) -2.316*** -2.384*** -2.148*** 
 (0.504) (0.661) (0.428) 
∆log(et-1)  -0.167***  
  (0.0369)  
∆log(Xt-1) 0.500*** 0.555*** 0.214* 
 (0.118) (0.116) (0.121) 
∆log(et-2)   -0.253* 
   (0.130) 
Time dummies  1985 1967 1970 
    
Time period 1960 - 2007 1970 - 2007 1960 - 2007 
Adj R2 0.625 0.628 0.736 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 3.12: Regression results for the export prices function 
Dependent 
Variable 
∆log(Px) 
Country USA Mexico Canada 
∆log(ulc) 0.189* 0.420*** -0.0441 
 (0.103) (0.0988) (0.125) 
∆log(Pm) 0.486*** 0.712*** 0.512*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0453) (0.0909) 
∆log(Yw)   0.392* 
   (0.213) 
∆log(ulct-1)  -0.104  
  (0.0812)  
∆log(Pm t-1) 0.132*** 0.136  
 (0.0312) (0.0824)  
∆log(Yw t-1)  0.905*  
  (0.500)  
∆log(Px t-1)  -0.206* 0.218** 
  (0.102) (0.0948) 
Time dummies 1980 1980 1986 1973 1974 
1979 
    
Time period 1960 - 2007 1970 - 2007 1960 - 2007 
Adj R2 0.932 0.974 0.893 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
The results in Table 3.11 show that the unit labour cost has a positive and significant 
relationship with the export prices only in the United States and in Mexico. The elasticity of export 
prices respect to unit labour costs (eX,Px) in these two countries is respectively 0.189 and 0.420. On 
the other hand, in Canada, the relationship is not statistically significant and it has the wrong sign. 
This result for Canada is probably due to a structural break in 1980/198135. Before 1981 the 
relationship between export prices and unit labour costs is positive as in the other two countries 
but from 1981 to 2007 the relationship is horizontal and non significant.   
                                                          
35 We tested for structural breaks using the Chow test. Until 1980 both ulc and pm had an effect on px but Yw had no 
effect. After 1980 ulc has no effect on px but both pm and Yw do. 
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Finally, the marginal effect of profit share on export is calculated as  
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
= − eX,Px ePx,ulc 𝑒𝑢𝑙𝑐,𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐
𝑌
𝑌𝑓𝑐
1
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑖
𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
                                      (20) 
Symmetrically to what was done above for import, the product of the three elasticities, the 
elasticity of export respect to real unit labour cost (eX,rulc = eX,Px ePx,ulc 𝑒𝑢𝑙𝑐,𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐) is first adjusted 
by the ratio of income at market prices and income at factor cost and then multiplied by export 
over the product of real unit labour cost and GDP at factor costs. 
Table 3.13: Marginal (price) effect of πi on i’s export (as % of Yfc) 
  USA Mexico Canada 
ePx, ULC A 0.189 0.42 0 
eULC, rulc B 2.041 4.167 2.688 
eX, Px C -0.419 0 -0.523 
eX, rulc 
D= 
A*B*C 
-0.141 0 -0 
Y/Yfc E 1.078 1.085 1.132 
X/(Yfc*rulc) F 0.131 0.396 0.549 
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 
G=-
D*E*F 
0.023 0 0 
The last row of Table 3.13 presents the result of this calculation. In the United States, the 
marginal effect on the profit share on export as a ratio to income at factor cost is positive but quite 
small (0.023) while it is zero in Mexico and Canada even if for different reasons. In Mexico, the 
final effect is null because of the irresponsiveness of Mexican export to relative prices - which is 
surprising, but Onaran and Galanis reached a similar result. On the other hand, in Canada, it is 
caused by the lack of response of export prices to changes in the unit labour cost. Onaran and 
Galanis (2014) instead, find always a positive effect of the profit share on export but its magnitude 
so small that in practice it is not very different from our result.  
3.4.2 Interactions between countries 
In this section we present the estimates of the interactions between the United States, Mexico 
and Canada as a result of a contemporaneous decrease in their wage shares. In particular, we 
calculate how an increase in the profit share in one country affects its trade partners thorough 
changes in their import prices and export demand. 
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3.4.2.1 Import 
The marginal effect of an increase in the profit share in country j on country i’s import is 
calculated – following equation (11) - as 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑗
= (−ePx,rulc(j)
𝑌
𝑌𝑓𝑐
Pxj
rulcj
)
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
(𝑒𝑀,𝑃𝑚(𝑖)
1
𝑃𝑚𝑖
𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
)                             (21) 
Where the result of the first parenthesis, the marginal effect of the profit rate on export prices 
in country j (
𝜕𝑃𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝜋𝑗
= −ePx,rulc(j)
𝑌
𝑌𝑓𝑐
Pxj
rulcj
) is first weighted by the share of country i’s import 
coming from country j (
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
) and then multiplied by the result of the second parenthesis that is the 
marginal effect of import prices on import as a proportion of GDP in country i 
(
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑚𝑖
= 𝑒𝑀,𝑃𝑚(𝑖)
1
𝑃𝑚𝑖
𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
). 
Table 3.14: Marginal effect of foreign πj on i’s import, through import prices 
 USA Mexico Canada 
USA // 0.126 0.036 
Mexico 0.005 // 0.003 
Canada 0 0 // 
𝜕𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑗
 
0.005 0.126 0.039 
The results (Table 3.14) show how an increase in the profit share in one country causes its trade 
partners’ imports to rise. The different magnitude of the effects reflect the different size of the 
economies and the direction of trade in NAFTA: The effect on the United States of an increased 
in the profit share in the other two countries is ten times smaller than in Mexico and Canada. 
Moreover, Table 3.14 shows that an increase in the Canadian profit share does not cause American 
or Mexican imports to rise. This is because, as reported in Table 3.13, Canadian export prices seem 
to be inelastic to unit labour cost. 
In Table 3.15 we sum the effect on import of a domestic redistribution of income towards profits 
(Table 3.10) and of a contemporaneous increase in the profit share in the other two countries (Table 
3.14). Part of the improvement in competitiveness due to a reduction in domestic prices is offset 
by a contemporaneous decrease in the price of import. The marginal effect on import respect to 
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GDP becomes -0.014%, -0.811% and -0.165% respectively in the United States, Mexico and 
Canada. 
Table 3.15: Marginal effect of a contemporaneous change in πi and πj on i’s import 
 USA Mexico Canada 
Domestic Effect -0.019 -0.937 -0.204 
Foreign effect 0.005 0.126 0.039 
𝑑𝑀𝑢
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑢
𝑑𝜋𝑢+𝑚+𝑐
 
-0.014 -0.811 -0.165 
3.4.2.2 Exports 
Export demand in each country depends on the demand for imports in its trade partners and on 
its price competitiveness compared to the other countries.   
Firstly, using equation (13), we compute the marginal effect of a contemporaneous change in 
the distribution of income on the demand for export.  
Table 3.16: Marginal effect of πj on i’s export, through changes in demand 
 USA Mexico Canada 
USA // -0.011 -0.044 
Mexico -0.074 // -0.030 
Canada -0.012 -0.002 // 
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑗
 
-0.085 -0.013 -0.074 
Table 3.16 shows that, in each country, an increase in the other two countries’ profit share causes 
exports demand to fall. This happens because, as shown in Table 3.10, import demand falls in each 
country after an increase in their profit share. 
Finally we have to calculate how exports in each country are affected by changes in export prices 
in the other two countries. This is the exports counterpart of what we calculated in Table 3.14 for 
imports: For example, Mexican’ export prices which correspond to a share of American import 
prices have a negative effect on American import but a positive effect on American export. When 
Mexican export prices fall, American import prices decrease and the United States becomes less 
competitive compared to the rest of the world, i.e. their export should fall36. Using the same method 
                                                          
36 Note that relative prices (Pxrel) in the export equation was the ratio of export and import prices. 
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that it was used to compute the effect of the change in import prices on import, we now compute 
the effect of the change in import prices on export37. The only difference between equation (21) 
and (22) is that in the second parenthesis, the elasticity of export respect to import prices (eX,Pm) is 
used as opposed to the elasticity of import to import prices(eM,Pm). 
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑗
= (−ePx,rulc(j)
𝑌
𝑌𝑓𝑐
Pxj
rulcj
)
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
(𝑒𝑋,𝑃𝑚(𝑖)
1
𝑃𝑚𝑖
𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
)                             (22) 
Table 3.17: Marginal effect of πj on i’s export, through import prices 
 USA Mexico Canada 
USA // 0 -0.079 
Mexico -0.005 // -0.006 
Canada 0 0 // 
𝜕𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑗
 
-0.005 0 -0.085 
The results presented in Tables 3.17 confirm that when the labour cost decrease in a country, 
export demand in other countries decrease because they become less competitive. This effect 
however is very small especially in the United States – because of the size of its export – and in 
Mexico where export seems not to respond to relative prices as shown in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.18: Marginal effect of a contemporaneous change in πi and πj on i’s export 
 USA Mexico Canada 
Domestic Effect 0.023 0 0 
Foreign demand effect -0.085 -0.013 -0.074 
Foreign price effect -0.005 0 -0.085 
𝑑𝑋𝑢
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑢
𝑑𝜋𝑢+𝑚+𝑐
 
-0.067 -0.013 -0.159 
The overall effect on export of an increase in the profit share in the United States, Mexico and 
Canada is the sum of the effect of a domestic redistribution of income towards profit in each 
country (Table 3.13) and the effect of a contemporaneous change in the distribution in the other 
two countries (Tables 3.16 and 3.17).  
                                                          
37 Since export and import prices entered the regression for export respectively at the nominator and denominator of 
Pxrel, eX,Pm – the elasticity of export to import prices - has the same magnitude but opposite sign compared to eX,Px . 
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The fallacy of composition discussed in Section 3.2 is confirmed by the results in Table 3.18. In 
the United States, Mexico and Canada, the relative advantage of a less equal distribution of income 
is more than offset by an equal change in the distribution of income in the other two countries. It 
should be noted however that the negative foreign demand and price effects take into account only 
changes in imports and import prices from the other two NAFTA countries. If we were to consider 
all the other trade partners, the negative effect would be higher. 
3.4.3 Aggregate demand 
Table 3.19 shows the effect of a pro-capital change in the functional distribution of income in 
NAFTA on aggregate demand: the sum of the effects on consumption, investment and export 
minus the effect on import in each country. A contemporaneous 1% increase in the profit share - 
in the US, Mexico and Canada - causes the aggregate demand to decrease by 0.159% in the United 
States and while in Mexico and Canada aggregate demand seems to increase by 1% and 0.285% 
respectively. The overall demand regime hence is wage-led in the former country and profit-led in 
the other two.  
Table 3.19: Marginal effect of a contemporaneous increase in πi and πj on i’s aggregate 
demand 
Aggregate 
Demand 
United States Mexico Canada 
𝜕𝐶𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 
-0.420 -0.119 -0.189 
𝜕𝐼𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 
0.314 0.324 0.468 
−
𝑑𝑀𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝑑𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
-(-0.014) -(-0.811) -(-0.165) 
𝑑𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝑑𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
-0.067 -0.013 -0.159 
𝑑𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝑑𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
-0.159 1.003 0.285 
For the sake of comparison, Table 3.20 shows the effect on aggregate demand of an increase in 
the profit share in each country without a similar increase in the other two. 
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Table 3.20: Effect of an increase in πi on i’s aggregate demand (without between countries 
interactions) 
Aggregate 
Demand 
United States Mexico Canada 
𝑑𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝑑𝜋𝑖
 
-0.064 1.142 0.483 
As expected and discussed in the second section, when a country lowers its cost of labour and its 
trade partners do not, the positive effect on aggregate demand is larger than when its trade partner 
adopt the same strategy of wage reduction. 
The main difference between this result and Onaran and Galanis’ one is that they find that Canada 
is wage-led rather than profit-led. Moreover, the magnitude of the change in aggregate demand in 
the United States is larger while in Mexico is smaller compared to the result shown in Table 3.19. 
These differences are mainly driven by the diverse methodology used to analyse the investment 
and import functions and the interactions between countries. The different sample size also plays 
an important role because the interactions between countries are larger when the number of 
countries increases (in their sample there are thirteen countries).  
3.5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Being that the United States, Mexico and Canada are part of the same trade agreement and given 
that the main argument in favour of wage moderation is that countries become internationally more 
competitive, let us start these final remarks with a summary of the findings on the effect of 
redistribution on trade. The results seem to confirm the fallacy of composition problem highlighted 
in the second section. When the members of NAFTA decrease their wage share 
contemporaneously, the gain in competitiveness is reduced compared to a scenario in which only 
one of the three countries decreases its wage share.  
It is interesting to compare our results with the data on the direction of trade in NAFTA during 
the same period. Tables 3.21 and 3.22 show, respectively, the estimated marginal effect of a 
contemporaneous increase in the profit share on net exports and the change - which actually 
occurred - in net exports, as a share of total trade, among the members of the trade agreement. 
From Table 3.21 we can see that when the profit share increases contemporaneously in all the 
members of NAFTA, our estimated effect on net exports is negative in the United States, positive 
in Mexico and positive but very small in Canada. On the other hand, it is possible to notice from 
Table 3.22 that, from 1960 to 2007, the United States worsened its trade balance with both Mexico 
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and Canada; Mexico has improved its trade balance with both the United States and Canada and 
Canada has improved its trade balance with the United States but not with Mexico. Overall, the 
United States is the country whose trade balance suffered the most, while Mexico is the country 
that improved it the most. The evolution of the trade balances in NAFTA therefore is compatible 
with our results regarding a contemporaneous fall in the wage share. Even though this is not 
necessarily a proof that our analysis is correct, we can say that the historical evolution of trade in 
this area is compatible with our analysis.  
Table 3.21: Marginal effect of a contemporaneous increase in πi and πj on i’s net exports 
 USA Mexico Canada 
𝑑𝑁𝑋𝑖
𝑌𝑖
𝑑𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
-0.053 0.798 0.005 
 
Table 3.22: Difference between net exports in 2007 and 1960 
 USA Mexico Canada 
To 
USA // 0.325734 0.209922 
Mexico -0.03324 // -0.01689 
Canada -0.03159 0.009464 // 
Turning to the total effect on aggregate demand, similarly to the finding regarding net exports, the 
overall effect of a pro capital redistribution of income has an overall negative effect in United 
States and a positive one in Mexico and Canada. However, as shown in Tables 3.19 and 3.20, the 
effect on aggregate demand is always lower when the three countries increase their profit share of 
income at the same time, rather than when this increase happens in one country alone. It is 
reasonable to suppose that, analysing an increase in the profit share in more than three countries 
at the same time, the final effect on Mexico and Canada would be smaller and may even be entirely 
offset by the increase in competitiveness in the other countries. 
The policy implications of the analysis carried out so far are not trivial. In terms of increasing or 
decreasing the labour cost there is not a common policy that would be ideal for the three countries. 
An increase in the wage share has a positive effect in the United States but not in Canada and 
Mexico and vice versa. Proposing an adequate common policy for the members of NAFTA is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, however there is a general point that can be made: NAFTA is 
overall wage-led. When we multiply the semi-elasticity of an increase in the profit share on income 
with the average income from 1960 to 2007 for each country, we find that the negative effect in 
the United States is larger than the sum of the positive effects in Mexico and Canada (Table 3.23).  
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Table 3.23: Overall growth regime in NAFTA 
 
𝑑𝑌𝑖
𝑌𝑓𝑐,𝑖
𝑑𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
Average Yfc 
𝑑𝑌𝑖
𝑑𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙
 
United States -0.159 6530 -1044.6 
Mexico  1.003 789 791.9 
Canada 0.285 569 162.1 
NAFTA   -90.6 
Notes: the average Yfc is in millions of PPP $ (2005) 
Therefore, a pro-wage redistribution would be possible if the United States somehow compensates 
Mexico and Canada for the economic loss of a contemporaneous fall in the profit share. Moreover, 
we should point out that the adjusted wage share in our estimates includes the salary of high 
executives as well as the salary of employees and workers. A pro wage redistribution of income 
should try to raise the income of the poorest part of the wage earners. This will have a higher effect 
on the propensity to consume with positive effects in all countries. 
The main contribution of this work to the neo-Kaleckian literature is the geographical change of 
focus of the empirical analysis. We make the argument that, to design a wage policy, it is not 
enough, in an increasingly globalised world, knowing whether an individual country38 is wage led 
or profit led or whether a group of countries as a whole (i.e. the EU) is wage led or profit led39. 
Indeed, we need to know both aspects. For example, had we analysed Mexico on its own, the 
policy conclusion should have been that Mexico should pursue a policy of wage moderation even 
though we have seen that, in coordination with Canada and the US, it could pursue a redistributive 
policy. Had we instead analysed NAFTA as a whole, we would have reached the conclusion that 
a redistributive policy would be beneficial for NAFTA but we would not know if all countries 
within NAFTA would individually benefit from it and therefore agree to implement a common 
policy. Moreover, our analysis is different from Onaran’s and Galanis’ work (2014) in that, even 
if they analyse both the interactions between countries and the growth regime of the sample as a 
whole, they select a mix of developed and developing countries (thirteen in total) without any 
political relationship between them. We believe that in order to reach realistic policy conclusions 
regarding a possible wage policy coordination across countries, the sample of countries analysed 
                                                          
38 See for example Bowles and Boyer (1995), Naastepad and Storm (2006), Ederer and Stockhammer (2007), 
Stockhammer and Ederer (2008), Hein and Vogel (2008, 2009).   
39 See for example Stockhammer et al 2009.  
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should be made of countries that trade mainly with each other and among which there is some sort 
of political agreement that would allow the implementation of a common policy. 
On the methodological side, this chapter proposed an improvement and an extension of the usual 
Post-Keynesian empirical approach to study the relationship between functional distribution of 
income and aggregate demand. Firstly, we expanded the preceding empirical works - excluding 
Onaran and Galanis (2014) – by taking into account and calculating the spillover effects between 
countries. This is particularly important in an increasingly globalised world with rising trade shares 
because the functional distribution of income affects competitiveness. Secondly, we modified the 
investment function using the capital-income ratio, rather than the growth of income, as a proxy 
for capacity utilization. Thirdly, we decomposed the import function so that we can account for 
the structural composition of imports between investment and consumer goods and services. This 
allows us to study the effect of income distribution on import demand in countries with different 
import structures. Finally, regarding the interactions between countries, while Onaran and Galanis 
(2014) make exports demand depend on the weight of each importer country in the world income, 
we calculate the change in export demand using the average destination of export between trade 
partners.  
Econometrically, the main limitation of this work is the small number of observations for each 
country. It is indeed difficult to find data prior to 1960 - in particular about employment and total 
wage bills - that are necessary to compute the wage share. A larger number of observations would 
not only deliver more precise coefficients but also allow for more sophisticated estimation 
techniques. Another empirical problem is that the share of trade between Mexico, Canada and the 
United States changed substantially over time while our estimation of the interactions between 
countries is based on its average value during the selected time period. Moreover, this work could 
be enhanced by the estimation of the multiplier effect – that is present in Onaran and Galanis 
(2014). 
Finally, the theoretical framework can be extended to take into account other relevant aspects. 
Governments - whose behaviour could be endogenous to income distribution – the financial sector 
and the supply side of the economy are some of the main factors that should be included in this 
analysis.  
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Appendix A Variables names, definitions and sources 
Table A3.1: Data sources and definition 
Variable Description Source Notes 
aWS Adjusted wage share  as a % 
of gross domestic product at 
factor cost 
AMECO (US 
and Canada), 
OECD STAT 
online 
(Mexico) 
 
π Adjusted Profit Share  𝜋 = 1 − 𝑎𝑊𝑆 
Y GDP, real (2005 PPP) AMECO  
aW Adjusted wage bill  𝑎𝑊 = 𝑎𝑊𝑆 × 𝑌𝑓𝑐 
aR Adjusted gross operating 
surplus 
 𝑎𝑅 = 𝜋 × 𝑌𝑓𝑐 
C Consumption, real (2005 
PPP) 
AMECO  
I Investment, real (2005 PPP) AMECO  
X Export, real (2005 PPP) AMECO  
M Import, real (2005 PPP) AMECO  
K Net capital stock (2005 PPP) AMECO  
ir Real interest rate WB: World 
development 
indicators 
 
Mij Import from country j IMF: 
Direction of 
trade 
statistics 
 
P Domestic Price AMECO GDP deplator 
Pm Import price AMECO Import deflator 
Px Export prices AMECO Export deflator 
Prel Relative prices  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 𝑃𝑚/𝑃 
Pxrel Export relative prices  𝑃𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 𝑃𝑥/𝑃𝑋 
rulc Real Unit Labour Cost  
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐 = 𝑎𝑊𝑆 (
𝑌𝑓𝑐
𝑌
) 
ulc Unit Labour Cost  𝑢𝑙𝑐 = 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑐 × 𝑃 
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Appendix B: Average values 
Table B3.2: Sample mean values 
 USA Mexico Canada 
C 4720.00 547.00 360.00 
aW 4430.00 379.00 378.00 
aR 2100.00 410.00 190.00 
I 1180.00 212.00 115.00 
M 706.00 141.00 160.00 
X 540.00 135.00 186.00 
Y 7040.00 856.00 644.00 
Yfc 6530.00 789.00 569.00 
rulc 0.63 0.46 0.60 
pm 66.08 34.93 65.55 
px 70.29 33.97 59.97 
Note: C, I, M, X, Y, aW and aR are in millions. 
 
Table B3.3: Average import shares (
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑖
) 
  USA Mexico Canada 
From (j) USA // 0.65 0.658 
From (j) Mex 0.067 // 0.017 
From (j) Can 0.202 0.023 // 
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4 - Short and long run growth regimes in the United States 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have expanded the traditional empirical neo-Kaleckian analysis on 
growth regimes by examining the effects of a contemporaneous decrease in the wage share among 
trade partners. We now turn to a different issue: does the growth regime change over the long run 
compared to the short run? 
The difference between the long and the short run effect of functional income distribution and 
aggregate demand has had only a marginal place in the neo-Kaleckian empirical literature. In 2014 
however, Robert Blecker published a working paper in which he argued that it is plausible that the 
growth regime is more wage-led in the long run than in the short run. This is because of how the 
components of aggregate demand behave in the long run. 
Some post-Keynesian authors have argued that, especially in recent years, consumption - together 
with other parts of demand - has been more and more driven by debt (Stockhammer 2009, 2015). 
If debt relaxes the constraint of current income on consumption, the elasticity to consume out of 
wages decreases and therefore consumption becomes less wage-led. However, Blecker points out 
that, in the long run, when the interest on debt increases and debt must be repaid, consumption is 
more likely to be driven by income. Moreover, since consumption out of wages is larger than 
consumption out of profits, consumption should become more wage-led in the long run.  
On the contrary, investment is probably less constrained by the profit share in the long run, which 
makes investment less profit-led. In the short run, the profit share is an indicator of profitability 
and a measure of internal as well as external funding. At firm level, in fact, a large cash flow - 
proxied by profits - reveals to potential investors the firm’s ability to pay interest on its debt. 
Consequently, an increase in the profit share can have two positive effects on investment. Firstly, 
it signals an increase in profitability, which could enhance “animal spirits” and secondly, it relaxes 
financial constraints. In the long run however, as discussed in Chapter 2, firms want to keep 
capacity at a certain desired level in order to respond quickly to demand shocks and to create an 
entry barrier for new firms. Therefore, they are less likely to invest beyond that point even if they 
are gaining high profits from current production or they have large availability of funds.  
Finally, while net exports is considered to be profit-led - because a lower unit labour cost would 
enhance competitiveness - in the long run two issues could arise. First, it is possible that an increase 
in competitiveness is offset by an automatic adjustment – for example, currency appreciation - that 
would make exports more expensive. Secondly, it is possible that, as discussed in the previous 
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chapter, other countries will start decreasing their unit labour cost as well in order not to lose export 
shares.  
Following the intuition of Blecker (2014), we analyse the relationship between function income 
distribution and internal demand40 in the short and in the long run in the United States between 
1950 and 2014. We estimate the determinants of consumption and investment and test how they 
change from the short to the long run using error corrections models. An element of novelty, 
compared to other studies on similar topics, is the disaggregation of consumption and investment. 
We carry out the empirical analysis using consumption and investment spending as well as their 
components. In particular, consumption is disaggregated into goods and services while investment 
is disaggregated into residential and non-residential. This decomposition not only serves as a 
robustness check, but also sheds some light on the functioning of different types of industries. We 
argue that the determinants of residential and non-residential investment can be profoundly 
different.  
Net exports is not included in the analysis for two reasons. Firstly, the United States is, because of 
its size, a relatively closed economy with exports playing a minor role in determining aggregate 
demand. Consumption and investment amounted, on average, to 80% of GDP during the period 
under examination while exports accounted for about 8% of GDP. Secondly, as highlighted in the 
previous chapter, the effect of the decrease in unit labour cost has been offset by a similar decrease 
in the unit labour cost in Mexico and Canada in the same period. Onaran and Galanis’ (2014) 
analysis of the G20 countries also confirm this. 
Our results substantiate Bleker’s hypothesis of the plausibility that growth regime is more wage-
led in the long run than in the short run. It certainly seems to be the case in the United States 
between 1950 and 2014 as both consumption and investment are less sensitive to profits in the 
long run compared to the short run. 
This chapter is organised as follows: The next section briefly summarizes the relevant literature. 
Section 3 discusses the nature of the data and empirical model. Section 4 presents the main results 
and Section 5 concludes.  
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Empirical studies on the overall growth regimes 
As discussed in Chapter 2, most neo-Kaleckian empirical works were inspired by the Bhaduri’s 
                                                          
40 Government expenditure is, in line with the relevant literature, excluded by the analysis because it is only 
marginally determined by the functional distribution of income.  
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and Marglin’s model (1990). The attractiveness of this model derives from its ability to allow for 
both a profit-led and a wage-led growth regime. Aggregate demand (Y) is said to be profit-led if 
an increase in the profit share (π) has a positive effect on income (∂Y/∂π<0) and wage-led if an 
increase in the profit share has a negative effect on income.  
The econometric evidence on the growth regime in the United States is mixed. We can divide the 
empirical studies by the two main methodologies used to estimate the growth regime: the single 
equations approach and the VAR approach. The single equation approach consists in estimating 
the components of aggregate demand individually - as a function of functional income distribution 
- and then summing up the partial effects of a change in the distribution of income on each of them. 
Using this method  Bowles and Boyer (1995), Hein and Vogel (2008), Onaran et al (2011), Onaran 
and Galanis (2014), Stockhammer and Wildauer (2015) and Chapter 3 of this thesis, find that the 
United States in the second half of the twentieth century, was characterised by a wage-led regime. 
Only Naastepad and Storm (2006) found evidence of a profit-led regime. On the other hand, using 
the VAR approach, capacity utilization (or growth) is estimated directly as a function of its past 
values, the past values of functional distribution of income and, often, other control variables. 
Using a VAR with data from 1948 to 2002, Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) find that demand is 
profit-led. Carvalho and Rezai (2015) confirm Barbosa-Filho and Taylor’s results. Moreover, they 
add that, since the increase in personal income inequality weakened the effect of the wage share 
on consumption (because high inequality among wage earners causes the average propensity to 
consume to fall), the regime became more profit-led in the last decades of the twentieth century. 
Finally, also Nikiforous and Foley (2012) - even though they do not use a VAR but instead estimate 
the capacity utilization function with a two stages least square method - find that the wage share 
has a negative effect on aggregate demand. 
All of these studies however, estimate only the short-run relationship between functional 
distribution and growth. To our knowledge, no study empirically analyses the difference between 
the long and the short-run growth regime - except Blecker (2014) - and the effect of functional 
distribution of income on the components of consumption and investment. Blecker argues in 
favour of the plausibility of his hypothesis using a preliminary graphical analysis. Using scatter 
plots, he shows that the correlation between the wage share and different measures of economic 
activity is positive from 1948 to 2013 but mostly negative when the sample is divided into smaller 
sub-periods. He concludes that the change in the sign of the correlation between the wage share 
and economic activity suggests that the demand regime is profit-led during the business cycle but 
it becomes wage-led in the long run.  
In the following two sections, we discuss the main theoretical and empirical works on the 
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consumption and investment functions.  
4.2.2 Consumption 
One of the most famous consumption theories is Friedman’s (1956) “permanent income” 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, consumption does not depend principally on current 
income because, since individuals are rational and want to maximise their lifetime utility, 
consumption depends on the income that individuals expect to gain over their life time. Post-
Keynesian works on the consumption function, however, are more influenced by Duesenberry’s 
(1949) “relative income” hypothesis according to which consumption is not only influenced by 
current income but by past levels of consumption and by the consumption standards achieved by 
those around us. Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) explain how the increase in income inequality 
combined with the relative income hypothesis can explain the rise in household debt. The desire 
to keep up with previous levels of consumption (as well as with the Joneses) and the boom in 
advertisement in the 1980s due to the increased use of mass media, caused a sharp rise in household 
debt which was needed to fuel consumption in the presence of stagnating wages. Barba and Pivetti 
(2009) who analyse the plausibility of this hypothesis in the United States make a similar point. 
Kim et al. (2014) however, point out that consumer debt and debt service can have different effects 
on consumption. They propose two scenarios. First, let us consider a situation in which the 
propensity to consume depends on disposable income and disposable income depends on the stock 
of debt because the higher the stock of debt, the higher is the debt service that has to be repaid. In 
this case, borrowing has a positive effect on consumption, but debt service will have a negative 
effect on consumption because it makes disposable income fall. In the second scenario instead, 
disposable income does not depend on debt service because the interest on debt is paid out of 
savings. Up to a certain level therefore, borrowing has only a positive effect on consumption 
because the debt service is repaid by decreasing savings. Both of the scenarios are compatible with 
the hypothesis that, over long periods, consumption depends more on income than on debt.  
Empirically, Kim et al. (2015), even though they do not include the distribution of income in the 
consumption function, find that the marginal propensity to consume increases from the short to 
the long run. Moreover they find robust evidence of a positive short-run effect of borrowing on 
consumption in the United States between 1950 and 2011.The long-run effect instead is less 
robust: the long-run coefficient of borrowing on consumption is mostly non significant across 
different specifications and estimation methodologies. They also find that accumulation of debt, 
has both a short and a long-run negative effect on consumption but this result is not very robust to 
different specifications either. The role of debt on consumption is further analysed by Caldentey 
and Vernango (2013). They find, using spectral analysis on low and high frequency data, that in 
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the United States “debt has rendered consumption independent, to a certain extent and for a given 
period of time, of income”.  
4.2.3 Investment 
Most of the theory behind the investment function has already been discussed in Chapter 2. We 
will now briefly summarise the main arguments and present some relevant empirical work.  
In the exogenous and endogenous growth models, investment is positively determined by savings, 
which represent the availability of funds, and not by demand. In fact, demand always follows 
supply and producers do not have to worry about shortages of demand. A second important 
determinant of investment is the interest rate, which is used as a proxy for the cost of capital. When 
capital becomes relatively cheaper compared to labour, investment will increase because there will 
be a shift towards more capital-intensive production techniques. Obviously, this implies that 
workers and productive capital can be a perfect substitute in the production process.   
In the traditional Marxian investment function, the rate of capital accumulation depends 
principally on the profit rate, because it represents both profitability and availability of internal 
funding (Dumenil and Levi 2004). In the Goodwin (1967) cycle, an increase in the labour cost 
decreases investments: a lower profit rate causes a fall in accumulation, which in turn increases 
the level of unemployment. When the reserve army increases and workers lose contractual power, 
the profit rate can increase again and with it, the accumulation rate. High accumulation and growth 
then make unemployment fall and the reserve army shrink. This causes the wage rate to increase 
again and the profit rate to decrease, starting a new cycle. However, Crotty (1993) explains how 
this interpretation of the investment function stands on assumptions of Volume I of Marx’s Capital. 
He expands the argument by relaxing such assumptions: when firms face the possibility of not 
selling all of their product and are allowed to borrow funds in the financial markets, it is possible, 
for short periods of time, that excessive competition among firms leads to increased capital 
accumulation, even when firms face decreasing profits. Both the Marxist and Neoclassical schools 
therefore agree that in the long run, investment depends on supply factors such as the availability 
of funds and profitability. 
The main difference between the supply side investment functions described above and post-
Keynesian investment function is that, in the latter, not only supply but also demand factors 
contribute to determine investment.  Steindl (1952 and 1979) suggested that output adjusts to a 
natural “desired” level of capacity utilization. This level is below full capacity because it serves as 
entry barrier to new firms and allows firms to respond quickly to demand shocks. When demand 
is high and capital utilization is above its desired rate, firms will invest more to reduce the 
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utilization of capital until it reaches its desired level. The investment function introduced by 
Bahduri and Marglin (1990) expresses investment as a function of the decomposed profit rate41. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, investment therefore depends on the profit share, capacity 
utilization and the productivity of capital. An increase in the wages and unit labour cost 
corresponds to a decrease in the profit share, which in turn reduces the profit rate and investment. 
A higher wage share however, stimulates consumption and therefore capacity utilization, the profit 
rate and investment increase. Whether investment is positively or negatively affected by a decrease 
in the profit share, depends on how strongly consumption responds to higher wages, how much 
capacity utilization increases because of higher consumption and how strong (and quickly) 
investment increases to bring capacity utilization back to its desired level which, as discussed 
before, could very well be endogenous.42 Another post-Keynesian feature of the investment 
function is that financialization plays an important role in it. The main argument is centred on the 
role of rentier capitalist and the shareholder value orientation of firms. As Lazonick and O’Sulivan 
(2000) pointed out in their seminal paper, in the 1980s, most firms switched from a “retain and 
reinvest” to a “downsize and distribute” strategy. This meant that, since the 1980s, an increasing 
part of profits were diverted from production and to be distributed in the form of dividends or 
interest payments. Similarly, Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013) argues that firms use a growing 
share of their profits to repurchase their own stock or carry out financial operations at the expenses 
of investment and particularly investments in innovation. 
From an empirical point of view, all of the studies that find that the growth regime is wage-led in 
the United States, also find that, in the short run, the effect of the proxy for capacity utilization has 
a larger effect on investment than the profit share. Regarding the long run, Onaran et al (2011) 
find that while capacity utilization has a strong positive long-run effect on investment as a share 
of income, the effect of the profit share is substantially smaller. In particular, they estimate a small 
long-run negative effect of the rentier profit share on investment and a small long-run positive 
effect of non-rentier profit share on the investment43. This is in line with Stockhammer and 
Wildauer (2015) who find, using a panel of countries, that while output has a strong long-run effect 
on investment, the long-run effect of the wage share is approximately zero. Moreover, a long-run 
relationship between investment and capacity utilization is also found by Chiriko et al (2011) using 
a panel of American firms.  Regarding financialization, the results from Onaran at al (2011) are 
consistent with the findings of Stockhammer (2004) and Orhangazi (2008). Using macroeconomic 
                                                          
41 As discussed in Chapter 2, previous Kaleckian models would express consumption as a function of the profit rate 
and capacity utilization. 
42 We are in this case considering a simple closed economy scenario. 
43 Capacity utilization is significant in all their specifications, while the rentier share of income and the non-rentier 
share of income are significant only if they enter the regression individually.  
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data on the United States the former and a panel of firm level data the latter, they both find that 
the shift towards a shareholder value orientation of firms, as predicted by Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(2000), had a negative effect on accumulation in the United States: interest payments and 
dividends have a negative effect on accumulation. Similarly, from a Marxist perspective, Dumenil 
and Levi (2004) defend the primary role of the profit rate in investment function. They argue that 
reason why investment did not keep up with the surge in the profit rate, in the last decades of 
twentieth century in the United States, was the large increase in rentier profits. Since accumulation 
depends on retained profits rather than overall profits and a great part of profits was diverted from 
firms to shareholders, the rise in the overall profit rate was not associated with an equivalent 
increase in investment. 
4.3 Empirical method 
Since we are interested in estimating the evolution of the consumption and investment function 
separately, similarly to the previous chapter, we use the single equation approach rather than the 
system (VAR) approach. The two main methodologies that allow for the estimation of both short 
and long-run effects are the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model and the Error Correction 
Model (ECM). The choice between the two methods depends on the nature of the data. If the data 
have unit root, it is standard econometric practice to use an ECM44. In order to choose the most 
appropriate methodology, it is first essential study the characteristics of the data. 
4.3.1 Consumption and investment functions 
Consumption (C) is specified as a function of the wage bill (W), gross operating surplus (R) and 
house wealth (HW), consumer debt (D).  
𝐶 = 𝑐(𝑊, 𝑅, 𝐻𝑊, 𝐷)                                                               (1) 
It is common, in neo-Kaleckian empirical works that study the different effects of wages and 
profits on consumption45, to express consumption as a function of income, split between total 
wages and total profit. If our hypothesis is correct, not only the elasticity of consumption respect 
to wages is higher than the elasticity of consumption respect to profits in the short run, but the 
difference between them should increase in the long run. Following Onaran et al (2011), house 
wealth enters the regression to control for the wealth effect and therefore it is supposed to have a 
positive effect on consumption. Household debt is controlled for by consumer debt (excluded 
                                                          
44 Pesaran and Shin (1998) however argue that it would be possible to use an ADL model even if data have a unit 
root. 
45 Other studies with a similar specification are Stockhammer and Ederer (2008), Hein and Vogel (2008, 2009), 
Stockhammer et al (2009) and Onaran and Galanis (2014).  
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mortgages), which as discussed in the previous section, we expect to be positive and significant 
only in the short run.  
As a robustness check, we use the same independent variables to estimate the two components of 
consumption: consumption of goods (CG), and consumption of services (CS). This further division 
is important because the components of consumption might differ in their determinants and in their 
short and long-run dynamics which should lead to different industrial policies. For example, we 
expect debt to have a larger effect on consumption of goods rather than consumption of services. 
This is because we expect households to use credit instruments to buy especially durable goods. 
Furthermore, we repeat the estimations dividing profits into rentier profits (Rr) and non rentier 
profits (Rnr)
46. Onarn et al (2011) already used this distinction to test the effects of the change in 
the distribution of profits between corporations and rentiers brought about by financialization. In 
particular, Rr equals dividends and interest payments while Rnr is a measure of firms’ retained 
profits and it equals total profits minus Rr.  
Regarding the investment function, following the literature, we first estimate it as a function of 
capacity utilization47 (Z), the interest rate (i) and the profit share divided between rentier share (πr) 
and non-rentier share (πnr).  
𝐼 = 𝑖(𝑍, 𝑖, 𝜋𝑟 , 𝜋𝑛𝑟)                                                                 (2) 
Subsequently we depart from the standard approach and estimate residential investment (IR) and 
non-residential investment (InR) separately. The rationale for this is that the determinants of 
investment in new houses are probably substantially different from those of non-residential 
investment required for production such as investment in new equipments, structures and 
intellectual property.  We believe the determinants of investment that appear in equation (2) are 
more fitted to explain the behaviour of non-residential investment than that of residential 
investment. We therefore estimate non-residential investment as  
𝐼𝑅 = 𝑖(𝑍, 𝑖, 𝜋𝑟 , 𝜋𝑛𝑟)                                                                (3) 
We expect capacity utilization to be positively related to investment both in the long and in the 
short run. The profit shares on the other hand should be more relevant in the short run than in the 
                                                          
46 Rentier profit equals dividends and interest payments while non-rentier profit is a measure firms’ retained profits 
and it equals gross operating surplus minus rentier profits. 
47 We use capacity utilization of manufacturing as a proxy for capacity utilization in total industry because the former 
is only available from 1967. The two series are almost identical in the period in which they overlap and the correlation 
between the two series is 0.994.   
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long run. Moreover, we expect πr to have a negative effect, or at least a smaller positive effect, 
than πnr. 
On the other hand, the different nature of residential investment requires a different specification. 
The NIPA handbook (Chapter 6, 2014) explains that  
“Residential structures consists of new construction of permanent-site single-family 
and multifamily housing units, improvements (additions, alterations, and major 
structural replacements) to housing units, expenditures on manufactured homes, 
brokers’ commissions and other ownership transfer costs on the sale of residential 
property, and net purchases of used structures from government agencies. Residential 
structures also include some types of equipment (such as heating and air conditioning 
equipment) that are built into the structure. Residential equipment consists of 
equipment, such as furniture or household appliances, that is purchased by landlords 
for rental to tenants.” 
It seems reasonable that construction and purchase of new and old houses or alteration of existing 
houses such as remodelling of kitchens and bathrooms depends on determinants similar to those 
of consumption expenditures rather than on capacity utilization. In this chapter, we specify non-
residential investment as a function of the wage bill (W), rentier profits (Rr), non-rentier profits 
(Rnr) and the level of mortgages (M).  
𝐼𝑅 = 𝑖(𝑊, 𝑅𝑟 , 𝑅𝑛𝑟 , 𝑀)                                                             (4) 
4.3.2 Time series properties of the data 
At a first glance, we can say that all of these variables, excluding capacity utilization and the 
interest rate, have an upward, often quadratic, deterministic trend. For most variables, the 
estimated coefficients of equation (5) are always extremely statistically significant. In most series, 
β1≈1 and β4<0. This indicates that most variables could have a unit root and a concave time trend48.   
log (𝑌) = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡−2 ) + 𝛽3𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡
2                              (5) 
Since we are interested in the long-run and short-run relationships between our variables, we 
should be very cautious about the nature of our series for both econometric and theoretical reasons. 
Whether macroeconomic series are actually stationary or non-stationary around their deterministic 
                                                          
48 The concave time trend of a variable expressed in logarithmic form implies that the average growth rate of the 
variable decreased over time. This describes well what happened in the United States over the period under 
examination.   
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trend is an issue on which there is not broad consensus in the literature. Nelson and Plosser (1982) 
famously argued that most macroeconomic data are characterised by a stochastic as well as a 
deterministic trend49 and most econometric textbooks support this idea. Perron (1989 and 1997) 
however, found that after controlling for structural breaks, many macroeconomic series are 
actually trend stationary. The main cause of this debate is well explained by Campbell and Perron 
(1991) in their seventh and ninth rules: 
“Rule 7: In finite samples, any trend stationary process can be approximated 
arbitrarily well by a unit root process.  
Rule 9: In a finite sample, any unit root process can be approximated arbitrarily well 
by a trend stationary process.” 
Whether the data generating process of a series is trend stationary or it is characterised by a 
stochastic trend (unit root) carries also important theoretical implications. One of the main 
characteristics of post-Keynesian theory is the use of historical time as opposed to logical time 
(Robinson 1962). The concept of historical time implies that time is irreversible and a decision 
cannot simply be undo in the next period. Regarding the relationship between business cycle and 
time trend, Kalecki (1971, p.165) points out that 
“The long-run trend is but a slowly changing component of a chain of short period 
situations; it has no independent entity.”  
By definition however, a deterministic trend is only function of time and therefore, the long-run 
evolution of the series does not depend on the short-run movements around the trend but on time 
alone. Equation (6) describe a trend stationary process 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,     |𝛽1| < 1                                             (6) 
Since |𝛽1| < 1, past values of Y and past shocks (𝜀) do not have a permanent effect on the series. 
That is, the long-run average of a series has its own identity, which is independent of the short run. 
On the other hand, the concept of historical time is better described by a stochastic trend. Let us 
consider for example a random walk, the simplest stochastic process  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑌0 + ∑ 𝜀𝑡−𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗=0
                                                      (7) 
As we can see in equation (7) each year’s value is equal to the value the year before plus a random 
                                                          
49 Note that if a series has both a stochastic and a deterministic trend it means that it is not trend stationary.  
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shock. In other words, the series is the sum of its original value (𝑌0) and the sum of all the random 
shocks which therefore have a permanent effect. In this case, the long-run average does not depend 
on time alone but on its own “history”.  
As discussed above, it is often argued that most macroeconomic time series data have both a 
stochastic and a deterministic trend such as 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + ∑ 𝜀𝑡−𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗=0
                                                          (8) 
Equation (8) carries two technical hitches. First, when the dependent variable in a regression 
follows a time trend, we should include a time trend among the control variables or de-trend the 
dependent variable. This is done to avoid spurious results because, by definition, the deterministic 
component of a variable is not a function of other variables but of time alone. The second problem, 
however, is that separating the deterministic trend from the stochastic trend is practically 
challenging because as pointed out by Campbell and Perron (1991), in finite samples the 
deterministic trend can be approximated by a stochastic trend and vice versa. The two trends are 
therefore difficult to separate. To illustrate this problem let us consider the logarithm of GDP from 
1950 to 2014 in the United States. We estimated it as a function of its past values (Log(Yt-1)), of a 
quadratic deterministic trend (Trend ) or as a combination of both (Table 4.1). 
The fact that in the first two columns the Adjusted R2 is respectively 0.999 and 0.997 indicates 
that the series can be “explained” by either a stochastic trend or a deterministic trend. Interestingly, 
when we control for both Log(Yt-1) and Trend (column 3) the coefficient of the stochastic trend 
decrease by only 18% while the effect of the deterministic trend falls by 78%. This proves that, in 
column (2), the coefficient of Trend did not capture only the effect on Y of the deterministic trend 
but also the effect of the stochastic one. Moreover, Figure 4.1 shows the predicted values of Log(Y) 
from the estimates in column (1) and (3). As we can see, the two series of predicted values almost 
entirely overlap. Therefore, if a time trend exists, it can be well approximated by the stochastic 
trend because, when we remove it, the remaining stochastic trend can “explain” the series just as 
precisely (column 1).  
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Table 4.1: Regression results for GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log(Y) Log(Y) Log(Y) 
    
Log(Yt-1) 0.989***  0.808*** 
 (0.00455)  (0.0796) 
Trend  0.578*** 0.127** 
  (0.0558) (0.0560) 
Trend2  -0.000138*** -3.06e-05** 
  (1.41e-05) (1.36e-05) 
Constant 0.358*** -574.6*** -126.2** 
 (0.134) (55.35) (55.66) 
    
Observations 64 64 64 
Adj R2 0.999 0.997 0.999 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Fig 4.1: Fitted values of Log (Y) 
 
To determine whether our series have a stochastic trend we use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test. Tables B4.1 and B4.2 in Appendix B show that when we use a linear trend in the test, 
only total profits and capacity utilization seem to be stationary around their deterministic trend (as 
in equation 6). All other variables have also a stochastic trend (as in equation 8). Despite the fact 
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that the test suggests that most series are characterised by both a stochastic and a deterministic 
trend, in the following estimates we will not remove the deterministic trend from our dependent 
variables, nor control for it in our regressions as standard econometric practice would require. We 
will instead assume, using Campbell’s and Perron’s (1991) Rule 7, that the deterministic trend, if 
it exists, can be well approximated by the stochastic trend present in the series. Not removing the 
possible deterministic trend allows us to respect the concept of historic time and take into account 
the complete long-run variation of our variables. In other words, the evolution of investment and 
consumption will be explained either by their past values or by the independent variables, not by 
time alone.  
4.3.2 The empirical model 
Given the presence of unit root in our data, we chose to carry out our estimations with an ECM in 
conjunction with the bound test for cointegration developed by Pesaran et al (2001). Given the 
generic ECM model 
∆𝑌 =  𝑐 +  𝜗∆𝑋 + φXt−1 + ψYt−1                                                    (9) 
The short-run relationship between X and Y is given by the coefficients of the variables in 
differences (𝜗) while the long-run relationship is given by  
𝜎 = − 
φ
ψ
                                                                      (10) 
However, we can say that there exists a level (long-run) relationship between X and Y only if the 
F value of ϑ = 0, ψ = 0 is above the (appropriate) upper bond critical value in the table in Pesaran 
et al (2001)50.  
The models to be estimated have been selected using the general to specific approach. In the 
general model, that is used as staring point to estimate the consumption and investment functions, 
all variables enter the regression in levels and in first difference as shown in equation (11) 
∆𝑌 =  𝑐 +  𝛽1𝐗t−1 + 𝛽2Yt−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑿 + 𝛽4 ∑ ∆𝐗t−n
2
𝑛=1
+ 𝛽5 ∑ ∆Yt−n
2
𝑛=1
                 (11) 
Where, Y is the dependent variable, c is a constant and X is a vector of control variables. The 
general model was then restricted into a more parsimonious model by removing the variables that 
                                                          
50 See Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola (2007) for a detailed explanation of the application of the bound testing 
approach. 
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were individually and jointly non statistically significant51. Both the general and the specific model 
successfully passed the tests for autocorrelation (Breush-Godfrey test), heteroskedasticity 
(Breusch-Pagan test), normality of the error term (K2 test) and functional form misspecification 
(Ramsey RESET test52). 
As in the previous chapter, year dummies have been included both in the general and the specific 
models to take into account outliers or observations that were causing some one of the forms of 
misspecification for which the model was tested53. The need to use year dummies reveals that our 
empirical model is failing to take into account some unknown factors that are relevant, to explain 
the behaviour of the dependent variable at least in those years. We use them, conscious that they 
are a measure of our ignorance. They are however necessary, as our sample size is too small to 
justify the use of robust standard error to cope with any form of misspecifications. 
Finally, all the variables are expressed in logarithmic from and consequently the coefficients must 
be interpreted as elasticities. 
4.4 Regression results 
4.4.1 Consumption 
The consumption function was estimated twice. Table 4.2 shows the results of the estimates of 
regressions (a) and (b) in which, similarly to the previous chapter, we control for total profits 
without distinguishing between rentier and non-rentier profits. Only the results for overall 
consumption and for consumption of services appear in the table because we could not find 
evidence of cointegration between consumption of goods and any of its determinants.  
a) Δlog(C) = c + β1log(W t-1) + β2log(Rt-1) + β3log(Ct-1) + β4Δlog(W) + β5Δlog(R) + β6Δlog(HW) 
+ β7Δlog(D) + β8Δlog(Wt-1) 
 
b) Δlog(Cs) = c + β1log(W t-1) + β2log(Rt-1) + β3log(Cst-1) + β4Δlog(W) + β5Δlog(R) + β6Δlog(HW) 
+ β7Δlog(D)+ β8d75 + β8d83 
Table 4.3 reports the estimated short and long-run effects of equation (a) and (b). In the short run, 
all variables in regression (a) have the expected effect.  
 
                                                          
51 See Spanos (1986) for a detailed explanation of the general to specific approach.  
52 We used two lags of the residual for the Breusch-Godfrey test and ŷ2, ŷ3 and ŷ4 for the RESET test. 
 
53 The coefficient of the dummy variables are not reported on the main tables. 
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Table 4.2: Determinants of Consumption 
 (a) (b) 
VARIABLES ΔLog(C) ΔLog(Cs) 
   
Log(W t-1) 0.253*** 0.0750** 
 (0.0372) (0.0335) 
Log(R t-1) 0.113*** -0.0294** 
 (0.0318) (0.0125) 
Log(dependent t-1) -0.347*** -0.0471 
 (0.0591) (0.0311) 
ΔLog(W) 0.371*** 0.355*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0410) 
ΔLog(R) 0.153*** 0.00644 
 (0.0501) (0.0355) 
ΔLog(HW) 0.0429* 0.0399** 
 (0.0220) (0.0175) 
ΔLog(D) 0.0977*** 0.0135 
 (0.0234) (0.0190) 
ΔLog(W t-1) -0.247***  
 (0.0465)  
Time dummies  1975 1983 
   
Sample 1950 - 2014 1950 - 2014 
Adj R2 0.857 0.836 
Notes: The constant term is not reported in the table but it is 
included in the regression. The variable Log(dependent) is the 
dependent variable in each regression. Standard errors in 
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The elasticity of HW and D on C - eHW and eCD respectively - is positive and significant, confirming 
the role of debt as an important determinant of consumption in the United States. The short-run 
elasticities of W and R with respect to C - eW and eR respectively - are strangely similar and take 
the value of 0.12 and 0.15. We would have expected wages to have a larger effect on consumption 
even in the short run. This could be explained by the fact that in the short run, wage earners use 
relatively more credit instruments to finance their consumption. Turning to the third column of 
Table 4.3, we can see how the results substantiate our hypothesis regarding the long run. First, HW 
99 
 
and D do not have a long-run effect on C. Second, both eW and eR are larger in the long run 
compared to the short run. This seems to confirm that in the long run when debt must be paid off, 
consumption will depend more on current income. Third, the ratio between eW and eR increases 
from the short run to the long run. While in the short run the eW is equal to 4/5 of eR, in the long 
run the effect of wages on consumption is more than double the effect of profits on consumption. 
Therefore, we can say that overall consumption becomes more wage-led in the long run. 
As we can see from regression (b), the role of house wealth and consumer debt does not drastically 
change when we consider consumption of services instead of overall consumption. The only 
difference is in the size of the short-run elasticity, which is sensibly reduced. On the contrary, eW 
is larger both in the short and in the long run. The only effect that changes substantially compared 
to regression (a) is that of profits. Not only does eR falls to 0.01 in the short run but, in the long 
run, it even becomes negative. For these reasons, consumption of services would seem to be 
substantially more wage-led in the long run compared to the short run. However, the negative long-
run effect of profits on consumption is difficult to explain and it undermines the credibility of the 
whole regression.  
Table 4.3: Short-run and long-run elasticities, from (a) and (b) 
Equation (a) Short run Long run 
eW 0.12 0.73 
eR 0.15 0.33 
eHW 0.04 // 
eCD 0.10 // 
eW /eR 0.8 2.21 
Equation (b) Short run Long run 
eW 0.35 1.60 
eR 0.01 -0.62 
eHW 0.04 // 
eCD 0.01 // 
eW /eR 35  
Notes: all values are rounded to the second decimal place. 
Table 4.4 shows the regression results for the consumption functions in which we control for 
rentier and non-rentier profits separately. This specification is better fitted to explain the evolution 
of consumption because as Onaran et al (2011) pointed out, dividends and interest earners have a 
substantially different consumption behaviour compared to that of firms. Therefore, we expect the 
elasticity of rentier income to be higher than the elasticity of non-rentier income because most of 
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firms’ retained profits are supposed to be invested rather than consumed. The estimated equations 
for overall consumption, consumption of goods and consumption of services are as follows 
c) Δlog(C) = c + β1log(W t-1) + β2log(Rnrt-1) + β3log(HWt-1) + β4log(Ct-1) + β5Δlog(W) + β6Δlog(Rr) 
+ β7Δ log(Rnr) + β8Δlog(HW) + β9Δlog(D) + β10Δlog(Wt-1) + β11d75 + β10d83 
 
d) Δlog(Cg) = c + β1log(W t-1) + β2log(Rnrt-1) + β3log(Cgt-1) + β4Δlog(W) + β5Δlog(Rr) + 
β6Δlog(Rnr) + β7Δlog(HW) + β8Δlog(D) + β9Δlog(Wt-1) + β10d07 
 
e) Δlog(Cs) = c + β1log(Rrt-1) + β2log(Rnrt-1) + β3log(Cst-1) + β4Δlog(W) + β5Δlog(Rr) + 
β6Δlog(Rnr) + β7Δlog(HW) + β8d83 
 
f) Δlog(Cs) = c + β1log(Wt-1) + β2log(Rrt-1) + β3log(Cst-1) + β4Δlog(W) + β5Δlog(Rr) + β6Δlog(Rnr) 
+ β7Δlog(HW) + β8d83 
As we can see from Table 4.4, regression (c) – for overall consumption - carries similar results to 
regression (a) but it reinforces the previous results. As before, consumer debt has only a short-run 
effect on consumption. House wealth instead, has both a short and a long-run effect but they are 
both very modest (0.05 and 0.1 respectively). Regarding profits, the results are counterintuitive: 
In the short run, eRr< eRnr while in the long run rentier income does not seem to have an effect on 
consumption while non-rentier profit does. One possible explanation for this result is that the 
income of self-employed individuals is also included in the non-rentier profits and since they have 
a similar propensity to consume as wage earners, they increase the magnitude of eRnr. The 
relationship between profits and wages however is as we expected: Not only the eW is larger than 
both eRr and eRnr in the short run, but the ratio between eW and eRnr increases from the short to the 
long run. In the short run, eW is about twice as big as eRnr while in the long run eW is thirteen times 
bigger than eRnr.  
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Table 4.4: Determinants of Consumption (c) – (f) 
 (c) (d) (e) (f) 
VARIABLES ΔLog(C) ΔLog(Cg) ΔLog(Cs) ΔLog(Cs) 
     
Log(W t-1) 0.180*** 0.122***  0.0895** 
 (0.0267) (0.0253)  (0.0353) 
Log(Rr t-1)   0.0223*** 0.0158*** 
   (0.00675) (0.00552) 
Log(Rnr t-1) 0.0128** 0.0278*** 0.0166**  
 (0.00541) (0.0101) (0.00670)  
Log(HW t-1) 0.0192**    
 (0.00901)    
Log(dependent t-1) -0.188*** -0.106*** -0.0358*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0234) (0.00879) (0.0344) 
ΔLog(W) 0.427*** 0.384*** 0.244*** 0.286*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0785) (0.0392) (0.0393) 
ΔLog(Rr) 0.0210 0.0513** 0.0191 0.0224* 
 (0.0129) (0.0241) (0.0122) (0.0124) 
ΔLog(Rnr) 0.111*** 0.216*** 0.0432* 0.0471* 
 (0.0270) (0.0527) (0.0234) (0.0239) 
ΔLog(HW) 0.0534*** 0.137*** 0.0508*** 0.0428** 
 (0.0183) (0.0342) (0.0171) (0.0176) 
ΔLog(D) 0.0949*** 0.150***   
 (0.0234) (0.0439)   
ΔLog(W t-1) -0.168*** -0.327***   
 (0.0382) (0.0707)   
Time dummies 1975 1983 2007 1983 1983 
     
Sample 1950 - 2014 1950 - 2014 1950 - 2014 1950 - 2014 
Adj R2 0.912 0.836 0.812 0.813 
Notes: The constant term is not reported in the table and it is always non significant. The variable 
Log(dependent) is the dependent variable in each regression. Standard errors in parentheses: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5: Short-run and long-run elasticities, from (c) - (f) 
Equation (c) Short run Long run Equation (e) Short run Long run 
eW 0.26 0.96 eW 0.24 // 
eRr 0.02 // eRr 0.02 0.62 
eRnr 0.11 0.07 eRnr 0.04 0.46 
eHW 0.05 0.10 eHW 0.05 // 
eCD 0.10 // eCD // // 
eW /eRnr 2.36 13.7 eW /eRnr 6 // 
Equation (d) Short run Long run Equation (f) Short run Long run 
eW 0.06 1.15 eW 0.29 0.81 
eRr 0.05 // eRr 0.02 0.14 
eRnr 0.22 0.26 eRnr 0.05 // 
eHW 0.14 // eHW 0.04 // 
eCD 0.15 // eCD // // 
eW /eRnr 0.22 4.42 eW /eRnr 5.8 // 
Notes: all values are rounded to the second decimal place. 
In regressions (d), (e) and (f) we look at the determinants of consumption of goods and 
consumption of services. Consumption of services was estimated twice because W and Rnr seem 
to have a long-run relationship with C only if they do not enter the regression together. Overall, 
the results confirm the results of regression (a) and (c). Consumer debt and house wealth never 
have a long-run effect, eRr is always smaller than eRnr in the short run and, with the exception of 
equation (d) in the short run, eW is always bigger than both eRr and eRnr. Regression (d), confirms 
that the long run is more wage-led than the short run also because the ratio between eW and eRnr 
increases greatly from the short to the long run. This would happen even if we were not to consider 
the (negative) lagged short-run coefficient of W. Without taking into account β9 in regression (d), 
eW would be equal to 0.38 which implies that in the short run eW would be about 2/3 bigger than 
eRnr while in the long run eW would be four times bigger than eRnr. Finally, in specifications (e) and 
(f), we do not find a significant short-run relationship between consumer debt and consumption of 
services.  This is consistent with the results from regression (b) in which eCD is extremely small 
and equal to 0.01. The lack of a short-run relationship between consumer debt and consumption 
of services suggests that most consumer debt in the United States is used to purchase durable and 
non-durable goods. 
Even though a small part of our results are not what we expected, they are robust evidence in 
support of Bleckers’ claim that consumption becomes more wage-led in the long run. Consumer 
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debt has only a short-run effect on consumption or on its components. This is consistent with the 
fact that debt and debt service over long periods have to be repaid. Consequently, in the long run, 
consumption depends relatively more on current income. Secondly, even though both wages and 
profits increase their effect on consumption in the long run, the effect of wages increases more 
than the effect of profits. For both these reasons, consumption in the United States becomes more 
wage-led in the long run.  
4.4.2 Investment 
Similarly to what we did for the consumption function, we first estimate overall investment and 
subsequently its components: non residential investment and residential investment. Investment 
and non residential investment – equations (g), (h) and (i) – are estimated as a function of capacity 
utilization, profit share divided between rentier share of income and non-rentier profit share, 
interest rate and a deterministic trend that we use as a proxy for capital productivity. In the short 
run, we expect capacity utilization and the non-rentier profit share to have a positive impact on 
investment while the interest rate should have a negative effect. The role of the rentier profit share 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, when rentier profits increase, the firms’ availability of internal 
funds decreases and this would have a negative effect on investment. On the other hand, dividends 
and interest payments could be considered as indicators of firms’ ability to pay its debt service and 
therefore it would allow firms to have access to external funds: the effect on investment would be 
positive. In any case, since most retained profits are assumed to be reinvested, the elasticity of 
rentier profit on investment (eπr) is supposed to be smaller than the elasticity of non-rentier profits 
on investment (eπr). Our hypothesis for the long run is that capacity utilization keeps having a 
positive effect on investment while the effects of the non-rentier profit share fades. As discussed 
above, in the long run firms should not want to increase productive capacity just because they have 
the means to do so, if they have already reached their desired level of utilization. Regarding the 
effect of the rentier profit share, if it is only considered as a proxy for availability of funds, in the 
long run it should have only a marginal role on investment, similar to that of the non-rentier profit 
share. If instead the negative effect of diversion of funds prevails, the effect might very well persist 
in the long run: if firms have limited access to external funding, a fall in retained profits might 
constrain investment even if firms would be willing to invest to reach the desired level of capacity.  
 Table 4.6 reports the results of regressions (g), (h) and (i) and Table 4.8 the derived short and 
long-run elasticities. The overall investment function is estimated twice because, consistently with 
the results from Onaran et al, πnr and πr only have a long run relationship with I when they enter 
the regression individually. 
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g) Δlog(I) = c + β1log(πnr t-1) + β2log(Zt-1) + β3log(it-1) + β4log(It-1) + β5Δlog(πr) + β6Δlog(πnr) + 
β7Δ log(Z) + β8Δlog(i) + β9Δlog(πnr t-1) + β10Δlog(Zt-1) + β11Δlog(it-1) + β12Δlog(It-1) + β13Trend 
+ β14d2009 
 
h) Δlog(I) = c + β1log(πr t-1) + β2log(Zt-1) + β3log(it-1) + β4log(It-1) + β5Δlog(πr) + β6Δlog(πnr) + 
β7Δ log(Z) + β8Δlog(πr t-1) + β9Δlog(Zt-1) + β10Δlog(it-1) + β11Δlog(It-1) + β12Trend + β13d2009 
 
i) Δlog(Inr) = c + β1log(πr t-1) + β2log(Zt-1) + β3log(it-1) + β4log(Inrt-1) + β5Δlog(πr) + β6Δlog(πnr) 
+ β7Δ log(Z) + β8Δlog(i) + β9Δlog(it-1) + β10Δlog(Inrt-1) + β11Trend 
In the short run, all the coefficient have the expected signs and magnitude in all three 
specifications. The elasticity of capacity utilization is always positive and larger than the elasticity 
of the two profit shares and interest rate. The interest rate has a robust, yet small, negative effect 
on both overall investment and non-residential investment. Finally, eπnr is positive and always 
larger than eπr. The positive sign of eπr indicates that in the short run the positive effect of the 
availability of external funds seems to prevail on the negative effect of smaller internal funds. 
Among the long-run elasticities, the only unexpected result is the positive elasticity of interest rate 
(ei) respect to both investment and non residential investment. If ei is capturing a feedback effect 
from investment to interest rate, an explanation could be that an increase in investment puts upward 
pressure on inflation and the central bank responds by increasing the interest rate. This increase in 
interest rate, however, might not have a negative effect on investment because in the long run 
investment might depend principally upon demand. Most post-Keynesians would not accept the 
first part of this explanation because - since the economy is supposed to work below full capacity 
- an increase in demand does not cause an increase in prices. Turning to the variables of interest, 
the elasticity of capacity utilization (eZ), as expected, increases in all regressions. On the contrary, 
we found evidence of a long-run relationship between πnr and I only in regression (g). However, 
as the increase in the ratio between eZ and eπnr indicates, the elasticity of capacity utilization 
increases proportionally more than the elasticity of the non-rentier profit share. Moreover, the fact 
that in regression (i) we do not find any long-run relationship between πnr and Inr strongly supports 
our hypothesis. Regarding the rentier share, we find a robust negative effect on both investment 
and non residential investment. This result is much larger compared to that of Onaran et al (2011) 
and it confirms that in the long run financialization has a negative effect on investment as it diverts 
funds from production.  
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Table 4.6: Determinants of non-residential investment 
 (g) (h) (i) 
VARIABLES ΔLog(I) ΔLog(I) ΔLog(Inr) 
Log(πr t-1)  -0.159** -0.165*** 
  (0.0726) (0.0445) 
Log(πnr t-1) 0.381**   
 (0.157)   
Log(Zt-1) 0.535*** 0.555*** 0.321*** 
 (0.141) (0.133) (0.0990) 
Log(it-1) 0.0819*** 0.0786** 0.0888*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0345) (0.0212) 
Log(dependent t-1) -0.169*** -0.140** -0.120** 
 (0.0518) (0.0524) (0.0450) 
ΔLog(πr) 0.280*** 0.222** 0.00262 
 (0.0893) (0.106) (0.0702) 
ΔLog(πnr) 0.914*** 0.678*** 0.0452 
 (0.226) (0.215) (0.146) 
ΔLog(Z) 1.371*** 1.537*** 1.125*** 
 (0.158) (0.131) (0.103) 
ΔLog(i) 0.0749**  0.0439* 
 (0.0361)  (0.0236) 
ΔLog(πr t-1)  0.166**  
  (0.0693)  
ΔLog(πnr t-1) -0.436**   
 (0.182)   
ΔLog(Zt-1) -0.619*** -0.422**  
 (0.190) (0.206)  
ΔLog(it-1) -0.177*** -0.155*** -0.0560* 
 (0.0457) (0.0435) (0.0296) 
ΔLog(dependentt-
1) 
0.304*** 0.241** 0.389*** 
 (0.0974) (0.0971) (0.0755) 
Trend 0.00784*** 0.00858*** 0.00838*** 
 (0.00214) (0.00250) (0.00228) 
Time dummies 2009 2009  
    
Sample 1950 - 2014 1950 - 2014 1950 - 2014 
Adj R2 0.863 0.858 0.852 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As explained in the previous section, the other component of overall investment, residential 
investment, is estimated using a similar specification (j) to the consumption function. The main 
difference is that we do not control for consumer debt and house wealth but rather for the total 
amount of mortgages (M). The expected results are similar to the consumption function. Wages 
are supposed to have the largest positive effect both in the short and in the long run. The effect of 
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profits on residential investments is supposed to be positive but smaller than that of wages, and 
mortgages should have a positive short-run effect but not a long-run one. Similarly to consumer 
debt for consumption, mortgages allow to increase house expenditures in the short run but, since 
debt has to be repaid in the long run, families take on mortgages based on their current and 
expected income. Therefore, in the long run, the main determinant of expenditures in new houses 
should be income rather than debt. 
j) Δlog(Ir) = c + β1log(W t-1) + β2log(Rrt-1) + β3log(Rnrt-1) + β4log(Irt-1) + β5log(W) + β6Δlog(Rr) 
+ β7Δ log(Rnr) + β8Δlog(M) + β9Δlog(Rnrt-1)  + β10Δlog(Mt-1)  + β11Δlog(Irt-1) + β12Δlog(Rnrt-2)  
+ β13d55 + β14d83 
The results for the residential investment function reported in Table 4.7 and Table 4.9, show the 
corresponding short and long-run elasticities. Strikingly, while wages and mortgages behave as 
expected, the elasticities of the rentier and non-rentier profits are more problematic. In the short 
run, the elasticities of wages (eW) and of mortgages (eW) are positive and equal to 1.93 and 1.68 
respectively. Moreover, in the long run, as expected, while eW increases to 3.24, we could not find 
a relationship between M and Inr. On the other hand, in the short run the elasticity of rentier profits 
(eRr) and of non-rentier profits (eRnr) are respectively 0.12 and 0.46 and therefore eRr< eRnr. This 
result is similar to that of the consumption functions reported in Table 4.5 but it is counterintuitive: 
rentier earners should spend more on new houses compared to non-rentier profit earners. As for 
consumption, one possible explanation is that the magnitude of eRnr is large because the income of 
the self-employed is included in Rnr. In the long run the relationship between profits and residential 
investment becomes even more puzzling as eRr and eRnr turn negative. Even though this implies 
that in the long run the residential investment becomes more wage-led, we do not find a reasonable 
ex-post explanation for these negative signs. The results do not change if we control for total profit 
rather than for Rr and Rnr individually. 
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Table 4.7: Determinants of residential investment 
 (j) 
VARIABLES ΔLog(Ir) 
  
Log(W t-1) 1.677*** 
 (0.267) 
Log(Rr t-1) -0.413*** 
 (0.0700) 
Log(Rnr t-1) -0.687*** 
 (0.137) 
Log(Ir t-1) -0.518*** 
 (0.0783) 
ΔLog(W) 1.927*** 
 (0.408) 
ΔLog(Rr) 0.117 
 (0.114) 
ΔLog(Rnr) 0.526** 
 (0.241) 
ΔLog(M) 3.099*** 
 (0.374) 
ΔLog(Rnr t-1) -0.421* 
 (0.210) 
ΔLog(M t-1) -1.416*** 
 (0.411) 
ΔLog(Ir t-1) 0.143* 
 (0.0788) 
ΔLog(Rnr t-2) 0.357* 
 (0.178) 
Time dummies 1955 1983 
  
Sample 1950 - 2014 
R-squared 0.857 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.8: Short-run and long-run elasticities, from (g) and (i) 
Equation (g) Short run Long run 
eπr 0.28 // 
eπnr 0.48 1.94 
ei -0.10 0.48 
eZ 0.75 3.16 
eZ/eπnr 1.56 1.63 
Equation (h) Short run Long run 
eπr 0.39 -1.14 
eπnr 0.68 // 
ei -0.16 0.56 
eZ 1.11 3.96 
Equation (i) Short run Long run 
eπr 0.002 -1.38 
eπnr 0.05 // 
ei -0.06 0.74 
eZ 1.125 2.68 
 
Table 4.9: Short-run and long-run elasticities, from (j) 
Equation (j) Short run Long run 
eW 1.93 3.24 
eRr 0.12 -0.80 
eRnr 0.46 -1.33 
eM 1.68 // 
 
To summarize, all our results point in the direction that in the long run investment is less profit-
led than in the short run because the effect of profits on investment is either weakened or it turns 
negative. Firstly, πnr and Rnr have only a short-run effect on non-residential and residential 
investments respectively54. Secondly, πr has a positive short-run effect but a negative long-run 
effect on non-residential investment and Rnr has only a positive effect on residential investment. 
Third, Z’s positive effect on non-residential investment increases from the short to the long run. 
                                                          
54 We discard the negative long run effect of Rr and Rr on residential investment - even though it would make 
investment less profit led - because a negative effect is implausible. 
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Similarly, the effect of W on residential investment increases form the short to the long run. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The analysis carried out in this Chapter was inspired by Robert Blecker’s (2014) paper in which 
he argues, without providing much statistical evidence to support his theory, that growth regimes 
are likely to be more wage led in the long run compared to the short run. For this reason, we 
proposed an econometric analysis to study whether it is plausible that the growth regime changes 
depending on the time span taken into consideration. Using error correction models, we found 
evidence that supports Blecker’s hypothesis that, in the long run the demand regime is more wage-
led (or less profit-led) than in the short run. This happens because, in the long run, both 
consumption and investment becomes more wage-led or less profit-led. 
Regarding consumption, our results are in line with Kim et al’s  (2014 and 2015) findings which 
reveal that, in the US, the marginal propensity to consume increases from the short to the long run 
and that the effect of borrowing on consumption is larger and more robust in the short run 
compared to the long run. Our work, however, expands the analysis carried out by Kim et al (2014 
and 2015) by including, among the determinants of consumption, the distribution of income 
between wage earners and profit earners and by estimating a separate consumption function for 
goods and services. Our results showed that, from the long run to the short run, the elasticity of 
wages on consumption increases more than proportionally compared to the elasticity of profit on 
consumption. Consequently, consumption becomes more wage led in the long run.  Moreover, 
consumer debt (excluded mortgages) only has a short-run effect on consumption. This is consistent 
with the argument that debt over long periods has to be repaid and therefore a negative effect on 
consumption must be added to the positive, short run, one. Therefore, income (and particularly the 
wage share) is the main determinant of consumption in the long run. These results do not change 
much when we use consumption of goods and consumption of services as dependent variables of 
the consumption function in specifications (b), (d), (e), (f). They are also robust to the use of rentier 
and non-rentier profits instead of overall profits as control variables. 
Our estimates for the overall investment function reveal that - in line with previous studies such 
as Onaran et al (2011), Chiriko et al (2011) and Sockhammer and Wildauer (2015) - the capacity 
utilization has the largest effect on investment in the long run. On the other hand, the non-rentier 
profit share has a positive long-run effect only if the rentier profit share does not enter the 
regression. However, the increase in the positive effect of the rentier profit share, from the short 
to the long run, is proportionally smaller than the increase in the positive effect of capacity 
utilization. The long-run effect of the rentier profit share on investment is negative and 
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consequently, it makes investment less profit-led. Our analysis expand the studies mentioned 
above not only because of its specific focus on the difference between long and short run effects 
on investment but also because of a new method to estimate the investment function. In particular, 
we suggested that it makes sense to distinguish between residential and non-residential investment 
because their determinants are likely to be very different and, therefore, when possible, should be 
estimated separately55. We find that, in the long run, non-residential investment is not profit-led 
because of the large negative effect of the rentier profit share and the absence of any significant 
positive effect of the non-rentier profit share. Moreover, similarly to consumption, the determinant 
of residential investment that has the largest effect on the long run is the total wage bill because 
mortgages play a role only in the short run. Consistently with our hypothesis, the distinction 
between residential and non-residential investment makes our overall investment function more 
wage led compared to previous studies because residential investment is predominantly 
determined by the wage share rather than profits. 
Our analysis does not determine whether the demand regime in the United States is profit-led or 
wage-led because we only estimate internal demand and do not consider net exports. As we 
discussed, the nature of the growth regime, in the studies published so far, seems to be sensitive to 
econometric technique. Therefore, our analysis contributes to this debate only in so far as it 
suggests that, independently from the nature of the short-run growth regime, in the United States 
the long-run regime should be more wage-led (or less profit-led). 
One of the main limitations of our study is the relatively high frequency of the data. As suggested 
by Caldentey and Vernango (2013), to capture long-run relationships it would have been better to 
use data with lower frequency (five years averages for example), which we did not use because it 
would make our sample too small. Had we opted to use lower frequency data for a panel of 
countries we would have had to accept a shorter time span and a smaller availability of variables 
(in particular most countries do not have available data on decomposed consumption, investment 
and profits). Failing to account for possible endogeneity problems is a second shortcoming of our 
analysis. As discussed in Chapter 2, there could very well be feedback effect from aggregate 
demand to functional income distribution, which would make endogenous most of our control 
variables. On this regard for example, Stockhammer (2012) finds a negative effect of growth on 
the wage share. Nevertheless, since we analyse the individual components of aggregate demand 
separately, the bias caused by a possible endogeneity problem should be smaller than if we were 
to regress the overall aggregate demand on the functional distribution of income. In the next 
                                                          
55 We do not estimate them separately in Chapter 3 and 5 because we only have data for residential investment in the 
United States. 
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chapter we will try to deal with this problem. 
Unfortunately, this study does not have important policy implications because it does not 
determine whether demand is, in the long run in the United States, wage-led or profit-led. Rather 
it opens at the possibility that other growth regimes, not only in the United States, become more 
wage-led (or less profit-led) in the long run. Therefore, it is possible that some of the study that 
finds a short-run profit-led regime in a certain country would find that in the long run, the same 
country is actually characterised by a wage-led regime. 
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Appendix A: Variables names, definitions and sources 
Table A4.1: Data sources and definition 
Variable Description Source Notes 
Y GDP NIPA  
C Consumption NIPA  
Cg Consumption of goods NIPA  
Cs Consumption of services NIPA  
I Gross capital formation NIPA  
Inr Non-residential investment NIPA  
Ir Residential investment NIPA  
W Wage bill NIPA  
R Grow operating surplus NIPA  
Rr Rentier profits NIPA Dividends + net interest 
payments 
Rnr Non-rentier profits NIPA Rnr = R - Rr 
πr Rentier profit share NIPA πr = Rr / Y 
πnr Non-rentier profit share NIPA πnr = Rnr / Y 
Z Capacity utilization in 
manufactoring 
FRED   
i Bank Prime Loan Rate FRED  
D Consumer credit, liabilities 
(excluded mortgages) 
Statistical 
Release,Financial 
Accounts, 
Federal Reserve 
 
HW Households and and NPO; 
real estate at market value 
Statistical 
Release,Financial 
Accounts, 
Federal Reserve 
 
M Mortgages Statistical 
Release,Financial 
Accounts, 
Federal Reserve 
 
Notes: All data are in real US Dollars (2009)  
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Appendix B: Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller test with a trend, is carried out using the following regression line 
𝛥𝑌 =  𝜃𝑌 + ∑ 𝛥𝑌𝑡−𝑛
4
𝑛=1
+ 𝛿1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  
We use up to four lagged values of the dependent variable in first difference to control for 
autocorrelations. The series have a stochastic trend (unit root) if we cannot reject the null of θ = 0 
using the critical values from Fuller (1996).  
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Table B4.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
Variables n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 
C -0.023 
(0.984) 
-0.035 
(0.973) 
-0.033 
(0.979) 
-0.059 
(0.95) 
Cg -0.199 
(0.168) 
-0.212 
(0.179) 
-0.233 
(0.171) 
-0.279* 
(0.087) 
Cs 0.018 
(0.999) 
0.014 
(0.997) 
0.027 
(0.999) 
0.028 
(0.999) 
R -0.397** 
(0.012) 
-0.387* 
(0.066) 
-0.491** 
(0.017) 
-0.384 
(0.27) 
Rr -0.026 
(0.977) 
-0.014 
(0.989) 
0.019 
(0.997) 
0.042 
(0.999) 
Rnr -0.066 
(0.713) 
-0.059 
(0.819) 
-0.058 
(0.846) 
-0.062 
(0.919) 
W -0.062 
(0.806) 
-0.057 
(0.887) 
-0.07 
(0.839) 
-0.04 
(0.966) 
HW -0.162** 
(0.01) 
-0.137 
(0.196) 
-0.185* 
(0.0619) 
-0.193 
(0.191) 
CC -0.179** 
(0.012) 
-0.151 
(0.155) 
-0.126 
(0.469) 
-0.175* 
(0.096) 
I -0.294 
(0.146) 
-0.345* 
(0.095) 
-0.223 
(0.762) 
-0.343 
(0.236) 
Ir -0.182 
(0.236) 
-0.226 
(0.108) 
-0.21 
(0.278) 
-0.23 
(0.336) 
Inr -0.256** 
(0.047) 
-0.219 
(0.278) 
-0.201 
(0.522) 
-0.268 
(0.259) 
i -0.123 
(0.315) 
-0.059 
(0.9) 
-0.054 
(0.935) 
-0.033 
(0.978) 
πr -0.054 
(0.927) 
-0.040 
(0.968) 
-0.01 
(0.992) 
0.009 
(0.996) 
πnr -0.06 
(0.903) 
-0.024 
(0.984) 
-0.016 
(0.989) 
-0.005 
(0.993) 
Z -0.546*** 
(0.001) 
-0.553*** 
(0.009) 
-0.568** 
(0.034) 
-0.563* 
(0.095) 
D -0.096*** 
(0.007) 
-0.08 
(0.142) 
-0.07 
(0.384) 
-0.093 
(0.127) 
Note: MacKinnon approximate p-value in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5 - Demand regime switch in Italy (1960 – 2007) 
5.1 Introduction 
The so-called “Wage-led” literature is growing rapidly. For over a decade, using Bhaduri and 
Marglin’s (1990 a, b) model as the main theoretical foundation, post-Keynesian scholars have tried 
to determine the effect of the functional distribution of income on economic growth. While initially 
- starting from Bowles and Boyer (1995) - the main goal was to find a robust methodology to 
establish how income distribution affects aggregate demand56, more recently the focus has 
switched to the factors that could influence this relationship such as debt (Stockhammer and 
Wildauer 2015), trade (Onaran and Galanis 2014) and financialisation (Onaran et al 2011).  
This chapter contributes to this branch of literature by exploring the dynamics between 
cooperative and conflictual growth regimes and the possibility that the effect of income 
distribution on growth (and consequently the growth regime) changes over time. According to 
Bhaduri and Marglin, a demand regime is defined as cooperative if a change in the functional 
distribution of income is favourable to both social classes or conflictual otherwise. In particular, 
a wage-led cooperative regime is one in which an increase in the wage share stimulates enough 
growth to allow for an increase in total profit, in spite of a decrease in the profit share. On the 
other hand, a profit-led regime is cooperative if the increase in the profit share causes an increase 
in growth that is large enough to cause, in spite of a decrease in the wage share, an increase in 
the wage bill – through higher employment for example. Similarly, a conflictual regime is one in 
which an increase in the profit (wage) share does not stimulate the economy enough to allow the 
total level of wages (profits) to grow. 
Our work analyses the evolution of the macroeconomic conditions that are necessary to achieve 
cooperation between social classes – wage and profit earners – rather than conflict. These 
conditions, following the intuition of the Bahduri and Marglin model (1990 a, b), depend on 
whether the growth regime is Wage-led or profit-led. However, as originally highlighted in the 
model57, regimes can switch over time either because of structural breaks or because of a non-
linear relationship between growth and distribution. Consequently, as the growth regime changes, 
the requirements to achieve cooperation will also change.  The main argument is that the 
relationship between the functional income distribution and growth depends on determinants that 
                                                          
56 Most scholars estimate the effect of functional income distribution on the components of aggregate demand and 
then sum them up. However, other methods have been proposed in the past such as the structural vector 
autoregressive models and panel analysis of firm level data. Lavoie and Stockammer (2012) and Blecker (2014) 
survey the literature on “Wage-led growth”. 
57 Tailor (1990) and Palley (2013) propose a similar non-linear relationship between functional distribution of 
income and capacity utilization. 
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can vary over time, even within the same country. Some of these variables, as we will discuss in 
Section 5.3, are the sensitivity of investments to profits, the sensitivity of investment to capacity 
utilization, the level of capacity utilization and profits and the elasticity of capacity utilization 
respect to the profit share. As a result, in different periods the profit share can be either positively 
or negatively related to demand depending on the evolution of the above variables. 
The analysis of dynamics between cooperative and conflictual regimes is carried out on Italy (1960 
– 2007) because, as we will show in Section 5.2, during the 1980s there was a remarkable switch 
from cooperative to conflictual regime. During the 1960s and the 1970s, on average, a change in 
the profit share was associated with a change in the same direction of both the wage bill and total 
profits. In the following two decades however, the profit share increased tremendously and while 
the growth of profits remained high, the growth of the wage bill decreased continuously. Our 
hypothesis is that Italy is slowly switching from a profit-led regime to a Wage-led one. We argue 
that, from the 1980s, the combination of increasing financialisation and reduced net exports due 
to the European exchange rate agreements weakened the effect of profits on demand. In a weak 
profit-led regime, the profit share does not manage to stimulate enough growth to allow the total 
wage bill to increase and therefore while total profits increase, the wage bill stagnates: the profit-
led regime becomes conflictual. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 describes the evolution from cooperative to 
conflictual growth regime in Italy from 1960 to 2008. Section 5.3 outlines in some detail the 
Bhaduri and Marglin’s model (1990) upon which our empirical investigation will be based. Once 
the theoretical framework has been clearly outlined, in Section 5.4, we will discuss our hypothesis 
and the motivation of our work and we will make the argument that the Bhaduri and Marglin’s 
model is a useful tool to explain the evolution of the relationship between functional distribution 
of income and growth in Italy. The main stylised facts will also be presented to support our 
argument. Section 5.6 describes the result of the empirical analysis of the determinants of 
cooperative and conflictual demand regimes. Section 5.7 concludes. 
5.2 Cooperative and Conflictual regimes 
A cooperative regime implies that any change in the functional distribution of income, will cause 
the total amount of profits and the wage bill to vary in the same direction, i.e., they both increase 
or they both decrease. 
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Table 5.1 reports the level and growth rate (between decades) of the profit share (h) and of income 
divided between total profits (aR) and the wage bill (aW)58 in Italy (1960 – 2007). Figure 5.1 
instead shows graphically the difference between the growth rate of the wage bill and of total 
profit, in real terms, from one decade to the next.  
As we can see, during the 1960s and the 1970s, the growth of the wage bill and the total profits 
has been balanced: total wages and total profits improved at similar rates during the first two 
decades independently of whether the wage share (1960s) or the profit share (1970s) was 
increasing. The demand regime was cooperative. On the other hand, from the 1980s, while the 
profit share increased continuously, the wage bill started to lag behind the growth rate of profits 
to the point that in the 1990s the regime was conflictual. In fact, while the profit share soared by 
14% in the 1980s and 23% in the 1990s, the growth rate of the wage bill decreased by 
approximately two thirds in the 1980s, and in the 1990s it did not grow at all. Finally, the first 
seven years of the new millennium were characterised by stagnation and the functional distribution 
of income remains substantially stable.  
Table 5.1: Adjusted wage bill and total profit and profit share at the beginning of each decade. 
Year aW aR h ∆aW/aW ∆aR/aR ∆h/h 
1960 244 120 32.9%    
1970 414 219 34.6% 0.70 0.82 0.05 
1980 612 307 33.4% 0.48 0.40 -0.03 
1990 722 445 38.1% 0.18 0.45 0.14 
2000 728 639 46.7% 0.008 0.44 0.23 
2007 801 692 46.3% 0.01 0.08 -0.01 
Note: aW and aR are in (real) billions of Euros. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 aW is the adjusted wage bill and aR is the adjusted gross operating surplus at constant prices. The adjustment refers 
to the self-employed workers whose income is included in the wage bill (this is done by assuming that the average 
wage of self-employed workers is equal to the one of employed workers).  
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Fig. 5.1: Percentage change in the adjusted wage bill and adjusted total profits from the 
previous decade 
 
5.3 The Bhaduri and Marglin model  
In this section, we present the main features of the closed economy model59 developed by Bhaduri 
and Marglin (1990). Their aim was to develop a Keynesian framework of analysis in which 
aggregate demand was expressed as a function of the functional distribution of income. They do 
this by presenting both the saving and investment functions as depending from the profit share and 
then equating them to find the IS curve.  
We denote output by Y and potential output by Y*. The profit rate (r) is defined as the ratio of total 
profit (R) over capital stock (K). By multiplying by Y/Y and Y*/Y*, this can be rearranged into the 
product of profit share (h = R/Y), capacity utilization (z = Y/Y*) and the inverse of capital/output 
ratio at full capacity (v-1 = Y*/K) 
 
𝑟 =
𝑅
𝐾
=
𝑅
𝑌
𝑌
𝑌∗
𝑌∗
𝐾
= ℎ𝑧𝑣−1 
 
(1) 
Since there are only two social classes in the model and workers are assumed to consume all their 
income, savings (S) are simply equal to a proportion (s) of total profits. Therefore, using the 
                                                          
59 In the original article, the authors extend these results to an open economy by expressing the profit share as a 
function of the exchange rate and adding export and import to equation 4. The conclusion are similar to the closed 
economy model and for the purpose of this study, the closed economy model is sufficient to highlight the relationship 
between the main variables.  
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decomposition of the profit rate and normalising by the potential level of output to one, savings 
can be rearranged as the product of saving rate, profit share and level of capacity utilization. 
 𝑆 = 𝑠𝑅 = 𝑠
𝑅
𝑌
𝑌
𝑌∗
𝑌∗ = 𝑠ℎ𝑧. (2) 
Moreover, assuming constant capital productivity (a-1), investment (I) is a function of the profit 
rate that in the short run depends on the profit share and capacity utilization 
 𝐼 = 𝐼(ℎ; 𝑧).   (3) 
Therefore, by equating saving and investment, S=I, we obtain 
 𝑠ℎ𝑧 = 𝐼(ℎ; 𝑧). (4) 
By taking the total derivative and rearranging terms60, we get the slope of the IS function in the 
(z,h) space  
 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
=
(𝐼ℎ − 𝑠𝑧)
(𝑠ℎ − 𝐼𝑧)
, (5) 
With Ih = ∂I/∂h, Iz = ∂I/∂z and . Hence, whether the profit share has a positive effect on capacity 
utilization depends on the sensitivity of investment to the profit share (Ih), the sensitivity of 
investment to capacity utilization (Iz), the saving rate and the level of profit share and capacity 
utilization. The slope of the IS determines whether the economy is in a Wage-led or profit-led 
regime. A negative slope indicates that the regime is Wage-led because a higher profit share is 
associated with a lower level of economic activity. Symmetrically, a positive slope indicates that 
the regime is profit-led because a higher profit share is associated with a higher level of economic 
activity.  
So far, we have formalised how the functional distribution of income affect aggregate demand and 
growth. The demand (IS) curve describes how the profit share influences aggregate demand. The 
distributive curve (DC) on the other hand, represents the other side of the coin: how growth affects 
the distribution of income between wage and profit earners. As in most post-Keynesian models 
described in Chapter 2, prices (p) are determined as a function of a mark-up (t) on wage cost 
𝑝 = (1 + 𝑡)𝑤𝑎                                                                     (6) 
                                                          
60 ds = 0 by assumption. This is realistic because from 1960 to 2008, in Italy, savings mostly remained within the 
0.20% - 0.25% of GDP interval.  
120 
 
Where 𝑤 is the nominal wage rate and 𝑎 is equal to the inverse of labour productivity. Moreover, 
in the chapter version of their model, Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) express the profit margin as a 
linear positive function of capacity utilization61 
𝑡 = 𝑡0 + 𝑏(𝑧) ,       𝑏
′(𝑢) > 0                                                         (7) 
Since - as shown in Section 2.4.2 - the profit share is a positive function of the profit margin, profit 
is also a positive function of capacity utilization.  
𝜋 =
𝑡(𝑢)
1 + 𝑡(𝑢)
                                                                     (8) 
The distributive curve therefore has, in this model, a positive slope in the  (h, z) space. 
Fig. 5.2: Non-linear IS curves in the (h, z) space 
 
Figure 5.2 shows two possible shapes of the IS curve. On the left, the curve is C shaped: for high 
levels of capacity utilization, the regime is profit-led while at low levels of capacity utilization 
(and demand) the regime becomes Wage-led. On the right, instead, the curve has an inverted U 
shape: when the profit share is low, the regime is profit-led while the economy becomes Wage-led 
when the profit share is high. In both cases, the non linear IS curve can intersect the distributive 
curve twice giving rise to two possible equilibrium points. 
As shown in Figure 5.3, a second possibility is that the shape of the IS curve changes with time 
rather than with the level of the profit share of capacity utilization. As we will discuss in the 
remainder of the chapter, if investment becomes less sensitive to the profit share (Ih falls) due to 
                                                          
61 The distributive curve does not need to be linear. Nikiforos and Foley (2012) for example allow the following 
a non-linear distributive curve  
𝑑𝜑
𝑑𝑧
= −
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𝜕𝑧
−
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝜑
−
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝜑
  in which 𝜑 and 𝑥 are the wage share and labour productivity 
respectively. 
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some institutional change - such as financialisation - the slope of the IS curve will tend to become 
negative (from IS1 to IS2). As we can see from Figure 5.3, if the distributive curve does not change 
a structural break will have an effect both on capacity utilization and the profit share. 
Fig. 5.3: IS curves in the (h, z) space 
 
We now explain under which conditions a profit or Wage-led regime can be cooperative. A Wage-
led regime is said to be cooperative if a decrease in the profit share is associated with an increase 
in the total level of profit caused by a larger increase in capacity utilization. Therefore, a Wage-
led regime is cooperative if the negative elasticity of capacity utilization respect to the profit share 
is larger than one  
−
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
ℎ
𝑧
> 1                                                                        (9) 
This is true when the following condition must hold 
ℎ𝐼ℎ < 𝑧𝐼𝑧                                                                       (10) 
Hence, a Wage-led regime is cooperative if the semi-elasticity of investment to the profit share is 
smaller than the semi-elasticity of investment to capacity utilization. 
On the other hand, a profit-led regime is cooperative if an increase in the profit share is 
accompanied by an increase in the wage bill caused by a large enough increase in employment.  
The wage bill (Ω) can be rearranged in order to be expressed as a function of the wage share (1-
h), the level of capacity utilization, the inverse of capital productivity and the capital stock  
𝛺 =
𝛺
𝑌
𝑌
𝑌∗
𝑌∗
𝐾
𝐾 = (1 − ℎ)𝑧𝑎−1𝐾                                                  (11) 
z 
h 
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(Profit-led) 
IS2 
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Therefore, a profit-led regime is cooperative if there is a positive relationship between the profit 
share and the wage bill, 
𝑑𝛺
𝑑ℎ
> 0. This is true when the following condition must hold 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
ℎ
𝑧
>
𝑅
𝛺
                                                                      (12) 
Hence, a profit-led regime is cooperative if the elasticity of capacity utilization with respect to the 
profit share is greater that the ratio between total profit and total wage bill. 
Independently from the form that the IS function takes, the main intuition of the framework 
proposed by Bhaduri and Marglin is that the curve can change over time depending on the 
conditions discussed above.  
Consequently, the model does not suggest specific policy implications but rather a policy 
methodology. In different times, depending on certain conditions, the economy might benefit from 
very different redistributive policies. In a profit-led situation, economic growth is not going to be 
stimulated by higher wages - that also represent higher costs for firms - just like in a Wage-led 
regime, wage moderation in favour of profits is not going to stimulate economic growth. Instead, 
what policy maker should do is, once understood in which regime their country is in, to find a way 
to transform the regime into a cooperative one. Independently whether it is a profit-led or a Wage-
led regime, cooperation guarantees stable growth and allows both classes to enjoy the fruits of 
economic growth. 
5.4 Our hypothesis: a slow change in regime 
5.4.1 Theoretical motivation 
Now that we have a described our theoretical reference we can present our hypothesis of a slow 
change in regime. Figure 5.4 shows the evolution of the profit share and a measure of capacity 
utilization (z* = Y/K) in Italy from 1960 to 200762. As we can see, capacity utilization initially 
increased and remained high until the 1980s when it started to fall slightly until it reached, in 2007, 
the same level from which it had started in 1960. The profit share, on the other hand, was initially 
relatively low (less than 35% of GDP) but from the beginning of the 1980s, it increased sharply to 
over 45% of GDP in 2007. 
We can represent evolution of capacity utilization and profit rate in the second half of the twenties 
century as a movement from point A to point B in the (h, z) space (Figure 5.5). While capacity 
utilization has a similar value at the beginning and at the end of the sample, the profit share 
                                                          
62 We will discuss this proxy for capacity utilization in more detail in Section 6. 
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increases greatly after the 1980s. Based on the Bhaduri and Marglin’s model, many explanations 
could depict the movement from point A to point B: a shift in both the distributive and the IS 
curve, a stable distributive cure and a non-linear IS curve or a non-linear IS curve and a stable 
distributive curve. Given the institutional changes that we will describe below, our hypothesis is 
that during the 1980s the distributive curve shifted rightwards (from DC1 to DC1) and the positive 
IS curve (IS1) rotated towards the right and became much flatter (IS2). In other words, the demand 
regime, which was initially strongly profit-led, became progressively less and less profit-led while 
exogenous factors changed the functional distribution of income in favour of profits. 
Fig. 5.4: Evolution of the adjusted total profit and adjusted capacity utilization (income capital 
ratio) from 1960 to 2007 
 
Fig. 5.5: Structural break and change in regime 
 
We believe that in the 1960s and in the 1970s the demand regime was cooperative and strongly 
profit-led. This is consistent with the stylised fact shown in Table 5.1. During the 1960s, the 
z z 
h h 
IS1 DC1 
DC2 
IS2 
A B B A 
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increase in the profit share was associated with very high growth rates of both the wage bill and 
total profits. Similarly in the 1970s, the profit squeeze, was associated with a fall of both the wage 
bill and total profits. Had the demand regime been Wage-led during the 1970s, the profit squeeze 
would have been accompanied by, at least, an increase in the growth rate of the wage bill. As we 
will substantiate in the next section however, from the 1980s the demand regime became less and 
less profit-led and therefore the regime became conflictual: the effect of growth caused by an 
increase in the profit share became too small to stimulate enough employment to raise the wage 
bill. We have identified three institutional factors that can explain this gradual change in the IS 
curve.  
First, financialisation weakened the responsiveness of investment to the profit share. It seems 
established in the literature (see for example, Stockhammer (2004), Dumenill and Levy (2004), 
Orhangazi (2008), Onaran et al (2011) and the previous chapter) that the (growing) rentier share 
of profits has a negative on investment because it diverts funds from production and therefore it 
decreases the sensitivity of investment to the overall profit share. As we show in Figure 5.6, while 
the value added of agriculture and industry decreased steadily (as a ratio to total value added), the 
value added of the monetary and financial intermediation sector increased from the beginning of 
the 1980s. The growing importance of financial markets in the Italian economy is also well 
described by the increased market capitalization. In 1988, the market capitalization of listed 
companies was about 15% of GDP while by 2007 it rose to 49% of GDP, an increase of about 
230%.  
Second, the other component of aggregate demand that is positively related to the profit share, net 
exports, played only a minor role in Italy in the last decades of the twentieth century. From 1970 
to 1992 (the year in which Italy left the European Monetary System and was able to devaluate the 
Lira) the contribution of net exports to growth was mostly negative or below 0.5%. Only from 
1993 until 1996 the net exports contribution to GDP increased to 4%. From 1997 (when Italy had 
to appreciate its currency in order to join the Euro system) to 2008, net exports has steadily 
decreased from about 3% to -1%. Many argue that, since the European countries carried out 
monetary integration before real economy integration, the least competitive countries were 
negatively affected by high exchange rates (Carlucci 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
Fig. 5.6: Value added of agriculture, industry and financial sector 
 
Note: the series are divided by total value added 
Third, while the profit share started to play an increasingly small role in determining aggregate 
demand through investment and net exports, the effect of wages of consumption probably did not 
decrease because of financialisation. As we have discussed in the second chapter, Lapavitsas 
(2011) and Lapavitsas and Powel (2013) point out that two of the main characteristics of 
financialisation are related to consumer debt. In fact, banks, rather than providing credit to firms, 
started to mediate the transactions on the financial markets and provide credits to households. 
Moreover, because of stagnating wages, workers are more active on the financial markets 
especially concerning borrowing63. Debt relaxes the constraint of current income on consumption 
and therefore decreases the elasticity of consumption with respect to wages. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the positive and significant effect on debt and consumption is confirmed 
empirically by Stockhammer and Wildauer (2015) for a panel of countries and Kim et al (2015) 
for the United States. Unlike in the United States and the United Kingdom however, Italian 
households did not use debt to finance their consumption expenditures – or at least not to the extent 
of those countries (Giraund et al. 2009). For this reason, Hein and Mundt (2012) classify the Italian 
economy, during the period 2000 - 2008, as “domestic-demand led”. According to their definition, 
in domestic-demand led countries while net exports negatively contributes to GDP growth, 
consumption is the component of demand that contributes the most to growth. However, unlike 
                                                          
63 Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), Barba and Pivetti (2009), Kim et al. (2014) and Stockhammer (2015) make similar 
points. 
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the “debt led” economies such as the United States and the United Kingdom in which consumption 
is financed by debt, consumption is financed mainly by income and therefore wages.  
To sum up, we support our hypothesis of a change in slope of the IS curve towards a less profit-
led (or more Wage-led) regime with three “institutional” arguments. Firstly, financialisation 
probably caused a fall in the elasticity of investment respect to the profit share. Secondly, the 
elasticity of consumption with respect to wages did not change much because Italian households 
did not increase much their use of credit instruments. Thirdly, the exchange rate agreements 
reduced the contribution of net exports to growth and therefore reduced the weight of the positive 
effect of the profit share on exports. 
Regarding the distributive curve, there are two main institutional changes that make its rightward 
shift plausible. The first, once more, is financialisation. Following Hein (2015), financialisation 
has an effect on the profit share because it has an effect on the sectoral composition of the economy 
and on the mark-up (t in equation 6). On the one hand, the sectoral composition of the economy 
has an impact on the profit share because there are certain sectors in which the profit margin is 
traditionally higher than in other sectors. It is not a coincidence that the increase in the finance 
sector and the decrease in agriculture and industry (Figure 5.6) is perfectly timed with the increase 
in the profit share shown in Figure 5.4: the profit margin is usually higher in the former sector 
compared to the latter two. On the other hand, financialisation influences the mark up. Firstly, the 
mark up is negatively related to the strength of trade unions which are traditionally weaker in the 
financial sector compared to the manufacturing and overall industry. Secondly, firms often 
consider interest payments and dividends as overhead costs. Since the profit share comprises both 
profits and overhead costs, an increase in the overhead cost, keeping the profit share constant, 
would decrease retained profits. Therefore firms, when facing high overheads costs, might be 
induced to increase the mark-up in order to keep profits constant. 
The second institutional change that can explain the shift in the distributive curve is the labour 
market deregulation. In spite of an increasing lack of internal and external demand, wage 
moderation has been a constant element of economic policies since the late 1980s (Acocella, 
2006). As an example, in July 1993, government, trade unions and the Italian chamber of 
commerce signed an agreement that set the rules for public and private employment contracts with 
the aim of controlling inflation in order to comply with the limits of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Moreover, it articulated three long term goals: the extension of social safety nets, the increase in 
the flexibility of work contracts and the implementation of policies in support of the production 
system such as R&D and infrastructures (Banca d’Italia, 1993). In the following years however, it 
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was mainly the second goal that was achieved by means of increasing the range of fix-term 
contracts (Acocella 2008). 
In our opinion therefore, financialisation and deregulation of the labour market are the exogenous 
factors that caused a shift towards the right of the distributive curve. In Figure 5.5, DC’s shift is 
parallel but it does not need to be: Our argument is not affected by a change in the slope of the 
distributive curve provided that it remains positive. 
5.4.2 Graphical analysis 
The two most common methods used to classify a growth regime are the single equation approach 
and the VAR approach. The former consists in estimating the effect of an increase in the profit 
share on each component of aggregate demand and summing them up. If the result is positive, the 
economy is profit-led, while if it is negative, the economy is said to be Wage-led64.  The main 
drawback of this method is that the result depends strongly on the magnitude of the individual 
estimated effects of distribution on the different components of aggregate demand, and not simply 
on their sign. Small changes in the estimated coefficients - that might happen using different data 
or a different econometric model - can very well lead to contrasting results. In contrast, the other 
estimation method - the VAR - overcomes both the above problem and possible endogeneity issues 
but it does not allow for the estimation of the individual effect of distribution on consumption, 
investment and net export65.  
Here we propose a graphical approach that should overcome the problem mentioned above for the 
single equation approach. Bhaduri and Marglin, in the short run, define a profit-led (wage-led) 
regime as one in which - keeping constant the productivity of capital and the saving rate - there is 
a positive (negative) relationship between capacity utilization and the profit share. Since the rate 
of capital utilization is an indicator of the level of demand66, if the profit share has a positive effect 
on demand, and hence the regime is profit-led, we should observe an increase in the rate of capital 
utilization. Consequently, if a positive relationship between capacity utilization and the profit share 
is detected, we can deduce that the regime is profit-led.  
                                                          
64 Representative “structural” studies are Bowles and Boyer (1995), Naastepad and Storm (2006), Stockhammer and 
Ederer (2008), Stockhammer et al. (2009), Onaran and Yenturk (2001), Hein and Vogel (2008, 2009) and Onaran and 
Galanis (2014).  
65 As already discussed in the second chapter, some of the studies that use the VAR approach are Stockhammer and 
Onaran (2004), Onaran and Stockhammer (2005 and 2007), Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) and Carvalho and Reza 
(2015). 
66 Capacity utilization is an indicator of demand because in order to cope with higher the demand, capital has to be 
use more intensively. 
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One technical difficulty however, is the lack of precise data on capacity utilisation. Hence, in the 
rest of the paper, we will use two proxies for capacity utilization: the income capital ratio (z*) and 
the acceleration of growth (z**). 
The first proxy, the ratio between income and capital, does not simply quantify how intensely 
capital is used but also how productive it is. This problem is partially mitigated by the Italian 
industrial structure. In fact, after the Second World War, Italy specialised its production in low 
technology and low capital intensity sectors populated mainly by small and medium sized 
enterprises (Carlucci 2008).  Moreover, capital utilization will mainly be used in differences and 
the change in productivity is unluckily to change significantly from one year to the other. As 
Onaran and Stockhammer (2005) acknowledge, the income capital ratio is a better proxy for 
capacity utilization compared to the growth rate. The main reason for which the growth rate is 
more commonly used is that data on the capital stock are not available for most countries. 
The second proxy (z**) is the change in the growth rate of GDP. The rationale behind this choice 
is that an acceleration of growth should be strongly related to an increase in the intensity with 
which capital is used. 
The bar graphs in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 depict the evolution of the responsiveness of capacity 
utilisation to the profit share. The average and median values of the ratio between the change in 
capacity utilization and the change in the profit share have been plotted in the graphs using, 
respectively, the first and second proxy for capacity utilization67.  
While changes in the profit share are positively associated with changes in capacity utilization in 
the first two decades, from the 1980s to 2007 the relationship becomes weaker and often negative. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that, while until the end of the 1970s, the regime was 
strongly profit-led, from the 1980s the regime became weakly profit-led and it is slowly becoming 
weakly Wage-led. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
67 In order to remove significant outliers, values that fell outside ten times the 95% confidence interval  have been 
excluded from the graph. 
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Fig. 5.7: Change of the responsiveness of capacity utilization to the profit share. z*=Y/K 
 
Fig. 5.8: Change of the responsiveness of capacity utilization to the profit share. z**=Δ(growth 
rate) 
 
5.5 Cooperative and conflictual demand regimes 
5.5.1 Regime shift: from cooperative to conflictual profit-led 
So far, we have made the case that the demand regime in Italy became progressively less profit-
led and less cooperative from the beginning of the 1980s. We now turn to the analysis of the 
conditions, as highlighted in the model, that would guarantee a cooperative regime and their 
evolution over time.  
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 The model predicts that, in the presence of a profit-led regime, condition (12) must hold in order 
to achieve a cooperative situation between workers and entrepreneurs 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
ℎ
𝑧
>
𝑅
𝛺
                                                                      (12) 
That is, the elasticity of capacity utilization with respect to the profit share has to be larger than 
the ratio between total profits and the wage bill. Hence, if the prediction of the model is accurate, 
we expect this condition to hold only until the end of the 1970s or the beginning of the following 
decade.  
5.5.1.1 The evolution of the total profit/total wage ratio 
Starting from the right hand side of the formula, we can notice, from Figure 5.9, that the ratio 
between total profits and wage bill (R/Ω) slightly decreased from 1960 to 1980 and rapidly 
increased afterwards. Hence, because R/Ω grew by 75% from 1980 to 2000 unless the elasticity 
of capacity utilisation with respect to the profit share increased substantially during the same years, 
it is reasonable to believe that the condition was not respected after the 1980s.    
Fig. 5.9: Evolution of the total profit/adjusted wage bill ratio (1960 – 2007) 
 
5.5.1.2 The evolution of the elasticity of capacity utilization respect to the profit share 
The first method that we use to investigate whether this elasticity changed over time and in which 
manner, is a test for structural change. In particular, we first split the sample into two periods and 
create a time dummy (i) that takes values of one in the first period and zero in the second. Secondly, 
we regress capacity utilization on the profit share interacted with the dummy and the profit share 
interacted with one minus the dummy.  
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𝑧 = β
1
h ∗ i +  β
2
h ∗ (1 − i) +  ε                                                  (13) 
The two coefficients represent the effects of the profit share on the capacity utilization in the first 
and second period respectively. Since we are arguing that the regime in the second period is less 
profit-led that in the first period, we expect β
1
 to be significant and positive and β
2
 to be smaller 
than β
1
 and possibly non significant. The final step is to test whether the coefficients for the two 
different periods are statistically different from each other; we do this using an F test and the 
following null hypothesis: H0: β
1
= β
2
 
To estimate the relationship between capacity utilization and the profit share we have to address 
first the problem of endogeneity. Since these two variables have feedback effects on each other, 
i.e., both the demand curve and the distributive curve exist, we will use a Two Stages Least Squares 
(TSLS) with the lag of an adjusted measure of unemployment as an instrument for the profit share. 
Past unemployment is strongly positively correlated with the profit share both before and after the 
1980s68 and it explains about 30% of its variation. The main limitation of unemployment as an IV 
is that, as shown the Appendix69, it can very well be correlated with past levels of capacity 
utilization. If we were to use the lagged value of unemployment as an IV for the profit share, our 
regressor would not be strictly exogenous. For this reason rather than using unemployment as an 
instrument, we use the residual of the regression of unemployment on past and present capacity 
utilization. Hence, the instrument for the profit share is all the variation in unemployment that is 
not explained by changes in past levels of capacity utilization. Moreover, the Hausman test for 
endogeneity rejected the hypothesis of an omitted variable bias70. Once endogeneity is removed 
from the regression, β
1
 and β
2
 represent the effect of a change on the profit share on capacity 
utilization and therefore they are the slope of the IS curve in the first and in the second period 
respectively. Regarding the distributive curve we are implying a negative slope, because, since 
unemployment is positively correlated with capacity utilization but negatively correlated with the 
profit share, there is a negative causal relationship between capacity utilization and the profit share. 
This is different from the CD curve specified in the model and depicted in Figure 5.5 but it does 
not change the argument of the chapter as long as our assumption about its shift is correct. 
The specifications are designed using the specific to general approach and they are dynamically 
complete (Wooldridge, 2009). Moreover, each regression successfully passed the tests for 
                                                          
68 There is more than one explanation for this correlation. For example, more employment in one year could be 
associated with a lower profit share in the following year either because labour becomes a more scarce recourse or 
because lower unemployment increases the contractual power of workers.  
69 A more detailed discussion of endogeneity and the validity of the instrument can be found in the Appendix. 
70 The test always rejects the hypothesis of an omitted variable bias except in equation 4 but the bias would occur only 
before 1980. 
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heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, misspecification and normality of the error term. Finally, 
throughout this section, the profit share and the income capital ratio are expressed in logarithmic 
form and in first difference, in order to remove the unit root present in the series. The second proxy 
for capacity utilization instead, the acceleration of growth, is used in levels as it is already 
stationary.  
Regarding the structural change, we know that the change in the regime from cooperative to 
conflictual happened during the 1980s but it is likely that it did not happen in a single year. Hence, 
for each proxy we test the magnitude of the coefficient before and after 1985 (equation (a) and (c) 
and before and after the 1980s (equations (b) and (d)).  
a) ∆log(𝑧∗) = c + ∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)𝑖60−84 + ∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)(1 − 𝑖60−84) 
b) ∆log(𝑧∗) = c + ∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)𝑖60−79 + ∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)(1 − 𝑖60−79) 
c) 𝑧∗∗ = c + ∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)𝑖60−84 + ∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)(1 − 𝑖60−84) + 𝑧
∗∗
𝑡−1 
d) 𝑧∗∗ = c + ∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)𝑖60−79 + ∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)(1 − 𝑖60−79) + 𝑧
∗∗
𝑡−1 + 𝑧
∗∗
𝑡−2 
 
The results in Table 5.2 indicate that the magnitude of the elasticity of capacity utilization with 
respect to the profit share is always larger in the first part of the sample independently from the 
proxy used to account for capacity utilization and the breakpoint year. The coefficient of 
∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)i is always greater than the coefficient of ∆log (ℎ𝐼𝑉)(1- i). In particular, the magnitude of 
the elasticity in the first period - that is always statistically significant at 1% - fluctuates from 0.495 
to 0.717. In the second period, instead, the elasticity is strongly non significant, except in equation 
3, and its magnitude oscillate between -0.181 and 0.441. In conclusion, the average value of the 
coefficient in the second period is at least half the magnitude compared to the coefficient in the 
first period71 in equations (1), (2) and (3) and about one third smaller in equation (3). The positive 
and significant coefficient (slope) of the IS curve in the first period indicates that the regime was 
profit-led. In the second period instead, the smaller coefficient - which is statistically non-
distinguishable from zero - indicates that the IS curve became flat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71 Note that the p-value is unsurprisingly high given the exceptionally small sample size and the use of instrumental 
variables that increases the variance of the estimator.   
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Table 5.2: Regression output: the elasticity of capacity utilization with respect to the profit share 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
VARIABLES Δlog(z*) Δlog(z*) z** z** 
     
c -0.002 0.001 -0.005* -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Δlog(ℎ𝐼𝑉)i60-84 0.505***  0.705***  
 (0.108)  (0.118)  
Δlog(ℎ𝐼𝑉)(1 - i60-84) 0.209  0.441*  
 (0.230)  (0.242)  
Δlog(ℎ𝐼𝑉)i60-79  0.495***  0.717*** 
  (0.0988)  (0.113) 
Δlog(ℎ𝐼𝑉)(1 - i60-79)  -0.181  0.315 
  (0.296)  (0.293) 
z**t-1   -0.456*** -0.495*** 
   (0.106) (0.112) 
z**t-2   -0.267** -0.272** 
   (0.108) (0.113) 
     
Time period 1960-2007 
1960-1979 
1990-2007 
1960-2007 
1960-1979 
1990-2007 
R2 0.351 0.441 0.640 0.726 
H0: (ĥ*i) = ĥ*(1-i) 0.251 0.0405 0.332 0.214 
Note: i60-84 = 1 ∀ year<1985 and i60-84 = 0 ∀ year>1984. i60-79 = 1 ∀ year<1980 and i60-79 = 0 ∀ 
year>1979. z* = ∆ln(Y/K) and z** = ∆[∆ln(Y)]. Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1) 
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The test however (last line in Table 5.2) rejects the equality of the coefficients only in regression 
(b). Hence as a robustness check, we employ the Chow breakpoint test on the following IV 
estimation72 
e) ∆log(𝑧∗) = −0.004∗ + 0.56∗∗∗∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉) +  0.27
∗∆log(𝑧∗𝑡−1) 
f) 𝑧∗∗ = −0.006∗∗ + 0.67∗∗∗∆log(ℎ𝐼𝑉)  − 0.52
∗∗∗𝑧∗∗𝑡−1 − 0.24
∗∗𝑧∗∗𝑡−2 
For both equations (e) and (d), the test rejects at 1% the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
profit share was the same before and after 1985. 
The second method used to check the evolution of the elasticity between capacity utilisation and 
profit share is a rolling correlation analysis. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show the evolution of the 
correlation coefficient calculated using a rolling fifteen year window. The horizontal axis indicates 
the last year of the window, so that the first point in 1975 represents the correlation coefficient 
calculated for the interval 1960-1975. 
The results are consistent with the structural break analysis. Independently from the proxy used, 
the correlation is high in the first part of the sample and drops in the second half. In particular, it 
is possible to notice that the correlation coefficient starts to decrease from the subsamples that 
begin in the late 1970s and finish in the early 1990s. 
Fig. 5.10: Coefficients of the rolling correlation, with a 15 years window, between Δz* and Δh 
 
 
 
                                                          
72 Both specifications are dynamically complete and have been tested for autocorrelations, heteroskedasticity and 
normality of the error term. The instrument for the profit share is the same as in the previous specifications. 
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Fig. 5.11: Coefficients of the rolling correlation, with a 15 years window, between z** and Δh 
 
In Table 5.3, we compute equation (12) using the elasticities estimated in regressions (a), (b), (c) 
and (d). the condition necessary to achieve cooperation holds only in the first part of the sample. 
In fact, in the upper half of Table 5.3, the elasticity of capacity utilization respect to the profit share 
(third column) is always larger than the (average) ratio between total profit and the wage bill 
(fourth column) - except equation (b) in which they are equal. The opposite is true in the second 
part of the sample (bottom half of Table 5.3).  
The results in Table 5.3 are confirmed by Table 5.4 in which we compute equation (12) using the 
average coefficients of the rolling correlation analysis. In the upper part of the table, 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
ℎ
𝑧
 is 
calculated as the average of the correlation coefficients estimated with the sub-samples whose final 
year was between 1975 and 1990. Giving that the rolling window is 15 years, the initial year of 
the sub-sample that finishes in 1975 is 1960 while the initial year of the sub-sample that finishes 
in 1990 is 1975. Similarly, the bottom half of Table 5.4 shows the average correlation estimated 
in with the sub-samples whose final year was between 1991 and 2008. As we can notice from 
column 4, also in this case the condition for cooperation holds only the first part of the sample.  
Overall, therefore, the evidence supports our hypothesis based on the Bhaduri and Marglin’s 
model: the demand regime was initially strongly profit-led and cooperative until the beginning of 
the1980s and weakly profit-led (or Wage-led) and conflictual in the last part of the sample. 
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Table 5.3: Estimated cooperative and conflictual regimes (from 2SLQ) 
Time period Regression 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
ℎ
𝑧
 
𝑅
𝛺
 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
ℎ
𝑧
>
𝑅
𝛺
 
1960 - 1984 
(a) 0.505 
0.496 
 
(b) 0.495 = 
1960 - 1979 
(c) 0.705 
0.495 
 
(d) 0.717  
1985 - 2007 
(a) 0.209 
0.743 
 
(b) -0.181  
1990 - 2007 
(c) 0.441 
0.794 
 
(d) 0.313  
Note: In column 4, we report the average value of  
𝑅
𝛺
 in each period 
Table 5.4: Estimated cooperative and conflictual regimes (from rolling correlation) 
Final year Regression 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
ℎ
𝑧
 
𝑅
𝛺
 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑ℎ
ℎ
𝑧
>
𝑅
𝛺
 
1975 – 1990 
(Figure 5.10) 0.811 0.496  
(Figure 5.11) 0.718 0.495  
1991 - 2008 
(Figure 5.10) 0.487 0.743  
(Figure 5.10) 0.501 0.794  
Note: In column 4, we report the average value of  
𝑅
𝛺
 in each period 
5.5.2 Robustness check: from cooperative profit-led to conflictual wage-led 
The empirical evidence shown so far in Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.10 and 5.11 and in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
support the our hypothesis of an initial profit-led regime which is becoming less and less profit-
led. While it is apparent that the slope of the IS curve became almost flat, there are some signals 
that open to the possibility that the slope was slightly negative in the last few decades of the sample. 
In Figures 5.7 and 5.8 for example, some of the final columns are negative which indicate a slightly 
negative relationship between the profit share and capacity utilization at the end of the sample. 
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Similarly, in regression (b) the effect of the profit share on capacity utilization becomes negative 
(-0.181) - even though it is not statistically significant - in the second part of the sample.  
The condition necessary to achieve a cooperative regime however, changes depending on the type 
of regime. If the demand regime was Wage-led in the second part of the sample, the model predicts 
that a the regime is cooperative if condition (10) holds 
ℎ𝐼ℎ < 𝑧𝐼𝑧                                                                       (10) 
That is, the product of the profit share and sensitivity of investment to the profit share has to be 
smaller than the product of capacity utilization and the sensitivity of investment to capacity 
utilization. If the prediction of the model is accurate, we expect this not to hold from the 1980s.  
In what follows, similarly to what we did in Section 5.5.1, we will estimate equation (10) but only 
for the period 1985 - 2007. Before, since the regime was surely profit-led, the condition that had 
to hold in order to achieve a cooperative regime was represented by equation (12). 
5.5.2.1 The evolution of the profit share and capacity utilization 
Figure 4.4 showed the evolution of capacity utilization and the profit share. While the share of 
income allocated to the entrepreneurs rose greatly from 1980 until the beginning of the new 
millennium, the capital income ratio (z*) decreased from the 1980s. In particular, it is worth 
pointing out that the Italian profit share of income rose by 40% from 1980 to 2000. Hence, we can 
conclude that unless, during the same years, Ih decreased substantially and Iz increased, the 
condition necessary to have a cooperative regime probably did not hold in the last part of the 
sample.  
5.5.2.2 The evolution of the elasticity of investment respect to capacity utilization and profit 
share 
In order to estimate the sensitivity of investment to the profit share and capacity utilization, we 
cannot employ a 2SLQ method as in section 5.5.1.2 because we could not find an appropriate 
instrument for capacity utilization. Even though most of the empirical papers referenced above 
(including the previous two chapters) do not take into account the endogeneity problem in the 
investment function, it seems reasonable that both capacity utilization and profit share are affected 
by past levels of investment. For this reason, using z* as proxy for capacity utilization we estimate 
the investment function after 1985 with a Structural Vector Autoregressive model. Given the 
exceptionally small sample, each variable is a function of only one lag of the other dependant 
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variables73 as in specification (g). The SVAR was successfully tested for autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, normality of the residual and system stability. 
g) {
∆log(I) = ∆log(It−1) + ∆log(zt−1) +  ∆log(ht−1) + d93
∆log(z) = ∆log(It−1) + ∆log(zt−1) +  ∆log(ht−1) + d93
∆log(h) = ∆log(It−1) + ∆log(zt−1) + ∆log(ht−1) + d93
 
The advantage of a Structural VAR compared to a simple VAR is that the former allows to impose 
restrictions on the contemporaneous relationships between variables according to economic 
theory. In particular, we use the following matrix, B, to model the contemporaneous effects 
between our dependent variables (vector y). 
h) 𝑦 = |
𝐼
𝑧
ℎ
| ;  𝐵 = |
𝑏11 0 0
𝑏21 𝑏22 𝑏23
0 0 𝑏33
| 
b11, b21, b22, b23, b33 are the contemporaneous effects that are estimated in the system while the 
zeros are the restrictions that we have imposed on the system. At time t, it is imposed that capacity 
utilization and the profit share do not have an effect on investment because it can take time for 
firm to react to changes in demand and profitability. Moreover, there can be a lag between 
investment decision and spending. Capacity utilization instead is contemporaneously affected by 
investment - new capital immediately lowers capacity utilization – and by the profit share, because, 
as shown in Table 5.3, the distribution of income has a rapid effect on capacity utilization through 
changes in demand. In the third row, it is imposed that neither investment nor capacity utilization 
has a contemporaneous effect on the profit share since, as discussed above and in Appendix C, 
there is a lag with which unemployment respond to changes in capacity utilization and growth and 
there is a further lag with which unemployment affect the profit share. This restrictions are similar 
to those imposed in Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) and Onaran and Stockhammer (2005) even 
though there is a difference in the definition of some of the variables.  
As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis using the following matrix to model the effects 
between variables. The only difference with matrix B in (h) is that, as it is normally the case in the 
estimations of the investment function, we allow for a contemporaneous effect of the profit share 
on investment. Naturally we expect 𝑏13 to be positively related to invesment 
                                                          
73  A time dummy for 1993 is added as exogenous variables in the regression because 1993 is an outlier in the 
relationship between profit share and investment.   
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i)  𝑦 = |
𝐼
𝑧
ℎ
| ;  𝐵 = |
𝑏11 0 𝑏13
𝑏21 𝑏22 𝑏23
0 0 𝑏33
| 
As we can see from Figures 5.12 to 5.13, the response of investment to changes in capacity 
utilization and the profit share74 does not change when we use restrictions in (i) instead of those in 
(g). However, both the response of investment to a shock in profit (Ih) and response of investment 
to a shock in capacity utilizations (Iz) are very small and equal to about 0.1 and 0.06 respectively. 
Fig. 5.12: Response of Δlog(I) to one standard deviation innovation in Δlog(z*) and in Δlog(h), 
Using (h)  
 
Fig. 5.13: Response of Δlog(I) to one standard deviation innovation in Δlog(z*) and in Δlog(h), 
Using (i) 
 
                                                          
74 Even though the confidence interval are not shown in the graph, the impulse response of investment to capacity 
utilization and the profit share is almost always non statistically significant. This is not surprising given the small 
sample size and it does not affect the results of our analysis that focuses on how the response of investment, on 
average, changed before and after 1985. 
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As a robustness check, we also employ rolling regressions to analyse the evolution of the 
investment function. Regression (j) was estimated using fifteen and twenty years rolling windows 
(starting from 1975). 
j) ∆log(I) = c + ∆log(ℎ) + ∆log(𝑧∗) + y93 
Given the small sample size in each regression, we simply estimate the static equation without 
taking into account, in this case, the problem of endogeneity. Figures 5.14 and 5.15 report the 
evolution of the coefficients75. The sensitivity of investment respect to the profit share (the darker 
line in the graphs) has always a negative slope. This is consistent our story: Financialisation 
decreased the positive effect of profits on investment making the demand regime less profit-led. 
Similarly, the sensitivity of investment with respect to capacity utilization (the light grey line in 
the graphs) even though it is always larger than the sensitivity of investment to the profit share, 
follows a negative path.  
Fig. 5.14: Rolling regression: 15 years window and Proxy I 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75 To keep the graph tidy, the confidence intervals are not reported. However, the effect of capacity utilization on 
investment is always statistically significant independently from the proxy and window used while, the coefficient 
measuring the effect of the profit share is mostly not significant.  
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Fig. 5.15: Rolling regression: 20 years window and Proxy I 
 
The results of the SVAR and of the rolling regression analysis are substantially different from each 
other. In Table 5.15, we summarize them and we calculate condition (10). As we can see, the 
results of the SVAR are consistent with our expectations: the demand regime is conflictual from 
the 1980s because condition (10) does not hold. On the other hand, when we use the average 
coefficient resulting from the rolling regressions, the condition does not hold and it would appear 
that the regime is cooperative. In this case, therefore, our results are inconclusive and seem to be 
dependent on the estimation technique used to calculate Ih and Iz.  
The results in the bottom half of Table 5.5 that imply a cooperative regime from the 1980s are 
inconsistent with both the stylised facts shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 and the empirical results 
shown in Table 2. On the one hand, Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show how in the 1980s and in the 
1990s the growth rate of the wage bill decreased while the growth rate of total profits increases. 
Had the regime been cooperative the two growth rate should have moved in the same direction. 
On the other hand, the results in Table 5.2 show that in the second period, the IS curve became 
flat. Therefore, if in this second period the regime was Wage-led, it was only weakly so. In order 
to have cooperation, however, the regime should have been strongly Wage-led because an increase 
in the wage share should have increased growth and capacity utilization enough to allow for an 
increase in the level of profits as well as wages. Probably a sample size of only fifteen or twenty 
years is too small to have a meaningful estimation of the investment function. Nevertheless the 
direction of the estimated coefficients do make sense as the elasticity of investment with respect 
to the profit share is decreasing over time as predicted. 
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Table 5.5: Estimated cooperative and conflictual regimes 
Time period Regression Ih h Iz z 
h(Ih) < 
z(Iz) 
1985 - 2007 
SVAR (h) 0.01 
0.424 
0.006 
0.342 
 
SVAR (i) 0.009 0.006  
1980 - 2007 
(Figure 
5.14) 
0.347 
0.407 
2.197 
0.343 
 
(Figure 
5.15) 
0.500 2.336  
Note: Ih and Iz in the upper half of the table are the value of the impulse responde 
function in the period after the shock (t+1). Ih and Iz in the bottom half of the table are 
the average coefficient of the rolling regressions. The values of h and z are the average 
values in each period 
5.6 Comparison with the literature 
To our knowledge the only studies that estimated the demand regime in Italy are Naastepad & 
Storm (2007) and Onaran and Galanis (2014). They both find, using the single equation approach 
that the regime is weakly Wage-led from 1960 to the early 2000s. The difference between our 
results and their results is discouraging but not surprising. Regarding the United States, for 
example, most of the studies that estimated the demand regime using a single equation approach, 
including Chapter 3, found a Wage-led demand regime76. In contrast, the studies that take into 
account endogeneity, by using either a VAR (Barbosa-Filho and Taylor 2006, de Carvalho and 
Rezai, 2015) or a 2SLT (Nikiforos and Foley, 2012) method find that the demand regime is profit-
led. We are not suggesting that one technique is better than the other is but, it would be interesting 
from a methodological point of view to investigate whether even in other countries the results 
about the demand regime are sensitive to the econometric technique used in the analysis. If this 
were to be true for other countries, and become a regularity, it would undermine the credibility of 
the studies. 
Regarding the structural break analysis, other studies tried to explain changes in equilibrium point 
in the (z h) space but they argued in favour of either a non-linear IS curve of a non-linear 
                                                          
76 Bowles and Boyer (1995), Hein and Vogel (2008), Onaran et al (2011), Onaran and Galanis (2014), Stockhammer 
and Wildauer (2015), find that the United States in the second half of the twentieth century, was characterised by a 
Wage-led regime. Only Naastepad and Storm (2006) found evidence of a profit-led regime. 
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distributive curve. On the one hand, Carvalho and Rezai (2015) extend the linear analysis by 
proposing a non-linear IS curve. They argue that when personal income distribution increases 
among wage earners the propensity to save out of wages increases and, therefore, an increase in 
the wage share has a smaller effect on consumption. When personal income inequality increase the 
demand regime becomes less Wage-led (or more profit-led). On the other hand, Nikiforos and 
Foley, 2012 include in their analysis a non-linear distributive curve. They argue that during the 
business cycle, when capacity utilization is low it is negatively associated with the wage share 
because, due to fixed costs, an increase in capacity has a stronger positive effect on productivity 
rather than on wages. At high levels of utilization when fixed costs are a smaller share of total 
costs, productivity gains decrease and the positive effect of higher capacity on wages - though 
higher bargaining power - prevails. Tavani et al (2011) make a similar argument about the 
distributive curve but they base their reasoning on the fact that the wage bargaining power of 
workers increases (decreases) more than proportionally when unemployment increases (decreases). 
 From an empirical point of view, Stockhammer et al (2011), test the hypothesis that globalization 
is changing the demand regime in Germany from Wage-led to profit-led. The reason is that 
globalization increases the relative weight of trade on GDP. Therefore, since net exports is 
supposed to be positively related to the profit share, the whole regime should become more profit-
led. Using a single equation method, they estimate the investment and the net exports functions 
divided into two sub periods 1970-1987 and 1987-2005. However, they do not find evidence of a 
regime switch. Using a Threshold VAR approach instead, Carvalho and Rezai (2015) find that that 
the demand regime in the United States became more profit-led during the 1980s. This was caused 
by the high levels of personal income inequality that were reached in the United States after 1981. 
5.7 Conclusions  
This Chapter showed that the Bhaduri and Marglin model is a useful tool in explaining the stylised 
facts about the relationship between functional distribution of income and growth in the second 
part of the twentieth century in Italy. In particular, we have looked at two of the main 
characteristics of the model that have been predominantly overlooked by the empirical literature: 
the possibility of a demand regime switch and the distinction between cooperative and conflictual 
demand regimes. 
Our hypothesis - based on the stylised facts discussed in Section 5.4 and shown in Figures 5.1, 5.4, 
5.7 and 5.8 and in Table 5.1- was that in the 1960s and in the 1970s, the demand regime was 
strongly profit-led and cooperative. An increase in the profit share was able to stimulate enough 
growth, and consequently employment, that the wage bill rose together with the total level of 
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profits in spite of the fall in the wage share. During the 1980s, two processes took place that 
affected the relationship between distribution and growth. The demand regime became less and 
less profit-led because of the negative effect of financialisation on the responsiveness of 
investment to the profit share and because of the negative effect of the exchange rate agreements 
on the contribution of net exports to growth. At the same time, financialisation and the deregulation 
of the labour market caused an exogenous increase in the profit share, shifting the distributional 
curve towards the right.  
To our knowledge this is the first study that looks at the dynamics between cooperative and 
conflictual growth regimes and the second that examines the possibility that changes in the growth 
regimes are caused by a structural break - even though it is the first that actually finds evidence of 
it. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous section, Stockhammer et al (2011) do not find empirical 
evidence of a regime switch in Germany. So far, the most common cause for a change in the 
growth regime was identified in the non-linearity of either the IS or the distributive curve (Barbosa-
Filho and Taylor 2006, de Carvalho and Rezai, 2015, Nikiforos and Foley 2012). A second element 
of novelty of the analysis carried out in this chapter is the identification of financialization as one 
of the main underlining causes of the change in the growth regime. 
The empirical analysis supports our hypothesis and confirms that the Bhaduri and Marglin model 
is still a relevant theoretical framework. Firstly, we showed using a 2SLQ estimation that the effect 
of capacity utilization is positive in the first part of the sample and becomes less positive (or 
negative) and non-statistically significant in the second part. If our instrumental variable method 
is valid, these results describe a rotation of the IS curve rather than of the distributional curve. In 
fact, since we removed endogeneity trough the use of instrumental variables, the coefficients in 
Table 5.2 describe the causal effect from the profit share to capacity utilization: the slope of the IS 
curve. At the same time, as discussed in Section 5.5.1.2 and in Appendix B, we have found 
evidence of a negative (lagged) effect of capacity utilization on the profit share through 
employment: The DC curve could be negative and not positive as assumed in the model. We do 
not estimate the slope of the DC curve because we could not find a reasonable instrument for 
capacity utilization. The validity of our story, however, does not depend on the slope of the DC 
curve but, rather, on its rightward shift. In our opinion, it seems hard to defend that the exogenous 
shift in the distribution of income, as argued in Section 5.5.1.2, did not happen. Secondly, the 
empirical analysis showed that the condition that has to hold in a profit-led demand regime in order 
to achieve cooperation only holds in the first part of the sample until the middle of the 1980s.  
The implication of our analysis is that, if the IS curve keeps rotating towards the right, the Italian 
demand regime could soon become, if it already is not, Wage-led. Unfortunately, since changes in 
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the regime are slow, initially it will be a weakly Wage-led regime and therefore it will not be 
possible to achieve cooperation. Therefore, economic policies should try to strengthen the effect 
of wages on growth. Since, as discussed in the previous chapters, the wage share has its largest 
positive effect on consumption, policies should try to increase it rather than watering it down. One 
way of doing this is by incentivising households not to relay on consumer debt to finance 
consumption, because consumer debt weakens the elasticity of consumption respect to wages, at 
least in the short run. Furthermore, redistributive policies should target the workers at the lower 
end of the distributive scale, as they should have the highest propensity to consume: the positive 
effect on consumption would be higher and the regime would become more Wage-led. 
Graphically, assuming that the distributive curve does not shift further, if the IS curve keeps 
rotating (IS3) the Italian economy will reach point C which implies a higher profit share and a 
lower level of capacity utilization and growth. Other things being equal, in order to increase the 
growth rate, the government will have to implement policies that oppose the existing exogenous 
forces that are pushing the CD curve towards the right. Any policy that improves the distribution 
of income exogenously from capacity utilization will shift the DC curve towards the left and 
increase capacity utilization and growth. 
Fig. 5.16: Italian IS and DC curves in the (h, z) space 
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Appenidix A: Variables names, definitions and sources 
Table A5.1: Data sources and definition 
Variable Description Source Note 
Yn Gross domestic product at current market 
prices 
AMECO  
P Price deflator gross domestic product at 
market prices 
AMECO  
Y GDP, real (2005)  Y = Yn/p*100 
aWS Adjusted wage share: total economy: as 
percentage of GDP at current market 
prices 
AMECO  
aRS Adjusted Profit Share  aRS = 1 - 
aWS 
aW Adjusted wage bill  aW = Y*aWS 
aR Adjusted gross operating surplus  aR = Y*aRS 
I Investment, real (2005) AMECO  
K Net capital stock (2005) AMECO  
 Contribution of net exports to GDP OECD_Stats  
 Value added of agriculture ISTAT  
 Value added of industry ISTAT  
 Value added of the monetary and 
financial intermediation 
ISTAT  
 Market capitalization of listed companies Standard & Poor's, Global 
Stock Markets Factbook and 
supplemental S&P data 
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Appendix B: Capacity utilization and profit share, an endogenous relationship.  
Establishing a causal relationship between capacity utilization and the functional distribution of 
income it is not an easy task and there are reasons to believe that there are feedback effects going 
in both directions. The profit share has an effect on capacity utilization through changes in the 
aggregate demand (consumption, investment and net exports) and the sign of this relationship 
depends on whether the demand regime is wage or profit-led. On the other hand, capacity 
utilization could affect the distribution of income because of its effect on unemployment. In 
particular, we would expect that an increase in capacity utilization would increase employment 
and hence improve the wage bill and the bargain power of workers which would in turn reduce the 
profit share.  
In our view however, at least in Italy, the two variables influence each other with different time 
lags: while the effect of changes in income distribution on capacity utilization happens within one 
year, capacity utilization affects the distribution of income only with a time lag of one or two years. 
The following graphic analysis cannot be the proof of our hypothesis but it will show its 
plausibility.  
Figure B5.1 and B2 show that while the correlation of profit rate and capacity utilization, at time 
t, is positive; the profit share is negatively correlated with past values (t-1 and t-2) of capacity 
utilizations. Figure B5.3 and B5.4, on the other hand, illustrate the relationship between capacity 
utilization and the profit share at time t, t-1 and t-2. Also in this case there is a contemporaneous 
positive relationship between the two variables but the lag values of the profit share seem not to 
have any relationship with capacity utilization.  
From this, we can draw some conclusions. Firstly, we can rule out that past levels of profit share 
have any “meaningful” effect on present capacity utilization. Secondly, we can say that past values 
of capacity utilization have a negative effect on the present profit share. To support this finding, 
Figure B5.5 shows that, while the contemporaneous correlation between capacity utilization and 
unemployment is weak, the effect of capacity utilization on future unemployment is much 
stronger. Moreover, Figure B5.6 demonstrates that unemployment is positively correlated to the 
present profit share but the relationship becomes stronger and steeper when we consider future 
profit share.  
If our view is correct, the profit share is exogenous at time t respect to capacity utilization but not 
at time t+1.  This violates the strict exogeneity assumption which would result in biased 
coefficients. To solve this problem, we regress capacity utilization on the present value of the 
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profit share instrumented by the lagged residual of the regression of unemployment on present and 
past values of capacity utilization. Moreover, as in each regression line in Table 5.3, we have 
divided the profit share into two periods, we have instrumented the profit share in each period 
separately from the other in order to allow for the effect of unemployment on the profit share to 
change over time. Finally - in the first stage, when instrumenting the profit share - a time dummy 
for 1975 was added to the regression line if the proxy for capacity utilization was the capital 
income ratio and a time dummy for 1975 and 1975 was added when the proxy for capital utilization 
was the acceleration of growth. In particular, we suspect that 1975 is an outlier in the time series 
of ∆ln(z*) and 1975 and 1976 are both outliers in the series of z** because in both cases they fall 
outside eight times the 95% confidence interval. This does not come as a surprise because in those 
years the economic contraction caused by the first oil crisis hit Italy.  
Fig. B5.1: Profit share [Δlog(h)] VS present and past capacity utilization [Δlog(z*)]   
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Fig. B5.2: Profit share [Δlog(h)] VS present and past capacity utilization [z**]   
 
 
 
Fig. B5.3: Capacity utilization [Δlog(z*)] VS present and past profit share [Δlog(h)] 
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Fig. B5.4: Capacity utilization [z**] VS present and past profit share [Δln(h)] 
 
 
Fig. C5.5: Present and future unemployment [Δlog(U)] VS capacity utilization (both proxies) 
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Fig. C5.5: Present and future profit share [Δlog(h)] VS unemployment [Δlog(U)] 
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6 - Concluding remarks 
Since the 1980s, income inequality rose in most of the industrialised countries (Smeeding 2002, 
Picketty and Saez 2006 and Hein 2015). As high inequality is not a desirable characteristic of any 
society, it should be a priority of national governments as well as of the international community 
to implement policies designed to reduce it. In order to effectively solve a problem, it is important 
to know what its causes and its effects are. The aim of this thesis was precisely to study the effects 
of the rising trend in inequality on economic growth. In particular, we tried to answer the following 
three sets of empirical questions: 
A. Do changes in the distribution of income in a country have any impact on other 
countries’ economic growth?  If so, is this positive or negative? 
B. Do the effects of changes in the distribution of income on a country’s economic growth 
differ over the short and long-runs?  If so, in what ways do they differ, and what is the 
source of the difference? 
C. What factors can cause a change from a ‘co-operative’ to a ‘conflictual’ growth 
regime? What is the impact of this change? 
 In principle, we were agnostic about the results because we believe that excessive income 
inequality should be fought independently from its effects on growth. In other words, since 
inequality is undesirable for society, policies that allow inequality to grow in the hope of increasing 
economic growth should not be pursued even if inequality were to have a positive effect on growth. 
In this regard we embrace Pope Francis analysis: 
“Just as the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ sets a clear limit in order to safeguard 
the value of human life, today we also have to say ‘thou shalt not’ to an economy of 
exclusion and inequality. Such an economy kills. How can it be that it is not a news 
item when an elderly homeless person dies of exposure, but it is news when the stock 
market loses two points? This is a case of exclusion. Can we continue to stand by when 
food is thrown away while people are starving? This is a case of inequality. Today 
everything comes under the laws of competition and the survival of the fittest, where 
the powerful feed upon the powerless. As a consequence, masses of people find 
themselves excluded and marginalized: without work, without possibilities, without any 
means of escape. 
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Human beings are themselves considered consumer goods to be used and then 
discarded. We have created a ‘throw away’ culture which is now spreading. It is no 
longer simply about exploitation and oppression, but something new. Exclusion 
ultimately has to do with what it means to be a part of the society in which we live; 
those excluded are no longer society’s underside or its fringes or its disenfranchised – 
they are no longer even a part of it. The excluded are not the “exploited” but the 
outcast, the ‘leftovers’.” – Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium [53], (2013). 
Nevertheless, it is important to know if a positive effect of inequality on growth exists because 
policy makers need to know what they are giving up in order to improve income distribution. This 
thesis contributes to the existing literature by studying, the three sets of questions mentioned above 
which, to this date, have been explored only marginally. 
In Chapter 3, we studied the set of questions A on the effects of a change in inequality in one 
country on its trade partners. The estimation of the interactions between countries is a new element 
of the neo-Kaleckian research on growth regimes. To our knowledge in fact, it was examined only 
in the present thesis and by Onaran and Galanis (2014). Estimating the effects of a change in the 
functional distribution of income on other countries is particularly relevant at the present time as 
falling wage share and wage moderation are a global phenomenon that are hardly opposed by 
governments. This is because lower wages are associated with lower export prices and, therefore, 
have a positive effect on net-exports. There is, however, a fallacy of composition problem: not all 
countries can improve their balance of payments contemporaneously. When more countries pursue 
policies of wage moderation in order to boost exports, they should end up, at least up to a certain 
point, offsetting each other. The main contribution of this work to the neo-Kaleckian literature is 
the geographical change of focus of the empirical analysis. This is the first study that determines 
the growth regime of the member States of a trade agreement which also takes into account the 
interactions between them. There are three reasons for which we decided to study the growth 
regimes of individual countries within the same trade area. First, in order to achieve international 
coordination on wage policies it is necessary to show not only that an area as a whole does not 
benefit from the present trend of wage moderation but that the individual countries within that area 
could benefit from an increase in the wage share in the whole area. Second, it would be easier to 
implement a wage policy coordination between countries that are already part of some sort of 
political agreement. Third, countries that belong to the same trade area, trade greatly with each 
other and, therefore, the effect of a change in the distribution in one country on the others is large. 
In line with our expectations, the analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement from 1960 
to 2007 showed that the effect on exports, following a contemporaneous decrease in the wage 
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share in Mexico, Canada and the United States, is negative for all countries. The increase in exports 
that each country experienced because of a reduction in its wage share, is offset by a 
contemporaneous increase in competitiveness in the other two countries. Moreover, even though 
an increase in the profit share has an overall positive effect in Mexico and Canada and a negative 
effect only in the United States, NAFTA is overall wage-led: the profit share has a negative effect 
on aggregate demand. This is caused by the fact that the negative effect of the profit share in the 
United States is larger than the sum of its positive effects in Mexico and Canada.  A policy of wage 
coordination in NAFTA is, therefore, plausible if the US were to somehow compensate Mexico 
and Canada of their losses.  
In Chapter 4, we studied the set of questions B on the possibility that the effect of income 
distribution on economic growth changes from the short to the long run. On this regard, Blecker 
(2015) argues, without providing much empirical evidence, that, since consumption investment 
and net exports are all likely to be more wage led (or less profit led) in the long run, the overall 
growth regime is also more wage led in the long run compared to the short run. Our analysis is the 
first, to our knowledge, to test empirically Bleckers’ hypothesis even though, as discussed in the 
chapter, there are other studies that implicitly estimate long and short run effects of income 
distribution on the components of aggregate demand (Kim et al. 2015, Onaran et al 2011, 
Stockhammer and Wildauer 2015, Chiriko et al. 2011).  The results of our empirical investigation 
support Blecker’s hypothesis, at least for the United States over the period 1950-2014: the 
American growth regime is more wage led in the long run compared to the short run. The  
estimation of the consumption function revealed that the effect of wages on consumption increases 
more than proportionally compared to the effect of profits on consumption from the short to the 
long run. Moreover, consumer debt seems to have only a short-run effect on consumption 
indicating that in the long run, when debt has to be repaid, consumption depends more on the level 
of income and on how it is distributed rather than debt. With regard to the consumption function, 
an element of novelty of our study is the separate estimation of the determinants of goods 
consumption and service consumption. We found that consumption of both goods and services is 
more wage led in the short run compared to the long run. Turning to the estimation of the 
investment function, an innovation of our study compared to the rest of the related literature, is the 
separate estimation of residential investment and non-residential investment. We make the 
argument that these two components of overall capital formation could have very different 
determinants and therefore should be analysed separately. The results confirm both Bleckers’ 
hypothesis and our intuition on the different determinants of residential and non-residential 
investment. On the one hand, we found that the effect of capacity utilization on non-residential 
investment is always larger than the effect of the profit share and that the difference between the 
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two effects is higher in the long run than in the short run. This confirms the hypothesis that in the 
long run, unless there is an increase in demand, it is likely that firms are not going to increase 
investments even in the presence of high profits. In addition, the rentier share of profits – that 
comprises dividends and interest payments – has a long-run negative effect on investment. This 
result is usually used in the literature to show the negative effect of financialization on investment: 
rentiers divert firms’ profits from investment. Therefore, in the long run, the relationship between 
profits and non-residential investment is weakened and investment becomes less profit-led. On the 
other hand, our estimates of the residential investment function suggest that, especially in the long 
run, the main determinant of residential investment is the wage bill rather than the level of profits. 
Consequently, also residential investment is less profit led in the long run. From our analysis we 
can deduce that aggregate demand and the growth regime become less profit led in the long run 
because both consumption and investment react less to profits in the long run. 
Finally, Chapter 5 studies the set of questions C on the dynamics between cooperative and 
conflictual growth regimes. According to Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), a wage-led cooperative 
regime is one in which an increase in the wage share stimulates enough growth to allow for an 
increase in total profits, in spite of a decrease in the profit share. On the other hand, a profit led 
regime is cooperative if the increase in the profit share causes an increase in growth that is large 
enough to cause, in spite of a decrease in the wage share, an increase in the wage bill – through 
higher employment for example. Symmetrically, a conflictual regime is one in which an increase 
in the profit (wage) share does not stimulate the economy enough to allow the total level of wages 
(profits) to grow. Strangely, the distinction (and the dynamics) between cooperative and 
conflictual regimes have never been empirically studied before in spite the fact that this is one of 
the main features of Bhaduri and Marglin’s (1990) model. In this chapter, we tested the dynamics 
between cooperative and conflictual growth regime in Italy: our hypothesis is that the Italian 
demand regime is slowly turning from cooperative profit-led to conflictual wage-led. The 
institutional changes that - we argue - caused this regime switch are financialization and the 
European exchange rate agreements such as the European Monetary System and the Euro system. 
As discussed above, financialization weakens the relationship between profits and investment 
because it diverts profits from firms: investment become less profit led. At the same time, Italian 
exports - which have never been particularly competitive - suffered from the European exchange 
agreements because devaluations were no longer allowed. Therefore, the contribution of net 
exports to GDP growth fell and so did the relative weight of the positive effect of lower wages on 
exports. Finally, the relationship between consumption and wages was weakened only marginally 
by financialization because Italian households did not rely on debt to pay for consumption. The 
results of the analysis confirmed our hypothesis. During the 1960s and the 1970s, the demand 
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regime in Italy was cooperative and profit led: an increase in the profit share was accompanied by 
an increase in both the level of profits and the wage bill. From the 1980s, however, the effect of 
profits on aggregate demand weakened. Consequently, the increase in the profit share that 
happened from the 1980s did not manage to stimulate enough growth to allow for an increase in 
the wage bill together with the level of profits: the profit-led regime became conflictual. If the 
factors mentioned above continue reducing the effect of profits on aggregate demand, the growth 
regime will soon become wage-led. Our analysis proves that the change in the growth regime that 
happened in the 1980s was caused by a structural break that was itself caused by the institutional 
changes mentioned above. This interpretation is substantially different from the rest of the 
literature and in particular from the work of Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006), de Carvalho and 
Rezai (2015) and Nikiforos and Foley (2012). These authors, indeed, argue that if the effect of 
income distribution on growth changes, it is because the relationship between them is non-linear 
rather than because of institutional changes that cause structural breaks. Only Stockhammer et al 
(2011) try to find empirical evidence of a structural break in the growth regime in Germany but 
without success. 
The policy implications derived from our empirical work have been already discussed in Chapters 
3, 4 and 5. The following is a brief summary of the key (common) points. Firstly, as predicted by 
the neo-Kaleckian models, our results confirm that the effect of functional income distribution on 
growth differs across countries. Consequently, each country should be studied individually and an 
appropriate one size fits all policy to increase growth through changes in income distribution does 
not exist. Secondly, growth regime tends to become more wage-led both when many countries 
adopt a policy of wage moderation at the same time and when the long run is considered instead 
of the short run. These results are relevant because they imply that the effect of a pro-wage 
redistribution on growth becomes either more positive or less negative. In Chapter 5, we argued 
that, if financialization only weakens the effect of profit on investment, but it does not alter the 
effect of wages on consumption, the demand regime should become more wage-led. This has 
similar policy implications to the other two chapters. However, what if financialization also 
weakens the effect of wages on consumption as probably happened in the United States and the 
United Kingdom because of increased availability of consumer credit instruments? In that case, 
the effect of redistribution and growth would fade away, especially in the contest of a 
contemporaneous change in the wage share in other countries, as discussed in Chapter 3. This 
would still be good news for those who believe that high income inequality is damaging for society. 
In fact, it still drives policy makers into a corner. If they cannot use the negative effect of a pro-
wage redistribution on growth as an excuse not to implement redistributive policies, they will have 
to either implement the policy or to explain their reasons for not doing it: it would damage the rich 
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part of the population. Finally, independently from whether the demand regime in a country is 
wage led or profit led, a pro-wage redistribution should be done in favour of the families at the 
lower end of the wage scale. This would maximise the positive effect on consumption - because 
of their higher propensity to consume -and, if any, reduce the negative effect of redistribution on 
growth. 
To conclude, we would like to make a methodological consideration. We are aware that 
mainstream economists would by and large be sceptical that this thesis may be a meaningful 
contribution to the literature. They would reject both the methodological premises and the 
theoretical framework that was used to motivate the analysis. As discussed in the Introduction and 
in Chapter 2, the relationship between income inequality and growth was studied by different 
schools of thought which reached very different conclusions. The difference in conclusions reflects 
different analytical methods and theoretical assumptions which are at the heart of their respective 
economic doctrine. Once we chose the topic of investigation, we decided to study it from a post-
Keynesian point of view simply because, in our opinion, this approach is more convincing than its 
main competitors: the Neoclassical or the Marxist schools. There are three main features of the 
post-Keynesian approach that we find particularly appealing. From a methodological point of view, 
we believe that “organicism” is a more appropriate method compared to (the neoclassical) 
individualism. We find more reasonable to consider individuals as part of social entities and, 
therefore, stress the importance of social classes in our analysis rather than relying on micro 
foundation that are based on a utility maximising representative agent. Secondly, a feature that 
distinguishes the post-Keynesian school from both the Neoclassical and Marxist schools - and that 
we believe to be reasonable - is the principle of effective demand: In post-Keynesian models, 
growth is constrained by demand factors rather than by supply as it is in the Neoclassical or Marxist 
models described in Chapter 2. Therefore, supply adjusts to demand and not the other way around. 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, we find convincing the use of “historical” time as opposed to 
the Neoclassical “logical” time. Historical time implies that time is irreversible and a decision 
cannot simply be undone in the next period: a shock in one variable has an impact on other variables 
that does not simply disappear when the shock wears out. Consequently, the long run has to be 
understood as the outcome of a succession of short run positions. To use the words of Kalecki 
(1971): “The long run trend is but a slowly changing component of a chain of short period 
situations; it has no independent entity.” The economists that reject these premises will not regard 
this thesis as a useful contribution to the economic literature. The others, hopefully, will.  
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